The Early Church: A Historical Problem TULIP Cannot Ignore

All Calvinists, whether they be Presbyterian or Reformed, Primitive Baptist or Sovereign Grace Baptist; all Calvinists, whether they be premillennial or amillennial, dispensational or covenant theologist; all Calvinists, whether they go by the name or not; all Calvinists have one thing in common: God, by a sovereign, eternal decree, has determined before the foundation of the world who shall be saved and who shall be lost. To obscure the real issue, a vocabulary has been invented to confuse and confound the Christian. The arguments about supralapsarianism and infralapsarianism, total depravity and total inability, reprobation and preterition, synergism and monergism, free will and free agency, common grace and special grace, general calling and effectual calling, perseverance and preservation, and the sovereignty of God are all immaterial.

Laurence M. Vance, The Other Side of Calvinism (Pensacola, FL: Vance Publications, 1991), 35.

Is Calvinism the faith of the early church, handed down in an unbroken line from the apostles? This video looks at what the church fathers before Augustine actually taught about free will and grace.

It first gives the Reformed historical narrative its full weight: Augustine of Hippo, Calvin’s systematization, the Synod of Dort and the appeal to Romans 9 and Ephesians 1. It then asks what came before Augustine’s late anti-Pelagian writings. Justin Martyr, writing around 150 AD, held that divine foreknowledge is not causation. Irenaeus of Lyon, around 180 AD in Against Heresies, made human freedom central to his answer to the Gnostics and asked why the apostle gave counsel if choice was not real. Origen rejected Stoic determinism, with an honest note on his condemned ideas, and John Chrysostom read Matthew 23:37 as real grief over real unwillingness. The video credits Augustine’s insight that grace is wholly unmerited, explains how the Pelagian controversy narrowed the earlier consensus, and notes that the Eastern Church never followed him there. It closes with John Wesley, who read these fathers in Greek and Latin and saw himself as recovering an older stream. Why is this history so rarely taught?

THE QUESTION CALVINISM DOES NOT WANT TO ANSWER

Calvinism is often presented as the recovery of historic Christianity: the doctrines of grace, the faith of the Reformers, the theology of Augustine, and ultimately the teaching of the apostles. That is an impressive historical claim. It is also a claim that must be tested against the historical record—not protected from examination by invoking the authority of later theologians.

The question is not whether the early Christians were Arminians, Provisionists, or Traditional Baptists. Those labels belong to later controversies. The question is whether the Christians nearest to the apostles taught that human beings are responsible agents who can respond to God’s commands, resist His appeals, obey or disobey, and exercise genuine choice in matters of faith—or whether they taught the deterministic system now represented by TULIP.

Here, the disputed determinism concerns saving faith: whether an unconditional decree fixes who will receive effectual grace, whether that grace makes their response certain, and whether those passed over lack the ability to respond. The historical test is not whether the fathers used later theological labels, but whether their accounts of faith and human responsibility support those specific claims.

The evidence presents Calvinism with a serious problem. The earliest Christian writers repeatedly defend human freedom and moral responsibility against systems that made human destiny fixed by nature, fate, or an overriding necessity. Irenaeus is especially important. He was not a medieval critic of Calvinism. He was a second-century bishop who had heard Polycarp, who had known the Apostle John. His testimony stands near the very beginning of the post-apostolic record.

Any Calvinist claim to the early church as a historical inheritance must deal honestly with what these writers actually said. A historical argument cannot simply leap from Paul to Augustine and from Augustine to Calvin, then treat those connections as proof that the whole history of Christianity has always taught TULIP. That would be selective memory, not a demonstration of continuity. The claim must be tested against the intervening witnesses.

JOHN, POLYCARP, AND IRENAEUS: A WITNESS CLOSE TO THE APOSTLES

Irenaeus’s connection to the apostolic generation is not an invented chain of internet apologetics. In his letter to Florinus, preserved by Eusebius in Ecclesiastical History 5.20, Irenaeus recalls hearing Polycarp speak. He describes Polycarp’s association with John and others who had seen the Lord. Irenaeus remembered Polycarp’s teaching, appearance, manner of life, and public accounts of his dealings with those who had known Christ.

This historical witness does not begin and end with Irenaeus. Norman Geisler, in Appendix One of Chosen but Free, documents the testimony of twenty prominent Christian thinkers spanning the early centuries of the church and extending through the medieval period. His list includes Justin Martyr (AD 100–165), Irenaeus (AD 130–200), Athenagoras of Athens, Theophilus of Antioch, Tatian of Syria, Bardaisan of Syria, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Novatian of Rome, Origen, Methodius, Archelaus, Arnobius of Sicca, Cyril of Jerusalem, Gregory of Nyssa, Jerome, John Chrysostom, and even the earlier writings of Augustine, followed by Anselm and Thomas Aquinas. Geisler’s central observation is that, with the exception of Augustine’s later theological development, virtually all these major thinkers affirmed that human beings possess the power of contrary free choice, even in their fallen condition. This is not an isolated theological opinion from one second-century bishop. It represents a substantial historical testimony extending across generations of Christian thought. The question Calvinists must answer is straightforward: if unconditional election, irresistible grace, and the inability of fallen humanity to respond to God’s gracious appeal are the unmistakable teachings of the apostles, why is this such a difficult position to establish among the very Christian thinkers who lived closest to the apostolic generation?

The challenge is direct: when a second-century writer, standing in this historical line, explicitly says that the human will remains in a person’s own power with respect to faith, why should a much later system be allowed to redefine the terms and tell us that the early church really meant something else?

IRENAEUS AGAINST COERCION: HUMAN FREEDOM IS NOT A SIDE ISSUE

In Against Heresies IV.37, Irenaeus argues that God made human beings free agents. God does not compel obedience. Human beings possess the capacity to obey or disobey, and this freedom makes commands, warnings, praise, blame, reward, and judgment morally meaningful.

The point becomes unmistakable in IV.37.5. Irenaeus says:

“All such expressions demonstrate that man is in his own power with respect to faith.”

This is not a vague statement about choosing what to eat or where to live. He specifically includes faith. The statement directly challenges the claim that fallen people are incapable of believing unless they have first been regenerated by an irresistible act that cannot be resisted.

(IV.37–41) Irenaeus is explaining why God created human beings with the capacity for choice, why obedience must be voluntary rather than coerced, why people are accountable for their actions, and why God’s dealings with humanity are just. He does not deny that humanity is fallen. He does not teach sinless human nature or salvation by unaided human achievement. He argues that sin does not turn human beings into puppets or erase their moral agency.

That distinction matters. Calvinist polemic often tries to force every non-Calvinist account of human response into the category of Pelagianism or semi-Pelagianism. Irenaeus will not fit that caricature. He can affirm humanity’s need for God, the reality of sin, and divine grace while also insisting that the human will is not coerced and that faith involves genuine human response.

The Calvinist interpreter has work to do here. It is not enough to say that Irenaeus believed in “free will” in some generic sense and then quietly redefine that freedom as compatibilist willingness under an exhaustive decree. Irenaeus’s argument is about meaningful alternatives, non-coercion, and responsibility. If his language is to be made compatible with TULIP, that compatibility must be demonstrated from his context—not merely asserted after the fact.

THE ENEMIES IRENAEUS OPPOSED: GNOSTIC FATALISM AND STOIC FATE

Irenaeus was not debating a modern five-point confession. He was confronting the religious and philosophical systems of his own world. Against Heresies attacks Gnostic teachers who divided humanity into classes and assigned different spiritual conditions and destinies to people. In some of these systems, a person’s nature determined what that person could become. Irenaeus regarded such schemes as incompatible with the Creator’s justice and with the moral responsibility taught in Scripture.

Despite the fluidity of the religious mix of the early churches, we do know that gnosticism was the overriding issue facing the Chris­tian community during the first four centuries of our era. Opposition to gnostic thought and practice occupies a great deal of the Pauline corpus; there are anti-gnostic themes in the Johannine literature and perhaps even in the Revelation.” By the end of the first century, the attack on gnosticism had been escalated by Ignatius (d. ca. 110), bishop of Antioch; Justin Martyr (ca. 100—ca. 165); and especially by Irenaeus (ca. 130—ca. 200), bishop of Lyons. The polemic was sus­tained by Tertullian of Carthage (ca. 160—ca. 220), the Roman theolo­gian; Hippolytus (ca. 170—ca. 236); Origen of Alexandria (ca. 185—ca. 254); and many others. It would seem either that the gnostics posed a grave threat to Christianity or else that the Fathers were suf­fering from a pathological obsession, for this question to have ab­sorbed so much of their considerable talents and energies.

Irenaeus, the gnostic fighter par excellence, records that “a multi­tude of Gnostics have sprung up, and have been manifested like mushrooms growing out of the ground.” The image is that of nu­merous fungi suddenly and rootlessly materializing on virgin soil. Irenaeus gives himself to the defense of that unprepared ground, the Church.

Philip J. Lee, Against the Protestant Gnostics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 5.

Stoic philosophy presented a different challenge through its account of fate and the ordered necessity of events. Early Christian writers had to explain how divine foreknowledge could coexist with genuine human responsibility, without reducing human choices to fate. Justin Martyr, Tatian, and others addressed this problem. Their recurring concern was that foreknowledge must not be confused with coercion or causal determination.

We should not collapse Gnosticism, Stoicism, Augustinian theology, and Calvinism into one identical system. They are not identical, and similarity is not proof of direct borrowing. The sharper—and more defensible—charge is this: the early church fought against deterministic accounts of human destiny because they believed such accounts damaged the doctrines of God’s justice and human accountability.

Later Augustinian and Calvinist formulations must be tested against the very objections those early Christians raised.

The question is not whether Calvinists use the word “Gnostic.” The question is whether their system reintroduces, in a Christianized form, the kind of fixed spiritual destinies and determined outcomes that early Christian writers rejected. When a theology says that God unconditionally selects some for saving grace, withholds that grace from the rest, and ensures that the selected cannot finally resist, the resemblance deserves examination. Calling the system “the doctrines of grace” does not answer the historical or moral question.

THE WIDER PRE-AUGUSTINIAN WITNESS

Irenaeus is the centerpiece, but he is not the only early witness worth hearing. Justin Martyr argues that foreknowledge does not abolish human choice. Tatian rejects fate and speaks of the freedom of human and angelic agents. Clement of Alexandria connects moral responsibility and faith with genuine human response. Tertullian argues against making God the author of human wrongdoing. Origen explicitly resists philosophical determinism and defends human freedom.

These writers do not form a modern denominational statement, and they do not agree on every question. It would be careless to call them all Provisionists or Arminians. But it is equally careless—and historically indefensible—to pretend that the early church simply taught the later Reformed system. Their repeated insistence on human agency, responsibility, and the distinction between foreknowledge and fate is a substantial obstacle to claims that TULIP was the uncontested apostolic position.

See more HERE regarding the graph

The resources gathered for this project help establish the breadth of the question. Norman Geisler’s Chosen but Free, especially Appendix One, assembles statements from a range of historical Christian writers. David Bercot’s Will the Real Heretics Please Stand Up raises the question of who is better positioned to understand the apostles: those close to the apostolic generation or later theological interpreters. Ken Wilson’s The Foundation of Augustinian-Calvinism and A Defense of Free Grace Theology examine the development of Augustinian soteriology. Ken Johnson’s The Gnostic Origins of Calvinism supplies additional material and claims to investigate concerning Irenaeus, Gnostic thought, and later determinist theology.

These secondary authors are research guides, not substitutes for primary sources. Their quotations and historical conclusions must be checked against the fathers themselves. But the combined research points toward a question that Calvinist histories often minimize:

  • why does the early record so frequently defend the very human freedom that later deterministic systems must qualify, redefine, or deny?

AUGUSTINE: A MAJOR TURN IN THE WESTERN STORY

One aspect of Augustine’s understanding of grace needs further comment. As human beings were incapable of saving themselves, and as God gave his gift of grace to some (but not all), it followed that God had “preselected” those who would be saved. Developing hints of this idea to be found in the New Testament, Augustine developed a doctrine of predestination. The term “predestination” refers to God’s original or eternal decision to save some, and not others. It was this aspect of Augustine’s thought which many of his contemporaries, not to mention his successors, found unacceptable. It need hardly be said that there is no direct equivalent in Pelagius’s thought.

Alister E. McGrath, Historical Theology: An Introduction to the History of Christian Thought (Malden, MA: Wiley & Sons LTD, 2013), 34.

The argument becomes especially important when the discussion reaches Augustine. Augustine was a towering figure, but he was not the apostle John, and his theology is not identical with the testimony of the second-century church. His views developed over time, particularly during his controversy with Pelagius and his followers.

Dave Hunt, in What Love Is This? Calvinism’s Misrepresentation of God, presses this point forcefully. Hunt argues that Augustine earlier affirmed free will and God’s desire for the salvation of all, but later adopted a much more restrictive account of grace, election, and the will. Hunt points to Augustine’s earlier statements on foreknowledge and free choice, including Augustine’s argument that God’s infallible foreknowledge does not compel human beings or cancel their willing. Hunt contrasts those statements with Augustine’s later doctrines of the elect, the massa perditionis, and grace given effectually to some while withheld from others.

That development deserves serious attention. The issue is not whether Augustine was intelligent, influential, or sincere. The issue is whether his later anti-Pelagian conclusions represent the faith delivered by the apostles—or a major theological development shaped by a particular controversy. If the first three centuries repeatedly emphasize human freedom and responsibility, then the burden is on those who make Augustine’s later position the measuring rod for Christian orthodoxy.

A necessary historical distinction must be made:

Augustine did formally reject Manichaeism and embraced Nicene Christianity, but that conversion does not mean his former religious commitments ceased to influence his theological development. In fact, substantial scholarship argues that his Manichaean background remained critically important to the formation of his later theology. Ken Wilson argues that Augustine’s post-412 theological developments involved the adoption of deterministic interpretations of Scripture previously advanced by his Manichaean opponents, including interpretations concerning human inability, divine election, and inherited condemnation.

Jason BeDuhn, while rejecting the claim that Augustine simply remained a Manichaean, reaches a significant related conclusion: Augustine appropriated particular Manichaean insights, detached them from their original religious system, and incorporated them into his developing Christian theology. BeDuhn specifically identifies the fragmentedness and disability of the human will and the necessity of divine grace among the concepts that may represent direct borrowings from Manichaeism. Consequently, the historical question is not whether Augustine formally abandoned Manichaeism—he did—but whether elements of its theological framework subsequently reappeared, transformed and incorporated into his influential Christian teachings. The evidence presented by Wilson and BeDuhn makes that question impossible to dismiss merely by pointing to Augustine’s conversion.

 

Hunt’s central challenge is moral as well as exegetical:

  • what kind of love is being attributed to God if He sincerely commands all to repent, invites all to come, and declares His desire that people be saved, while the theological system says He has withheld from many the only grace by which they could respond?

What kind of justice condemns people for failing to do what, by the system’s own definition, they were never enabled to do? Those questions cannot be dismissed as emotional objections. They go to the character of the God being proclaimed.

CALVIN: AUGUSTINE’S AUTHORITY BECOMES A SYSTEM

John Calvin did not invent every element of the theology later called Calvinism. He drew extensively on Augustine, cited him repeatedly in the Institutes, and treated him as a major authority on predestination and grace. Hunt documents this dependence with examples from Calvin’s own writings. Calvin invokes Augustine when defending predestination, reprobation, and the claim that God’s decree cannot be resisted.

The historical line is therefore not simply “the apostles taught TULIP, and Calvin recovered it.” A more accurate line of inquiry is:

  1. the early fathers debated freedom and fate;
  2. Augustine developed a distinctive and increasingly restrictive account of grace and predestination (see Appendix A);
  3. Calvin drew heavily on Augustine and systematized those themes in the Reformation era;
  4. and the five points were later formalized in response to the Remonstrants at the Synod of Dort.

That chronology matters. The acronym TULIP is not found in the New Testament, nor was it a confession written by the apostles or Irenaeus. The five-point formulation emerged in a later controversy. Its defenders must establish that its doctrines are biblical and apostolic; they cannot establish that simply by pointing to Augustine’s influence on Calvin or Calvin’s influence on later Reformed confessions.

Hunt’s critique in What Love Is This? is especially sharp on the consequences of the system. If total depravity means inability to believe, unconditional election selects some and passes over others, limited atonement restricts Christ’s saving intent to the elect, irresistible grace ensures the elect’s response, and perseverance guarantees their final salvation, then what becomes of the repeated biblical invitations to all people? What becomes of God’s stated desire that all come to repentance? What becomes of the sincerity of the gospel offer to those whom the system says cannot respond and for whom Christ did not die?

Calvinists have answers to these questions, usually involving distinctions between God’s revealed and decretive wills, compatibilist freedom, and the difference between external calling and effectual calling. But naming those distinctions is not the same as resolving the contradiction. The question remains whether the system preserves the plain force of the biblical invitations—or redefines them so that “all,” “world,” “whoever,” and “any” repeatedly mean only the elect, or mean something less than their ordinary force.

THE FIVE POINTS UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION
See APPENDIX B

TOTAL DEPRAVITY: All Christians who take sin seriously affirm that humanity is fallen and cannot save itself. The dispute is whether depravity entails an absolute inability to respond to God’s gracious initiative. Irenaeus’s statement that a person is in his own power with respect to faith is a direct challenge to that added conclusion. Sin is real; so is accountability. One does not prove inability merely by repeating that sinners are spiritually dead.

UNCONDITIONAL ELECTION: The issue is whether God chose particular individuals for salvation without reference to foreknown faith, and whether that choice necessarily entails passing over the rest. Hunt argues that Scripture’s election language is repeatedly connected to foreknowledge and to blessings and purposes in Christ, not a secret decree assigning some individuals to heaven and others to hell. Irenaeus’s appeal to foreknowledge and responsible choice must be faced, not waved away.

LIMITED ATONEMENT: If Christ did not die for the non-elect, then the universal language of the New Testament must be qualified. The gospel preacher cannot straightforwardly tell every hearer, “Christ died for you,” if he believes Christ’s atoning death was never intended for that hearer. Hunt presses the point: a restricted atonement sits uneasily beside the biblical presentation of Christ as Savior of the world and the provision made for all.

IRRESISTIBLE GRACE: If saving grace cannot be resisted by the elect, and the non-elect are never given the grace necessary to believe, then the biblical warnings against resisting God and the repeated calls to repent require explanation. Irenaeus’s insistence that God does not compel obedience and that human beings are responsible for their response is directly relevant.

PERSEVERANCE: The question is not whether God keeps His people. The question is whether the doctrine is being used to make the entire response of faith, the continuance in faith, and the final outcome the inevitable result of an irresistible decree in a way that empties biblical warnings and exhortations of their ordinary force. The texts must be allowed to speak before the system decides what they are permitted to mean.

Challenging the Historical Narrative: Was the Early Church Calvinistic?

Here’s a question worth asking the next time someone suggests that rejecting Calvinism means rejecting the historic Christian faith:

What did the Christians who lived before Augustine actually believe about human freedom, faith, grace, and election?

The historical record deserves a much broader examination than simply tracing a line from the Apostle Paul to Augustine, then to Luther and Calvin.

Consider some of the witnesses:

  • Justin Martyr (c. AD 150): Argued that divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible, and that human beings are accountable for their choices.
  • Irenaeus of Lyons (c. AD 180): Made genuine human freedom central to his argument against heretical teachings. He explicitly included faith in his discussion of human freedom, writing that “man is in his own power with respect to faith” (Against Heresies IV.37.5).
  • Origen (c. AD 230): Defended meaningful human agency and challenged philosophical determinism.
  • John Chrysostom (c. AD 400): Interpreted Christ’s lament over Jerusalem in Matthew 23:37 as expressing a genuine desire to gather those who were unwilling to come.

These were not sixteenth-century Reformers or seventeenth-century Arminians. They were Christian writers addressing these questions centuries before those theological systems existed.

Their writings demonstrate that human freedom, accountability, and the ability to respond to God’s invitations were established subjects of early Christian theology.

The Augustinian Turning Point

Augustine deserves his place in Christian history. His contributions to the doctrines of grace, sin, and salvation were enormous. His insistence that salvation is entirely dependent upon God’s grace remains an essential consideration in any serious theological discussion.

But his mature writings on predestination, inherited sin, and irresistible grace emerged in a particular historical setting, especially during his controversy with Pelagius in the early fifth century.

The question is whether Augustine’s later formulations represent the uncontested position of the preceding Christian centuries.

The Eastern Christian tradition, in particular, developed a substantially different understanding of original sin, human freedom, and the relationship between grace and the human will. Nor did all Western theologians simply adopt Augustine’s strongest conclusions.

This is an important distinction:

  • Augustine’s influence on subsequent Western theology should not be confused with proof that every aspect of his mature soteriology represented the universal teaching of the earliest church.

The History We Need to Read

There is another question worth considering. If the historical discussion of Christian soteriology begins primarily with Augustine, what happens to the three centuries of Christian writing that preceded him?

Which church fathers receive attention? Which passages are emphasized? Which theological disagreements are explained? And which earlier voices are overlooked when the history of Christian salvation is presented?

Historical narratives inevitably influence how people understand theological orthodoxy. If someone is repeatedly told that Calvinism represents the historic Christian consensus, that claim deserves to be examined against the writings of the earliest Christian generations.We should not dismiss church history. We should read more of it.

We should not force Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Origen, or Chrysostom into modern theological categories. But neither should we ignore their writings when evaluating claims about the historical origins of Calvinist theology.

The fathers are still there. Their writings have not disappeared. And their testimony deserves to be heard.

The question is not whether every early Christian writer agreed with modern Provisionism, Arminianism, or Traditional Baptist theology. They did not formulate those systems. The question is whether the historical evidence supports the assertion that Calvinism represents the original, uncontested understanding of Christian salvation.

That is a much larger historical question than simply asking whether Augustine agreed with Calvin.

THE HISTORICAL BURDEN OF PROOF

Calvinists often tell non-Calvinists that rejecting TULIP means rejecting historic Christianity. That claim reverses the burden of proof. The early Christian writings must be examined before a later system is declared the historic standard. A second-century witness connected to Polycarp and John cannot be dismissed simply because his language is inconvenient to a seventeenth-century confession or a modern Reformed system.

If Irenaeus’s teaching is incompatible with key claims of TULIP, Calvinists must do one of two things. They must show, from Irenaeus’s own context, that his statements about freedom and faith are compatible with their doctrines; or they must acknowledge that Irenaeus did not teach their system and explain why a later theological development should override this early witness. What they cannot honestly do is claim Irenaeus as an uncomplicated Calvinist while ignoring his explicit argument that human beings are in their own power with respect to faith.

And if the wider pre-Augustinian record points in the same direction, the problem becomes larger. The claim that Calvinism is simply apostolic Christianity in its purest form becomes historically untenable unless the evidence is addressed. Later influence is not proof of earlier consensus. A doctrine does not become apostolic because Augustine adopted it, Calvin systematized it, or the Reformed tradition institutionalized it.

CONCLUSION: THE FATHERS CANNOT BE ERASED

This is not a plea for ecumenical silence. It is a demand for historical honesty and biblical accountability on three connected questions. Historically, a theology that makes faith impossible until an irresistible act of regeneration must confront the early Christian witness to human responsibility with respect to faith. Exegetically and morally, a theology that portrays God as withholding saving grace from people He commands to repent, then condemning them for unbelief, must explain how that account preserves His justice and the sincerity of His invitation. And a theology that makes every event—including sin—part of an exhaustive decree must explain how God is not thereby made the ultimate determiner of the evil He forbids. These are the questions the argument requires the later system to answer.

Irenaeus is not a decorative name to place in a historical timeline. He is a witness. He heard Polycarp. Polycarp was connected to John. Irenaeus fought systems that assigned fixed spiritual destinies and undermined moral responsibility. In the very course of defending the faith, he argued that God created human beings with genuine agency and that their response to Him was not coerced.

The later Augustinian and Calvinist systems must answer that witness. They must also answer Justin, Tatian, Clement, Tertullian, and Origen where their writings defend freedom and responsibility. They cannot claim the fathers when convenient and dismiss them when inconvenient.

Before Augustine. Before Calvin. Before Dort. Before TULIP.
The early church was already confronting determinism
—and Irenaeus’s words remain a challenge to anyone who
claims that the deterministic conclusions of later theology
are simply what the apostles taught.

The question for Calvinism is not whether it can construct a sophisticated explanation of these historical facts. It is whether that explanation is faithful to Scripture and honest about the historical record. The fathers are still there. Their writings have not disappeared. And no later system has the authority to make them say the opposite of what they wrote.

RESEARCH BASE AND IMPORTANT DISTINCTIONS

Primary sources to foreground: Irenaeus, Against Heresies IV.37–41; Irenaeus’s letter to Florinus as preserved in Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 5.20; Justin Martyr, First Apology; Tatian, Address to the Greeks; and the relevant writings of Clement, Tertullian, and Origen. Verify every quotation against a reliable translation and retain the immediate context.

Secondary resources supplied for this project: Dave Hunt, What Love Is This? Calvinism’s Misrepresentation of God; Ken Wilson, The Foundation of Augustinian-Calvinism; Ken Johnson, The Gnostic Origins of Calvinism; Norman Geisler, Chosen but Free, especially Appendix One; David Bercot, Will the Real Heretics Please Stand Up; and A Defense of Free Grace Theology, including the pages and appendix previously identified.

This essay deliberately advances a forceful critique, but it distinguishes doctrinal resemblance from historical dependence. It does not claim that Augustine or Calvin simply copied Gnostic or Stoic systems. It argues that later determinist formulations must answer the early church’s explicit opposition to fatalism, fixed spiritual destinies, coercion, and the denial of meaningful human responsibility.

Bibliography

Primary Sources: Early Christianity and the Church Fathers

Augustine. The Confessions. Translated by Henry Chadwick. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Augustine. The City of God against the Pagans. Edited and translated by R. W. Dyson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Clement of Alexandria. The Stromata. In Ante-Nicene Fathers, edited by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994.

Eusebius. The Church History. Translated by Paul L. Maier. Grand Rapids: Kregel Publications, 1999.

Irenaeus. Against Heresies. In Ante-Nicene Fathers, edited by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994.

———. “Letter to Florinus.” In Eusebius, The Church History, Book 5, chapter 20.

Justin Martyr. The First Apology. In Ante-Nicene Fathers, edited by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994.

Origen. On First Principles. Translated by G. W. Butterworth. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1973.

Polycarp. The Epistle of Polycarp to the Philippians. In Ante-Nicene Fathers, edited by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994.

Tatian. Address to the Greeks. In Ante-Nicene Fathers, edited by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994.

Tertullian. Against Marcion. In Ante-Nicene Fathers, edited by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994.

———. A Treatise on the Soul. In Ante-Nicene Fathers, edited by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994.

Modern Books and Theological Studies

Anderson, David R., Fred Chay, Joseph Dillow, J. Paul Tanner, and Ken Wilson. A Defense of Free Grace Theology: With Respect to Saving Faith, Perseverance, and Assurance. Grace Theology Press, 2017.

Bercot, David W. Will the Real Heretics Please Stand Up: A New Look at Today’s Evangelical Church in the Light of Early Christianity. 3rd ed. Amberson, PA: Scroll Publishing Company, 1999.

Coate, Micah. A Cultish Side of Calvinism. Innovo Publishing, 2011.

Geisler, Norman L. Chosen but Free: A Balanced View of God’s Sovereignty and Free Will. 3rd ed., revised and expanded. Minneapolis: Bethany House, 2010.

Hunt, Dave. What Love Is This? Calvinism’s Misrepresentation of God. 4th ed. Bend, OR: The Berean Call, 2018.

Johnson, Ken. The Gnostic Origins of Calvinism. 2013.

Robinson, Geoffrey D. Saved by Grace through Faith or Saved by Decree? A Biblical and Theological Critique of Calvinist Soteriology. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2022.

Wilson, Kenneth M. Augustine’s Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to “Non-free Free Will”: A Comprehensive Methodology. Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 111. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018.

———. The Foundation of Augustinian-Calvinism. Montgomery, TX: Regula Fidei Press, 2019.

Edited Volumes and Additional Theological Critiques

Allen, David L., and Steve W. Lemke, eds. Calvinism: A Biblical and Theological Critique. Nashville: B&H Academic, 2022.

———, eds. Whosoever Will: A Biblical-Theological Critique of Five-Point Calvinism. Nashville: B&H Publishing Group, 2010.


APPENDIX A
This is a summary I am zeroing in on of a book review, found HERE.


Byard Bennett, review of Jason David BeDuhn, Augustine’s Manichaean Dilemma, 2: Making a “Catholic” Self, 388–401 C.E. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), Augustinian Studies 45, no. 2 (2014): 300–305.

One of the most significant findings in Jason David BeDuhn’s historical study, as summarized by Byard Bennett, is the documented change in Augustine’s understanding of the human will. Bennett explains that Augustine’s earlier Christian position explicitly defended free will, maintaining that moral responsibility required genuine human freedom and that impairment of rational control was temporary and remediable. However, following his engagement with Manichaean arguments, particularly those raised by Fortunatus in 392, and his subsequent interaction with Tyconius’s interpretation of Paul, Augustine’s position changed. Bennett identifies the shift with remarkable clarity:

“Augustine’s earlier free will position had understood the will as a will to do good. Following Tyconius, Augustine now saw the will as a will to depend on God” (302).

Augustine increasingly portrayed the fallen will as internally divided, weakened, and unable to accomplish good without effective divine intervention. The consequences were substantial. As Bennett explains, conversion was no longer understood as the product of effective human agency, as Augustine’s earlier position had maintained; rather, conversion became the beginning of such agency (304). This is a documented theological development in Augustine’s own thinking. The later Augustinian emphasis on human inability and the efficacy of divine grace should therefore not be casually projected backward as though it had always been Augustine’s position.

Bennett describes Augustine’s earlier Christian position as a direct rejection of the Manichaean explanation of human sinfulness.

Augustine maintained that:

  • There was no inherently evil nature compelling people to sin.
  • Actions performed under necessity could not properly be considered sinful.
  • Every rational being possessed free will.
  • Moral responsibility—and therefore guilt—required free will.
  • The impairment of rational control was temporary and remediable, arising from habits developed through negligence and disordered bodily desires.

Bennett’s description is particularly significant:

“Only where one possesses free will can moral responsibility (and hence, sinfulness) exist.” (p. 301)

This is not a minor qualification. Augustine’s earlier defense of moral responsibility rested upon the existence of genuine human freedom.

The turning point: Augustine’s encounter with Fortunatus in 392

Bennett identifies Augustine’s debate with the Manichaean Fortunatus in 392 as an important turning point. Fortunatus challenged Augustine’s free-will defense by appealing to Paul’s descriptions of human conflict and inability, particularly:

  • Romans 7
  • Ephesians 2

These passages forced Augustine to reconsider whether his earlier understanding of free will adequately explained humanity’s spiritual condition. Bennett writes that Fortunatus’s arguments led Augustine to study these disputed Pauline passages more closely.

Augustine began reconsidering the relationship between human inability, sin, and grace.

The shift: From a will to do good to a will dependent upon God

This is arguably the most important sentence in the entire review:

“Augustine’s earlier free will position had understood the will as a will to do good. Following Tyconius, Augustine now saw the will as a will to depend on God.” (p. 302)

Consider the difference:

Earlier Augustine Developing Augustine
The will possesses genuine freedom. The will is fundamentally impaired.
The will can choose to do good. The will must depend upon God to do good.
Moral responsibility requires free will. Human inability becomes central to explaining the need for grace.
Impaired rational control is temporary and remediable. Sin exercises an internal coercive influence over the fallen will.

This is a substantial theological development, not merely a change in terminology.

The developing doctrine of inability

Bennett then describes Augustine’s increasingly negative assessment of the pre-conversion human will. On page 303, Augustine’s developing position portrays sensual desire (concupiscence) as:

  • An irrational internal compulsion.
  • A coercive power that subverts rational autonomy. 
  • An indwelling power of sin.
  • A force that undermines the individual’s ability to will rightly.

Bennett makes another important observation:

Augustine’s model of the individual’s pre-conversion life “more nearly resembled the view held by the Manichaeans than that held by the earlier Catholic commentators on Paul’s letters.” (p. 303)

Augustine did not adopt the Manichaean explanation of two competing natures. Instead, he increasingly described the human will itself as divided, corrupted, and weakened.

The resulting position: Grace creates faith

The review then describes the implications of this developing understanding. Bennett explains that Augustine’s later position increasingly emphasized that:

  1. The fallen human being cannot independently accomplish what is good.
  2. The human soul is radically dependent upon divine grace.
  3. Grace creates faith.
  4. The human response follows God’s effective call.
  5. Conversion is no longer the consequence of effective human agency; it becomes the beginning of such agency.

Bennett’s wording is particularly direct:

“Conversion is therefore not a product and consequence of effective human agency (as Augustine’s earlier freewill position had contended); conversion is instead the beginning of such agency.” (p. 304)

That sentence explicitly contrasts Augustine’s earlier and developing positions.

BOTTOM LINE: This review of the book documents the change in the will’s perceived capacity; it documents the resulting change in the understanding of conversion and grace. Together, they make a much stronger historical argument than simply saying Augustine was influenced by Manichaeism.


APPENDIX B
This is an excerpt of a book found HERE. PDF also.


MAJOR POINTS – TULIP

Ken Johnson, The Gnostic Origins of Calvinism (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2013), pages 34–63 of thePDF.

As we said, Calvinism consists of five major points which can be remembered using the acronym TULIP. Calvinism says we are Totally depraved, meaning we could not accept God’s gift of salvation even if we wanted to. God must Unconditionally elect those He wants saved because we cannot do anything to be saved. God Limited the atonement to only those few He wanted to save. All the rest He consigned to hell. None of those He wants to be saved can refuse their salvation, because God uses an Irresistible grace. That being the case, God forces the Perseverance of the saints, making sure they cannot lose their salvation. In addition to these there are minor points: Calvinistic Foreknowledge and Calvinistic Predestination.

In contrast, Arminianism teaches that everyone is born with a sin nature, but each has the free will to accept or reject Christ as their Savior. Salvation is available to all on the condition that each accepts Christ as his Savior. The Atonement of salvation is open to all, so that “whosoever will” may be saved. The Atonement is not limited to a select few. God draws all individuals to salvation by grace, but grace can be resisted by free will.

Some Arminian denominations teach that you can lose your salvation and other Arminian denominations teach you cannot. But even those who believe you cannot lose your salvation base it on God’s love for us, not His predestination, as Calvinists and Gnostics do.

The extreme forms of Calvinism and Arminianism are Universalism (the belief that everyone will eventually be saved) and Pelagianism. [Irenaeus, Against Heresies 1.27]

Being a Calvinist does not make you a non-Christian heretic. It simply shows that part of your doctrine is not perfect. It should be noted that to be a Calvinist you must accept all five points of Calvinism, or that doctrine falls apart. Some denominations state they are partial Calvinists, but in reality they simply redefine two or three points and accept the rest as Arminian theology. With this in mind, we need to look at the five major and three minor points of Calvinism and its related theology and compare them to the Bible and what the ancient church fathers taught.

Total Depravity

Calvinist Definition WRONG

Each man is so totally depraved that he could not accept the gift of salvation God would give him because he has no free will to do so. Therefore, God simply decreed before the creation of man that some individuals would be saved. God then intervenes in their lives to force them to be saved. He decrees all the others will spend eternity in hell.

One argument is that Colossians 2 and Ephesians 2 state we are dead in trespasses and sin. The Calvinist will argue that the dead cannot make decisions. But if we look at the context, it says that we are all “dead men walking,” so to speak. We all have sinned, and if God did not intervene, we would all parish.

Arminian Definition CORRECT

Each man is totally deprived in the sense that he cannot do anything to bring about his own salvation. But when God reveals Himself to that person, he has the ability, or free will, to accept the free gift of salvation God is offering him. Those who refuse the gift will spend eternity in hell.

Pelagian Definition WRONG

If you allow yourself to become corrupted by sin, you could become totally depraved, incapable of ever being saved.

BIBLICAL POSITION

First John teaches all mankind is born with a sin nature. If you deny that, you are deceived. If you think you were not born with a sin nature and that you have been sinless all your life and do not need a savior, you are calling God a liar.

“If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness. If we say that we have not sinned, we make Him a liar, and His word is not in us.” 1 John 1:8-10

Paul says in Romans 3 that no one born is righteous or even tries to seek after God. Everyone has sinned (because of their sin nature) and is on their way to hell because of it.

“As it is written, there is none righteous, no, not one: There is none that understandeth, there is none that seeketh after God. They are all gone out of the way, they are together become unprofitable; there is none that doeth good, no, not one.” Romans 3:10-12

“For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God” Romans 3:23

This is sometimes called total depravity or total inability. But can a person accept the free gift of salvation by just believing in Jesus, or is that impossible for them as well?

“For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life.” John 3:16

Calvinists state that accepting a free gift would be a work, which amounts to a works salvation and not by God’s grace. But Paul says accepting a free gift is not a work, instead it is simply belief.

“But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness.” Romans 4:5

So we are depraved in the sense that we can do nothing to save ourselves, but we are free to believe and accept God’s gift of salvation.

“ … through His name whosoever believeth in Him shall receive remission of sins.” Acts 10:43

“And this is the will of Him that sent Me, that everyone which seeth the Son, and believeth on Him, may have everlasting life: and I will raise him up at the last day.” John 6:40

Quotes of the Ancient Church Fathers

Justin Martyr, AD 165

Second Apology 7 – Man acts by his own free will and not by fate.

Dialogue 88 – Men and angels have free will. The human race from Adam had fallen under the power of death and the guile of the serpent, so that each one of us has committed personal transgression.

Dialogue 102 – He created both angels and men free to do that which is righteous, and He appointed periods of time during which He knew it would be good for them to have the exercise of free will; and because He likewise knew it would be good, He made general and particular judgments; each one’s freedom of will, however, being guarded.

Dialogue 141 – God created men and angels free to do righteousness; possessing reason, that they may know by whom they are created, and through whom they, not existing formerly, do now exist; and with a law that they should be judged by Him, if they do anything contrary to right reason: and of ourselves we, men and angels, shall be convicted of having acted sinfully, unless we repent beforehand. But if the word of God foretells that some angels and men shall be certainly punished, it did so because it foreknew that they would be unchangeably wicked, but not because God had created them so.

Tatian, AD 165

Greeks 7 – Jesus created men and angels with free will. Jesus had foreknowledge of what free agents would do. There is no such thing as fate.

Greeks 9 – Demons invented the concept of fate with astrology to enslave man into worshiping them.

Greeks 11 – Our free will enslaved us to sin [Rom. 7], but we can choose to follow righteousness now.

Irenaeus, AD 177

Against Heresies 4.29 – God only blinds the minds of those who chose not to believe and have already rejected him. In Romans [1], those who would not retain God in their knowledge He gave them over to a reprobate mind. In 2 Thessalonians [2], strong delusion is sent to believe the lie. God knows the number of those who will not believe, since He foreknows all things, has given them over to unbelief. God has foreknowledge of all things.

Against Heresies 4.37 – God made man a free agent from the beginning. This is the ancient law of human liberty, for there is no coercion with God. In man, as well as in angels, He has placed the power of choice. The Gnostic teaching that some men are born good, and others are born bad, is wrong. Everyone has the power to reject the Gospel. God has free will and we do, too, because we are made in His image. God preserved the will of man free and under his own control. We will be brought to perfection in the resurrection. Romans [8] refers to the church being predestined to be conformed to the image of Christ.

Against Heresies 4.39 – Man has the ability to distinguish good from evil. He has the power by his own free will to perform God’s commandments. This is taught in Romans [2]. God does not compel people to salvation, so those who have apostatized have done so through their own fault. God allows them to blind themselves.

Clement of Alexandria, AD 192

Stromata 2.3 – Christians teach saving faith is a gift that starts with God and is accepted by free choice.

Stromata 2.4 – The ability to freely choose salvation is a gift [started by] God, but true faith produces repentance.

Stromata 5.3 – Faith is the rational assent of the soul exercising free will.

Tertullian, AD 190-210

Marcion 2.5 – Man has free will.

Minucius Felix, AD 210

36 – The mind of man is free from birth and remains free throughout his life.

Origen, AD 230

Against Celsus 4:70 – Man has free will.

Mathetes AD 130

Epistle to Diognetus 7 – Jesus, who is God come in the flesh, came to persuade, not compel us, to salvation because violence has no part in the character of God.

Unconditional Election

Calvinist Definition WRONG

Man’s election unto salvation is unconditional because he is incapable of accepting God’s free gift. If he was able to accept or decline the gift, the gift would be on the condition that man accepted it.

Arminian Definition CORRECT

Man’s election to salvation is conditional based on the condition that he accept the free gift from God by using his free will to believe. Accepting a gift is not a work.

Pelagian Definition WRONG

Man’s election unto salvation is conditional. It is based on the condition that he not sin in this life and accept Jesus as Savior.

BIBLICAL POSITION

Those who are saved are not saved by their own merit.

“Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us, by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost;” Titus 3:5

“Who hath saved us, and called us with an holy calling, not according to our works, but according to His own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began,” 2 Timothy 1:9

In other words, there is nothing we can do to start, help, or finish the process of salvation. Salvation is not connected to any work or good deed we could do. It is entirely by God’s grace.

“Who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth.” 1 Timothy 2:4

“The Lord is not slack concerning His promise, as some men count slackness; but is longsuffering to us-ward, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance.” 2 Peter 3:9

We are elect through belief.

“But we are bound to give thanks always to God for you, brethren beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth:” 2 Thessalonians 2:13

“Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ: Grace unto you, and peace, be multiplied.” 1 Peter 1:2

“Wherefore the rather, brethren, give diligence to make your calling and election sure: for if ye do these things, ye shall never fall” 2 Peter 1:10

You must watch yourself carefully to make your election real. This shows us a conditional election. You are part of the elect on the condition that you make it a sure thing. You do that by exercising your free will and accepting the gift God’s wants to give you.

Paul said belief is not a work.

“But to him that worketh not, but believeth on Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness.” Romans 4:5

“No man can come to Me, except the Father which hath sent Me draw him: and I will raise him up at the last day.” John 6:44

“And when the Gentiles heard this, they were glad, and glorified the word of the Lord: and as many as were ordained to eternal life believed.” Acts 13:48

“For whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brethren.” Romans 8:29

“Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ: according as He hath chosen us in Him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before Him in love: having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to Himself, according to the good pleasure of His will” Ephesians 1:3-5

We need to guard ourselves because salvation is based on belief.

“Take heed, brethren, lest there be in any of you an evil heart of unbelief, in departing from the living God.” Hebrews 3:12

“Seeing therefore it remaineth that some must enter therein, and they to whom it was first preached entered not in because of unbelief:” Hebrews 4:6

“Let us labour therefore to enter into that rest, lest any man fall after the same example of unbelief.” Hebrews 4:11

Quotes of the Ancient Church Fathers

Justin Martyr, AD 165

Second Apology 7 – Man acts by his own free will and not by fate.

Dialogue 88 – Men and angels have free will. The human race, from Adam forward, has fallen under the power of death and the guile of the serpent, so that each one of us has committed personal transgression.

Dialogue 102 – He created both angels and men free to do that which is righteous, and He appointed periods of time during which He knew it would be good for them to have the exercise of free will; and because He likewise knew it would be good, He made general and particular judgments; each one’s freedom of will, however, being guarded.

Dialogue 141 – God created men and angels free to do righteousness; possessing reason, that they may know by whom they are created, and through whom they, not existing formerly, do now exist; and with a law that they should be judged by Him, if they do anything contrary to right reason: and of ourselves, we, men and angels, shall be convicted of having acted sinfully, unless we repent beforehand. But if the word of God foretells that some angels and men shall be certainly punished, it did so because it foreknew that they would be unchangeably wicked, but not because God had created them so.

Tatian, AD 165

Greeks 7 – Jesus created men and angels with free will. Jesus had foreknowledge of what free agents would do. There is no such thing as fate.

Greeks 9 – Demons invented the concept of fate with astrology to enslave man into worshiping them.

Greeks 11 – Our free will enslaved us to sin. [Rom 7] but we can choose to follow righteousness now.

Irenaeus, AD 177

Against Heresies 4.29 – God only blinds the minds of those who chose not to believe and have already rejected Him. In Romans [1], those who would not retain God in their knowledge He gave over to a reprobate mind. In 2 Thessalonians [2], strong delusion is sent to believe the lie. God knows the number of those who will not believe, since He foreknows all things, and has given them over to unbelief. God has foreknowledge of all things.

Against Heresies 4.37 – God made man a free agent from the beginning. This is the ancient law of human liberty, for there is no coercion with God. In man, as well as in angels, He has placed the power of choice. The Gnostic teaching that some men are born good, and others are born bad, is wrong. Everyone has the power to reject the gospel. God has free will and we do, too, because we are made in His image. God preserved the will of man free and under his own control. We will be brought to perfection in the resurrection. Romans [8] refers to the church being predestined to be conformed to the image of Christ.

Against Heresies 4.39 – Man has the ability to distinguish good from evil. He has the power by his own free will to perform God’s commandments. This is taught in Romans [2]. God does not compel people to salvation, so those who have apostatized have done so through their own fault. God allows them to blind themselves.

Clement of Alexandria, AD 192

Stromata 2.3 – Christians teach saving faith is a gift that starts with God and is accepted by free choice.

Stromata 2.4 – The ability to freely choose salvation is a gift [started by] God, but true faith produces repentance.

Stromata 5.3 – Faith is the rational assent of the soul exercising free will.

Stromata 5.12 – The Holy Spirit opens the minds of believers.

Stromata 7.2 – Jesus persuades, but never compels us to salvation.

Tertullian, AD 190-210

Marcion 2.5 – Man has free will.

Marcion 2.23 – It is not the mark of a good God to condemn beforehand persons who have not yet deserved condemnation. Who is so faultless among men, that God could always have him in His choice, and never be able to reject him? Or who, on the other hand, is so void of any good work, that God could reject him forever, and never be able to choose him?

Minucius Felix, AD 210

36 – The mind of man is free from birth and remains free throughout his life.

Origen, AD 230

Against Celsus 4:70 – Man has free will.

Against Celsus 7.50 – Jesus’ sacrifice was for newborn infants also, since no one is born free from sin.

Limited Atonement

Calvinist Definition WRONG

Jesus’ work on the cross atoned for the sins of only a select few. All the others have no chance to be saved and are predestined for hell.

Arminian Definition CORRECT

Jesus’ work on the cross atoned for the sins of all mankind. Those who reject Him have no chance to be saved and are eternally lost.

Pelagian Definition WRONG

Jesus’ work on the cross atoned for the sins of all mankind. This covers the sin nature and unintentional sins. You must pay for willful sins.

BIBLICAL POSITION

Jesus’ death on the cross paid for the sins of the whole world, not just a select few. This atonement is not limited. Peter says it is a heresy to state that the Lord did not die for all men. It is not His “good pleasure” to send anyone to hell.

“For I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord GOD: wherefore turn yourselves, and live ye.” Ezekiel 18:32

“For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour; Who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth.” 1 Timothy 2:3-4

“For there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus; Who gave Himself a ransom for all, to be testified in due time.” 1 Timothy 2:5-6

“But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honour; that He by the grace of God should taste death for every man.” Hebrews 2:9

“And He is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world.” 1 John 2:2

“But there were false prophets also among the people, even as there shall be false teachers among you, who privily shall bring in damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought them, and bring upon themselves swift destruction.” 2 Peter 2:1

“To wit, that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them; and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation.” 2 Corinthians 5:19

“And we have seen and do testify that the Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world.” 1 John 4:14

“For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life. For God sent not His Son into the world to condemn the world; but that the world through Him might be saved.” John 3:16-17

“For whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved.” Romans 10:13 KJV

Please notice Paul’s comment in Romans 3. Salvation is to all that believe because all have sinned. Either salvation is obtainable to every single person for all have sinned, or, if Calvinism is true, salvation is to all the elect. Then only the elect have sinned. So the ones God condemns to hell are sinless?

“But now the righteousness of God without the law is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets; even the righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe: for there is no difference: For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God” Romans 3:21­23

Assurance

Calvinism teaches that some are predestined for salvation and others to hell and that outcome cannot be changed. If this were true, no one would know if he or she were saved until after death. That’s a scary thought; however, John says there is a way you can know for sure.

“These things have I written unto you that believe on the name of the Son of God; that ye may know that ye have eternal life, and that ye may believe on the name of the Son of God.” 1 John 5:13

Quotes of the Ancient Church Fathers

Justin Martyr, AD 165

Second Apology 7 – Man acts by his own free will and not by fate.

Tatian, AD 165

Greeks 7 – Jesus created men and angels with free will. Jesus had foreknowledge of what free agents would do. There is no such thing as fate.

Irenaeus, AD 177

Against Heresies 4.37 – God made man a free agent from the beginning. This is the ancient law of human liberty, for there is no coercion with God. In man, as well as in angels, He has placed the power of choice. The Gnostic teaching that some men are born good, and others are born bad, is wrong. Everyone has the power to reject the gospel. God has free will and we do, too, because we are made in His image. God preserved the will of man free and under his own control. We will be brought to perfection in the resurrection. Romans [8] refers to the church being predestined to be conformed to the image of Christ.

Irresistible Grace

Calvinist Definition WRONG

God will draw only those whom He elects for salvation with an irresistible grace. There is no way they can refuse. Those whom He refuses to draw are those whom He has chosen to unelect, or destined for hell, because if He did draw them they would all be saved and that would not please Him.

Arminian Definition CORRECT

God’s grace is resistible. God draws everyone by His grace. Those who respond will be granted eternal life and those who willfully choose not to respond to God’s free gift will be damned.

Pelagian Definition WRONG

God does not need any kind of grace to draw people. Each individual can come to the conclusion on their own and accept salvation.

BIBLICAL POSITION

The Holy Spirit draws men to Himself with grace.

“No man can come to Me, except the Father which hath sent Me draw him: and I will raise him up at the last day.” John 6:44

“All that the Father giveth Me shall come to Me; and him that cometh to Me I will in no wise cast out… And this is the Father’s will which hath sent Me, that of all which He hath given Me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day.” John 6:37, 39

But this drawing can be resisted.

“O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, the one who kills the prophets and stones those who are sent to her! How often I wanted to gather your children together, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, but you were not willing!” Matthew 23:37 NKJV

If the Calvinists were right, no one would know who the elect were and who they were not. But the apostle John states believers can know for sure that they are saved.

“These things I have written to you who believe in the name of the Son of God, that you may know that you have eternal life, and that you may continue to believe in the name of the Son of God.” 1 John 5:13 NKJV

It is Satan who takes away the Word from the minds of the people so they would not accept Christ by believing the gospel and become saved. It is not God who forces this to happen. God’s grace is resistible.

“Those by the way side are they that hear; then cometh the devil, and taketh away the word out of their hearts, lest they should believe and be saved.” Luke 8:12

If grace cannot be resisted and God only selects a few, how can whole houses be saved just by believing?

“And they said, Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved, and thy house.” Acts 16:31

Anyone who believes will be saved.

“That if thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thine heart that God hath raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved. For with the heart man believeth unto righteousness; and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation.” Romans 10:9-10

We are sealed by the Holy Spirit after we confess and believe. Belief starts the process; it is not a result of being forced into regeneration.

“In whom ye also trusted, after that ye heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation: in whom also after that ye believed, ye were sealed with that Holy Spirit of promise,” Ephesians 1:13

Quotes of the Ancient Church Fathers

“Man has the ability to distinguish good from evil. He has the power by his own free will to perform God’s commandments. This is taught in Romans [chapter 2]. God does not compel people to salvation, so those who have apostatized have done so through their own fault. God allows them to blind themselves.” Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.39

“The ability to freely choose salvation is a gift given by God. True faith produces repentance.” Clement of  Alexandria, Stromata 2.4

Perseverance of the Saints

Calvinist Definition WRONG

The elect will persevere in Calvinism and doing good works. However, some of the unelect will confess Calvinism and do good works also. Therefore, no one can know for sure if they are truly saved in this life. We have to wait and see.

Arminian Definition CORRECT

Every single person who truly believes the gospel message and accepts Jesus Christ as their Lord and Savior will be saved.

Pelagian Definition WRONG

Anyone who is careful to never sin is assured eternal life. Those who have sinned will not know for sure until the resurrection.

Gnostic Definition WRONG

Certain individuals who have a spirit that is a direct creation or emanation of a god or goddess have eternal life abiding in them. They always have had, and always will have, eternal life.

We are secure in the salvation given to us in Christ Jesus. We cannot accidently lose it. We do not have to wait and see if we will obtain it. We have it right now. John says:

“These things have I written unto you that believe on the name of the Son of God; that ye may know that ye have eternal life, and that ye may believe on the name of the Son of God.” 1 John 5:13

The question then remains: how do we distinguish between those who are truly saved and those who just think they are? The Calvinist usually says it is by the fact that they endorse Calvinism and continue doing some form of good works. This is called the perseverance of the saints, which they get from Ephesians:

“Praying always with all prayer and supplication in the Spirit, and watching thereunto with all perseverance and supplication for all saints” Ephesians 6:18

But wait. There are good and bad people predestined for hell, and both godly and evil people predestined for heaven, according to the Calvinistic doctrine of unconditional election. So if Calvinism is true, there is no way anyone can know for sure he is saved. It’s very odd that Calvinists can state that it’s all by God’s grace, not by any works of man that we are saved. And yet they state we are the elect based on our good works!

Scripturally, we can know for sure we are saved:

“These things have I written unto you that believe on the name of the Son of God; that ye may know that ye have eternal life, and that ye may believe on the name of the Son of God.” 1 John 5:13

And we can tell we are saved by:

“But he that shall endure unto the end, the same shall be saved.” Matthew 24:13

Everyone who continues to believe Jesus Christ is Lord and Savior currently has, and is guaranteed to continue to have, eternal life. It’s by God’s grace and your exercising your free will.

“Abide in Me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine; no more can ye, except ye abide in Me.” John 15:4

Eternal Security

Some have erroneously thought that the Calvinistic doctrine of the Perseverance of the Saints is the same doctrine as the eternal security of the believer. This is the idea that a true believer cannot lose their salvation. While Calvinists must believe this because if a person cannot do anything about his salvation, and God chooses to force a person to be saved, then obviously you cannot do anything about losing it, either.

The non-Calvinists denominations are divided on the issue of whether or not people can lose their salvation. Compare the Baptists and the Holiness groups below.

BAPTIST DENOMINATIONS: no believer can walk away from being a member of the body of Christ and is therefore eternally secure in his or her salvation.
HOLINESS DENOMINATIONS: each believer can walk away from being a member of the body of Christ and can therefore loose his or her salvation.

Both groups are non-Calvinists and both agree that no one is decreed to be saved based on anything other than God’s foreknowledge of who would accept the free gift of salvation and become a part of the body of Christ.

“Even so faith, if it hath not works, is dead, being alone. Yea, a man may say, Thou hast faith, and I have works: shew me thy faith without thy works, and I will shew thee my faith by my works.” James 2:17-18

James is saying a true believer who has eternal life abiding in him will show it by good works, which are defined as continuing to believe that Jesus is Lord and continuing to follow His commands.

“Moreover, brethren, I declare unto you the gospel which I preached unto you, which also ye have received, and wherein ye stand; by which also ye are saved, if ye keep in memory what I preached unto you, unless ye have believed in vain.” 1 Corinthians 15:1-2 KJV

Neo-Calvinists

Today there are groups of what is being termed Neo-Calvinists, who no longer teach that holiness and good works mark those who are saved, but they are saved because they say so and there is no need to practice a lifestyle of holiness to prove they are the elect. These people are often heard using curse words from the pulpit and admitting they indulge in sinful acts without remorse. This is the same result the predestination theology had among the Gnostic cults.

Quotes of the Ancient Church Fathers

Ignatius, 30-107 AD

Ephesians 14 – No man truly making a profession of faith sins; nor does he that possesses love, hate anyone. The tree is made manifest by its fruit; so those that profess themselves to be Christians shall be recognized by their conduct. For there is not now a demand for mere profession, but that a man be found continuing in the power of faith to the end.

Tertullian, AD 200

Valintians 1.29 – [Valentinus taught] some are not predestined to be saved, but predestined for hell, but the rest might be saved through works.

Valintians 1.30 – [Valentinus taught] those predestined for salvation do not need to practice good works.

Minor Points

These are points that should be considered in dealing with Calvinism but are not part of the main five doctrines of TULIP. I think knowing about these will help in any debates that Calvinists might bring up.

Predestination

Calvinist Definition WRONG

Certain individuals are predestined for salvation, based solely on God’s good pleasure. All others are damned to an eternal hell based solely on that same good pleasure of God.

Gnostic Definition WRONG

Certain individuals are predestined for salvation based solely on the fact that they are an emanation of a god or goddess. All others who are not a special creation of a god or goddess with a piece of that god or goddess in them, are destined to spend eternity in hell.

Arminian Definition CORRECT

The body of Christ as a whole is predestined to be conformed to the image of Christ. Each person who uses his free will to accept the free gift of salvation (which God draws him to by His grace and by the power of the Holy Spirit) will be saved, becoming a part of that predestined body of Christ.

Pelagian Definition WRONG

Since God is not willing that any perish and He has predestined the body of Christ to be saved, it follows then that all men are already members of the body of Christ. Hence every person that has ever lived is saved.

BIBLICAL POSITION

The Bible does use the word predestination; but, we need to define what the word means and not read into the text what is not there. The Calvinistic definition of predestination differs slightly from the Gnostic definition of predestination and a great deal from the Arminian / biblical definition of predestination.

The biblical position is that those who choose to accept Jesus as their Lord and Savior obtain salvation. In Romans, Paul teaches that in some sense God foreordained or predestined them to be saved. This predestination was based on God’s foreknowledge. See the chapter on foreknowledge for a complete definition. Here are the verses in Scripture that used the Greek word, proorizō, for predestination. I have underlined the words the KJV translates the Greek word as “predestinated” or “ordained.”

“For whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brethren. Moreover whom He did predestinate, them He also called: and whom He called, them He also justified: and whom He justified, them He also glorified.” Romans 8:29-30 KJV

Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to Himself, according to the good pleasure of His will, Ephesians 1:5

In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things after the counsel of His own will: Ephesians 1:11

But we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the hidden wisdom, which God ordained before the world unto our glory: 1 Corinthians 2:7

The ancient church fathers called this Gnostic / Calvinistic concept of being sealed for salvation or damnation before you were even born, “fate.”

Quotes of the Ancient Church Fathers

Justin Martyr, AD 165

Second Apology 7 – Man acts by his own free will and not by fate.

Dialogue 141 –But if the word of God foretells that some angels and men shall be certainly punished, it did so because it foreknew that they would be unchangeably wicked, but not because God had created them so.

Irenaeus, AD 177

Against Heresies 4.39 – Man has the ability to distinguish good from evil. God does not compel people to salvation, so those who have apostatized have done so through their own fault. God allows them to blind themselves.

Tatian, AD 165

Greeks 7 – Jesus created men and angels with free will. Jesus had foreknowledge of what free agents would do. There is no such thing as fate.

Mathetes AD 130

Epistle to Diognetus 7 – Jesus, who is God come in the flesh, came to persuade, not compel us, to salvation because violence has no part in the character of God.

Foreknowledge

Calvinist Definition WRONG

God foreknew those few He wished to pick to save and give eternal life to, and those He wished to send to hell.

Arminian Definition CORRECT

God knows what will happen in the future, including each person’s choice to become a believer or to reject the gift of salvation. All believers, the whole body of Christ, will be saved. All the followers of other religions will not be saved.

BIBLICAL POSITION

God elects some to salvation based on His foreknowledge.

“For whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the firstborn among many brethren. Moreover whom He did predestinate, them He also called: and whom He called, them He also justified: and whom He justified, them He also glorified. What shall we then say to these things? If God be for us, who can be against us?” Romans 8:29-31

“And when the Gentiles heard this, they were glad, and glorified the word of the Lord: and as many as were ordained to eternal life believed.” Acts 13:48

Calvinists argue that individuals, not the body of Christ, are predestined for salvation. In order to do this they must redefine “foreknowledge” to mean not knowledge of a future “event” but intimate knowledge of a “person.” That would be the only way to prove that God does not elect people based on the “event,” the moment they accepted Jesus as their Savior. Calvinists say these individuals have no choice in the matter.

If it can be demonstrated that the first century church and secular society before, during, and after the first century used the word “foreknowledge” to mean the knowledge of a future event, and never used it in any other way, then Calvinism falls apart. Look at these Scriptures and you will see God in His foreknowledge predestined the body of Christ to salvation.

“God hath not cast away His people which He foreknew.” Romans 11:2

“Forasmuch as ye know that ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, from your vain conversation received by tradition from your fathers; but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot: Who verily was foreordained before the foundation of the world, but was manifest in these last times for you, who by Him do believe in God, that raised Him up from the dead, and gave Him glory; that your faith and hope might be in God.” 1 Peter 1:18-21

“Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ: according as He hath chosen us in Him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before Him in love: having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to Himself, according to the good pleasure of His will, to the praise of the glory of His grace, wherein He hath made us accepted in the beloved.” Ephesians 1:3-6

“Peter, an apostle of Jesus Christ, to the strangers scattered throughout Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithynia, elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ: Grace unto you, and peace, be multiplied.” 1 Peter 1:1-2

Calvinism bases its whole concept of foreknowledge on one verse in Scripture: Acts 2:23.

“Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain:” Acts 2:23

The Greek of this passage is vague enough to mean either Jesus was delivered by the “council and foreknowledge” or by the “council which is the foreknowledge” of God. You will constantly hear Calvinists quote this verse and state that it proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that the word “foreknowledge” never referred to God or a prophet knowing an “event,” but knowing a “person.”

The Bible is full of examples of prophets predicting events like earthquakes, so foreknowledge is God knowing everything, including events and people. The following quotes from the ancient church fathers prove they believed God had foreknowledge of both people and events.

Quotes of the Ancient Church Fathers

Clement of Rome, AD 90

1 Clement 44 – Our apostles also knew, through our Lord Jesus Christ, that there would be strife on account of the office of the Episcopate. For this reason, therefore, inasmuch as they had obtained a perfect foreknowledge of this, they appointed those [ministers] already mentioned, and afterwards gave instructions, that when these should fall asleep, other approved men should succeed them in their ministry.

Justin Martyr, AD165

Dialogue with Trypho 35 – So that, in consequence of these events, we know that Jesus foreknew what would happen after Him, as well as in consequence of many other events which He foretold would befall those who believed on and confessed Him, the Christ.

Dialogue with Trypho 42 – I can demonstrate that they were types, and symbols, and declarations of those things which would happen to Christ, of those who it was foreknown were to believe in Him, and of those things which would also be done by Christ Himself. Dialogue with Trypho 70 – The people foreknown to believe in Him were foreknown to pursue diligently the fear of the Lord.

Dialogue with Trypho 82 – We know that He foreknew all that would happen to us after His resurrection.

Irenaeus, AD 177

Against Heresies 2.32.1 – [Christians] have foreknowledge of things to come: they see visions, and utter prophetic expressions.

Against Heresies 4.29 – God only blinds the minds of those who chose not to believe and have already rejected Him. In Romans [1], those who would not retain God in their knowledge He gave them over to a reprobate mind. In 2 Thessalonians [2], strong delusion is sent to them so they will believe the lie. God knows the number of those who will not believe, since He foreknows all things, and has given them over to unbelief. God has foreknowledge of all things.

Tatian, AD 166

Greeks 7 – Jesus created men and angels with free will. Jesus had foreknowledge of what free agents would do. There is no such thing as fate.

Clement of Alexandria, AD 190

Instructor 9 – [Jesus shows] His divinity in His foreknowledge of what would take place.

Stromata 12 – Again, prophecy is foreknowledge; and knowledge, the understanding of prophecy; being the knowledge of those things known before by the Lord who reveals all things.

Stromata 6:8 – The disciple of wisdom foreknows signs and omens, and the issues of seasons and of times.

Origen, AD 240

Of First Principles 3:13 – [God] knows the secret things of the heart, and foreknows the future.

Is Calvinism a Heresy? (Bonus: Allie Beth Stuckey)

 

VIDEO VIA IDOL KILLER!

For the entire video by Idol Killer, see: “What is the Gospel? – Allie Beth Stuckey vs John Mark Comer“

For clarity and historical depth: The first four belonged to the Western Latin Church, the historical church that developed into the Roman Catholic Church. They were not Eastern Orthodox councils. The first four gatherings occurred before the Great Schism of 1054, the conventional date associated with the separation between Eastern Orthodox and Western Catholic Christianity.

They therefore belong to the history of the Western Church, although their geographical and political settings differed. Mainz and Quierzy, in particular, were Frankish synods rather than ecumenical councils of the entire Christian church.

Jerusalem in 1672 was different: it was an explicitly Eastern Orthodox synod responding to Protestant theology, including doctrines associated with Calvinism.

Council or synod Church tradition Historical setting
Arles (475–480 AD) Western Latin Church Late Roman Gaul, in what is now southern France
Orange (529 AD) Western Latin Church Southern Gaul, now France; associated with Caesarius of Arles
Mainz (848 AD) Western Latin Church The Carolingian Frankish Church, in what is now Germany
Quierzy (853 AD) Western Latin Church The Carolingian Frankish Church, in what is now northern France
Jerusalem (1672 AD) Eastern Orthodox Church Convened under Patriarch Dositheus II of Jerusalem

Council of Arles (475–480 AD)

Issue: Human freedom, predestination, and the extent of Christ’s atonement

Arles required the priest Lucidus to renounce propositions associated with an extreme form of predestinarian teaching. These included the denial of meaningful human freedom after the Fall, the claim that Christ did not die for the salvation of all, and the idea that some people were predestined to damnation.

Connection to the “later” TULIP (explained in APPENDIX):

  • Total Depravity: Challenges interpretations that eliminate any meaningful capacity to respond to God’s gracious initiative.
  • Limited Atonement: Challenges the claim that Christ’s death was not intended for the salvation of all.
  • Unconditional Election and Reprobation: Raises objections to certain formulations of predestination to damnation.

The central question is whether God’s sovereignty and humanity’s fallen condition require the conclusion that human responses are determined by God rather than genuinely resistible.

Second Council of Orange (529 AD)

Issue: The necessity of grace and predestination to evil

Orange affirmed that fallen humanity cannot turn to God or embrace saving faith apart from God’s prior grace. It rejected the idea that God predestines people to evil and emphasized the necessity of divine grace in salvation.

Connection to the “later” TULIP (explained in APPENDIX):

  • Total Depravity: Orange affirms humanity’s dependence on grace, but does not establish every later Calvinist claim about spiritual inability.
  • Unconditional Election: Its teachings raise questions about how election and condemnation should be understood, although Orange did not settle every later debate over election.
  • Determinism: Its rejection of predestination to evil challenges interpretations in which God’s decree is understood to determine sinful actions in a way that makes God the ultimate determiner of evil.

The important distinction is between God permitting and governing a world in which sin occurs and God determining that particular sinful choices must occur. The council’s rejection of predestination to evil is relevant to that distinction, though it does not by itself settle the modern debate over theological determinism.

Synod of Mainz (848 AD)

Issue: Gottschalk’s doctrine of double predestination

The Synod of Mainz condemned Gottschalk of Orbais, who taught a form of double predestination: God predestines some people to eternal life and others to eternal death. His position also included a restricted understanding of the beneficiaries of Christ’s death.

Connection to the “later” TULIP (explained in APPENDIX):

  • Unconditional Election: Related to the teaching that God elects individuals to salvation independently of their response.
  • Limited Atonement: Gottschalk held that Christ died for the elect rather than for all people.
  • Double Predestination: His formulation raises the question of whether God’s decree determines not only who will be saved but also who will be condemned.

This is particularly relevant to the historical debate over whether reprobation is simply God’s decision not to elect certain people or a positive predestination to damnation.

The distinction matters because later Calvinists have offered different explanations of reprobation and do not all formulate it identically.

Synod of Quierzy (853 AD)

Issue: Predestination to salvation versus predestination to sin and damnation

The proceedings against Gottschalk began earlier, but the doctrinal statement associated with Quierzy dates to 853. It affirmed predestination to salvation while distinguishing it from God’s foreknowledge of those who would be condemned. It also affirmed God’s desire to save all and the universal scope of Christ’s redemptive provision.

Connection to the “later” TULIP (explained in APPENDIX):

  • Unconditional Election: The synod’s account of election and condemnation differs from formulations of double predestination.
  • Limited Atonement: Its affirmation of universal redemption conflicts with strict formulations that limit Christ’s saving provision to the elect.
  • Determinism: Its distinction between predestination to salvation and foreknowledge of condemnation challenges the claim that both outcomes should be understood as equivalent acts of divine predetermination.

From a Provisionist perspective, this distinction is important: God’s sovereign provision of salvation does not necessarily entail that God determines which individuals will believe or refuse to believe.

Synod of Jerusalem (1672 AD)

Issue: Unconditional predestination and the Reformed understanding of salvation

The Synod of Jerusalem, associated with Patriarch Dositheus, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, responded to Protestant teachings it regarded as inconsistent with Eastern Orthodox doctrine. Its confession rejected unconditional predestination as it understood the Calvinist position and emphasized the relationship between divine grace and human response.

Connection to the “later” TULIP (explained in APPENDIX):

  • Unconditional Election: The synod rejected the Calvinist formulation of unconditional predestination that it addressed.
  • Irresistible Grace: Its understanding of grace and human response differs from the Calvinist claim that saving grace effectually brings the elect to faith.
  • Perseverance: Its broader understanding of salvation differs from the Reformed account of the perseverance of the saints.

Jerusalem is the most direct example in this list of an ecclesiastical body addressing doctrines identified with Calvinism after the Reformation.

One qualification: it was an Eastern Orthodox synod, so its decisions represent the doctrinal position of that church, rather than a universally binding judgment accepted by all Christian traditions.


Augustine, the Father of TULIP?
Examining the Historical Foundations of Augustinian-Calvinism


Introduction: Did Calvinism Begin with Augustine?

The five points of Calvinism, commonly summarized by the acronym TULIP, are among the most recognizable features of Reformed theology. They describe a system of salvation involving humanity’s inability to come to God apart from divine grace, God’s unconditional election of individuals, the particular intent of Christ’s atonement, the effectiveness of saving grace, and the perseverance of the saints.

But where did this theological framework originate?

Many Calvinists appeal to Augustine of Hippo (AD 354–430), one of the most influential theologians in Western Christianity. John Calvin himself acknowledged Augustine’s enormous influence on his theology. The question, therefore, is not whether Augustine influenced Calvinism. The more significant question is whether Augustine’s later teachings on determinism, election, grace, and perseverance supplied the historical foundation for the distinctive doctrines later associated with TULIP.

Kenneth M. Wilson directly addresses this question in two works:

  • The Foundation of Augustinian-Calvinism (2019), which develops his historical argument concerning Augustine’s theological development and the philosophical and religious influences he believes shaped it.
  • “Calvinism Is Augustinianism,” Chapter 6 of Calvinism: A Biblical and Theological Critique (2022), which presents a more concise version of his argument within a broader critique of Calvinism’s historical foundations.

Wilson makes a particularly strong claim: Augustine was the historical father of the theological framework underlying TULIP.

According to Wilson, Augustine’s later theology represented a significant departure from the earlier Christian emphasis on human freedom to respond to God’s gracious offer of salvation.

That conclusion is controversial. Nevertheless, Wilson’s historical argument raises an important question for anyone examining Calvinism:

Did Augustine recover the original Christian understanding of predestination, or did his later theology introduce a deterministic interpretation that substantially departed from earlier Christian thought?

1. Augustine’s Importance to Calvinism

Augustine is a towering figure in the history of Western Christianity. His writings influenced medieval theology, the Protestant Reformation, and subsequent debates about sin, grace, election, and salvation.

Wilson emphasizes that Calvin’s dependence on Augustine was substantial. In Calvinism Is Augustinianism, he quotes Calvin acknowledging that he could express his theology through Augustine’s writings. Wilson also notes that Calvin cited Augustine hundreds of times in his Institutes of the Christian Religion.

Wilson cites other Reformed writers who acknowledge this relationship. The Reformed theologian Loraine Boettner famously characterized the Reformation as essentially a revival of Augustinianism.

Wilson also cites Matthew McMahon’s (a Calvinist arguing in favor of Augustine’s influence on TULIP) argument that Augustine, rather than Calvin, had already systematized much of what later became known as the five points of Calvinism. These admissions establish an important historical connection: Calvin did not develop his theology in isolation. He inherited and adapted an extensive theological tradition, and Augustine was a major source within that tradition.

One aspect of Augustine’s understanding of grace needs further comment. As human beings were incapable of saving themselves, and as God gave his gift of grace to some (but not all), it followed that God had “preselected” those who would be saved. Developing hints of this idea to be found in the New Testament, Augustine developed a doctrine of predestination. The term “predestination” refers to God’s original or eternal decision to save some, and not others. It was this aspect of Augustine’s thought which many of his contemporaries, not to mention his successors, found unacceptable. It need hardly be said that there is no direct equivalent in Pelagius’s thought.

Alister E. McGrath, Historical Theology: An Introduction to the History of Christian Thought (Malden, MA: Wiley & Sons LTD, 2013), 34.

However, influence does not establish that Augustine and Calvin taught identical doctrines in every respect. The issue is the relationship between Augustine’s later theological framework and the distinctive doctrines subsequently associated with Calvinism.

The filtered systematization of the five points of Calvinism which have been brought to the modern church as the doctrines of grace were originally systematized and widely written on, not by Calvin, but by Augustine. This is why one finds that every four pages written in the Institutes of the Christian Religion John Calvin quoted Augustine. Calvin, for this reason, would deem himself not a Calvinist, but an Augustinian. And both Augustine and Calvin would really deem themselves children at the feet of Jesus Christ and the teachings of the Bible, especially quoting their favorites passages from the Apostle Paul over and over again.

They are Pauline, and bibline, to the glory of Jesus Christ. To work backwards, then, one moves from the doctrines of grace today, to the Synod of Dordt, to the Institutes of the Christian Religion by Calvin, to the writings of Augustine, to the Bible. The biblical record is the foundation for all that came after concerning grace. It is no wonder why Augustine, even in his own day, was deemed the “Doctor of Grace.” Here we turn to him for this study.

This work is concerned with the writings of Augustine to determine Augustine’s views on the doctrines of grace (or what has become to be known as Calvinism or TULIP) and if his views are the same as John Calvin‘s, or for that matter the Synod of Dordt, the Westminster Confession and other reformed viewpoints on the Gospel that have been since penned. Knowing that the Bible does not change, and the matters of faith and practice in the Bible do not change, one should find Augustine’s words and thoughts about grace lying within the same veins as any reformer who believed the Gospel of grace, or any Puritan afterwards. It is easy to see where the Reformers or Puritans believed these doctrines. Again, those who believe these doctrines are referred to as “Calvinists.” But why are they not referred to as Augustinians? This is the scope of the study. Is it determinable that instead of calling one who believes the doctrines of grace a Christian Calvinist, should they be more likely deemed an Augustinian Calvinist? Are those terms interchangeable? Did Augustine believe these doctrines in the same way that Calvin, or the later Puritans did, or even Calvinists today?

C. Matthew McMahon, Augustine’s Calvinism: The Doctrines of Grace in Augustine’s Writings (Coconut Creek, FL: Puritan Publications, 2012), 7–9.

2. The Turning Point: Augustine’s Development Toward Determinism

One of Wilson’s most important arguments concerns the development of Augustine’s theology over time.

Wilson distinguishes Augustine’s earlier Christian writings from his later writings on predestination, grace, and the human will.

According to Wilson, Augustine initially defended a view of human freedom that allowed people to respond to God’s gracious offer of salvation. During this period, Augustine opposed Manichaean teachings that made human destiny dependent on a unilateral divine determination that left no genuine alternative response.

Wilson argues that this changed around AD 412, during Augustine’s controversy with Pelagius and Caelestius.

In Wilson’s reconstruction, Augustine increasingly adopted a theology in which God determined who would receive saving grace and who would not. Human beings remained responsible for their actions, but their ability to respond positively to God depended on God’s prior and decisive intervention.

Wilson calls this a form of “non-free free will”: people act voluntarily according to their desires, but their ultimate spiritual condition and saving response are determined by divine action rather than an independently exercisable ability to accept or reject God’s offer.

Why does Wilson identify AD 412 as significant?

Wilson argues that Augustine’s theological transition has often been dated too early, particularly to his work Ad Simplicianum, traditionally associated with approximately AD 396.

Wilson contends that Augustine continued defending positions compatible with human freedom for years after that work. He argues that the decisive shift becomes apparent around AD 412, when Augustine’s response to the Pelagian controversy led him to reconsider the implications of infant baptism, original sin, grace, and election.

Wilson believes this controversy was crucial because it forced Augustine to explain why some infants received baptism while others died without it, even though infants could not personally choose or reject baptism.

Wilson reconstructs Augustine’s reasoning as follows:

  1. Baptism was understood to convey forgiveness of sins and the reception of the Holy Spirit.
  2. Infants could not personally choose baptism or exercise faith in the same manner as adults.
  3. Some infants received baptism, while others died without it.
  4. If baptism was necessary for salvation, the difference between those outcomes could not be explained by the infants’ own choices.
  5. Augustine therefore concluded that God determined which infants would receive saving grace.

Wilson argues that this reasoning helped move Augustine toward unconditional election and a more comprehensive theology of divine determinism. The important point is that Wilson does not portray Augustine’s later theology as simply an unchanged continuation of his earlier writings. He argues that Augustine’s understanding of grace and predestination developed substantially in response to particular theological controversies.

3. The Philosophical and Religious Background: Stoicism, Neoplatonism, and Manichaeism

Wilson’s argument goes beyond Augustine’s response to Pelagius. He contends that Augustine’s earlier philosophical and religious experiences influenced his later theology. In The Foundation of Augustinian-Calvinism, Wilson examines four major intellectual traditions: Stoicism, Neoplatonism, Gnosticism, and Manichaeism.

His contention is that certain deterministic concepts found in these traditions reappeared in Augustine’s later Christian writings.

A. Stoicism: Meticulous providence and determinism

Stoicism taught a comprehensive understanding of providence in which events occurred within an ordered causal structure governed by fate.

Wilson argues that Augustine retained a strong conception of meticulous divine providence even after becoming a Christian. In this understanding, God’s providential ordering encompasses not merely broad historical purposes but the specific events and circumstances of human life.

Wilson sees a significant parallel between this conception and theological determinism: if every event is comprehensively determined by divine providence, then human decisions ultimately occur within an order from which they cannot finally depart.

This raises a question central to the debate between Calvinism and Provisionism:

Does God’s sovereignty require Him to determine every human choice, or can God sovereignly govern His creation while allowing people genuinely to respond to His gracious call?

Provisionists answer that God’s sovereignty does not require exhaustive divine determination of every human decision. God can accomplish His purposes while permitting meaningful human responses to His commands and offers.

Wilson argues that Augustine’s later understanding of providence moved away from the earlier Christian emphasis on divine foreknowledge and human freedom.

B. Neoplatonism: The corrupted will and the need for divine restoration

Wilson also examines the influence he attributes to Neoplatonic philosophy, particularly the writings of Plotinus and Porphyry. He argues that certain Neoplatonic concepts supplied a framework in which humanity’s fallen condition rendered the human will incapable of choosing the good without divine restoration.

Within Wilson’s comparison, this resembles the later Calvinist doctrine of total inability: the sinner cannot produce the saving response God requires unless God first acts to overcome that inability.

Wilson further argues that Neoplatonic thought offered a way to reconcile the absence of genuine alternatives with personal responsibility. A person could act voluntarily according to an existing disposition even if that disposition and the resulting action were ultimately determined. For Wilson, this resembles the compatibilist understanding of freedom found in some forms of Calvinism.

The comparison is important, but it requires precision. Neoplatonism was a diverse philosophical tradition, and its concepts should not automatically be equated with the full Reformed doctrine of total depravity. Wilson is arguing for a historical and conceptual relationship, not demonstrating that every Neoplatonic teaching is identical to Calvinist theology.

C. Gnosticism: A divinely differentiated humanity

Wilson also discusses Gnostic teachings in which humanity was divided into different spiritual categories. In some Gnostic systems, only a predetermined group possessed the capacity to receive saving knowledge, while others lacked the ability to attain salvation.

Wilson sees a structural resemblance between this idea and unconditional election understood as God’s unilateral determination of who receives the ability to believe. His comparison concerns the unequal distribution of saving ability: salvation may be proclaimed broadly, but only those specially enabled by divine action can ultimately respond.

This comparison should not be mistaken for a claim that Calvinists accept Gnostic cosmology or the Gnostic distinction between a good spiritual realm and an evil material realm. They do not need to hold those beliefs for Wilson’s narrower comparison to be relevant.

Calvinists desire to stand out among complacent Christians who might not be as educated in biblical studies as they are. At face value, being intellectual about the Bible is not an error in itself. That is, until intellectualism takes over. Dr. Ron Comfort, president and founder of Ambassador Baptist College in Lattimore, North Carolina, has noticed this. He observes the similarities between the ancient heresy of Gnosticism and present day Calvinism. He notes what the International Standard Bible Encyclopedia writes about Gnosticism:

Gnosticism is Christianity perverted by a learning and speculation. The intellectual pride of the Gnostics refined away the gospel into a philosophy making salvation exclusive and not universal. They lived under the conviction that they possessed a mysterious knowledge that could only be understood by them.

Comfort concludes with the question, “Now, I wonder, does that sound like something that is prevalent in our land today?” The parallels between Calvinism and Gnosticism are stunning. By speculative and intellectual assumptions, both Gnosticism and Calvinism deviate from orthodox Christianity in concluding that salvation is exclusive.

Micah Coate, A Cultish Side of Calvinism (2011), chap. 3, “The Marks of a Cult within Calvinism,” 66–67.

  • Gnosticism, as presented in the quotation: Salvation is associated with special knowledge unavailable to everyone.
  • Calvinism, as Coate characterizes it: Saving grace is given effectively to the elect, while others are not given the ability to respond savingly.

The question is whether a theological system that restricts the effective ability to respond to a predetermined group shares a significant structural feature with earlier systems that similarly differentiated the saved from the unsaved.

D. Manichaeism: Inability and unilateral divine intervention

Manichaeism is particularly important in Wilson’s argument because Augustine spent approximately nine years as a Manichaean hearer before becoming a Christian.

THE CORE CONNECTIONS & ACCUSATIONS

  • Augustine’s Background: Critics point to Augustine of Hippo’s approximately nine years of involvement with Manichaeism, a religious movement with dualistic teachings, before his conversion to Christianity. Because Augustine’s writings significantly influenced John Calvin and later Reformed theology, critics question whether aspects of his earlier worldview influenced his understanding of sin and human nature. [1, 2]
  • Total Inability / Total Depravity: Manichaeism presented a deeply dualistic understanding of good and evil and the human condition. Critics argue that Calvinism’s doctrine of total inability—the “T” in TULIP, which teaches that fallen humanity cannot come to faith apart from God’s enabling grace—resembles this pessimistic view of human nature. [1, 2, 3, 4]
  • The Material World and the Flesh: Gnostic movements often viewed the material world as inferior, corrupt, or even evil, although Gnostic beliefs varied. Critics argue that Augustine’s teachings concerning original sin, its transmission through human generation, and the effects of sexual desire reflect a similar pessimism about embodied human existence. They further contend that aspects of this outlook carried into later Reformed theology. [1, 2]

Wilson contends that Augustine later returned to certain deterministic interpretations associated with his former religious environment, particularly when addressing the relationship between inherited sin, the human will, and saving grace.

In Wilson’s reconstruction, the human will cannot independently escape its corrupted condition. A decisive divine intervention must restore the capacity to respond, and this intervention is not equally effective for everyone.

Wilson argues that this pattern resembles the later Calvinist understanding of regeneration and effectual calling: saving grace does not merely offer assistance to a person who may respond; it effectively brings about the saving response in those whom God has chosen.

The important qualification is that resemblance does not establish identity. Manichaeism’s cosmology, its account of matter and evil, and its understanding of salvation differ fundamentally from historic Christian theology. Wilson’s argument concerns specific parallels in determinism, inability, and divine selection—not an assertion that Calvinism is simply Manichaeism under another name.

4. Augustine and the Five Points of TULIP

Wilson brings these historical arguments together in his discussion of the five points of Calvinism. He argues that Augustine’s later theology supplied the essential framework from which these doctrines developed.

It is important to remember that TULIP is a later summary of Reformed theology. Augustine did not write a work organized under that acronym, and the five points were not formally formulated in their familiar arrangement during his lifetime.

Wilson nevertheless argues that the underlying theological ideas can be traced to Augustine’s later writings.

T — Total Depravity or Total Inability

The question: Can fallen human beings respond to God’s gracious offer of salvation, or must God first regenerate them so that they can believe?

Wilson argues that Augustine’s later theology developed a particularly strong understanding of humanity’s inability.

According to Wilson, Augustine moved beyond the idea that humanity is sinful, morally weakened, and dependent on grace. He increasingly taught that fallen humanity lacked the ability to make a saving response to God unless God first intervened.

Wilson connects this development with Augustine’s changing understanding of original sin. He argues that Augustine’s later doctrine involved inherited guilt and condemnation, rather than merely the mortality, moral weakness, and propensity to sin associated with his earlier writings.

Wilson also examines Augustine’s interpretation of passages such as Romans 5:12 and Psalm 51:5, arguing that Augustine’s later conclusions differed from his earlier understanding.

For Wilson, this change was foundational because the remaining doctrines of TULIP followed logically once humanity was understood to be totally unable to respond to God.

The Provisionist objection:

Humanity’s universal sinfulness does not necessarily establish that people have no ability to respond to God’s gracious call. Provisionism maintains that fallen people cannot save themselves, earn salvation, or come to Christ independently of divine grace. Nevertheless, God graciously provides what is necessary for people to respond to the gospel.

The disagreement is not whether grace is necessary. It is whether grace must first regenerate a person in order to make faith possible.

U — Unconditional Election

The question: Does God choose individuals for salvation without reference to their response to His gracious offer, or is election conditional upon faith that God foreknows?

Wilson argues that Augustine’s later doctrine of election developed from his understanding of humanity’s inability and the necessity of divine intervention.

His discussion of infant baptism is central. Because infants could not personally exercise faith or choose baptism, Wilson argues that Augustine concluded their salvation depended on God’s unilateral decision to provide the means of salvation.

Wilson contends that Augustine then extended this logic to humanity more generally. God determines who receives the saving grace necessary for faith, while others do not receive that grace.

Wilson uses the term “Divine Unilateral Predetermination of Individuals’ Eternal Destinies” (DUPIED) to distinguish this form of determinism from election understood in relation to God’s foreknowledge of human responses.

In Wilson’s interpretation, Augustine’s later understanding of election resembles the unconditional election taught in Calvinism.

The Provisionist objection:

Conditional election does not mean that people earn their salvation. God determines the gracious provision and the condition under which its benefits are received. Faith is not payment for salvation; it is the means by which a person receives what God has provided in Christ.

Provisionists therefore distinguish God’s sovereign decision to save believers from the claim that God unconditionally determines which individuals will believe and which will remain unable to believe.

L — Limited Atonement

The question: Did Christ die with the intention of saving only the elect, or did He provide atonement for all humanity, with its saving benefits received by those who believe?

Wilson argues that limited atonement follows logically from Augustine’s later understanding of election and providence.

His reasoning is that if God unilaterally determines who will be saved, and God’s providential purposes cannot ultimately fail, then Christ’s atoning work must be understood in relation to the people God has determined to save.

Wilson believes Augustine’s later theology increasingly restricted the saving intent of Christ’s death to the elect. He examines Augustine’s attempts to interpret 1 Timothy 2:4, which says that God desires all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.

Wilson argues that Augustine struggled to reconcile the universal language of this passage with his increasingly deterministic understanding of divine sovereignty.

An important qualification is necessary here: Wilson acknowledges that Augustine did not always state the later doctrine of limited atonement in the explicit form familiar from Reformed confessions. Wilson’s claim is that Augustine’s later premises implied a restriction of Christ’s saving work to the elect.

The Provisionist objection:

Universal atonement does not require universal salvation. Christ’s death can be sufficient and intended for all without every person receiving its saving benefits. The atonement is God’s provision; faith is the means of receiving its benefits.

The central question is whether Christ’s death was provided for all people or exclusively for those whom God unconditionally determined to save.

I — Irresistible Grace

The question: Can a person resist God’s gracious call to salvation, or does God’s saving grace unfailingly produce the response He intends?

Wilson argues that Augustine’s later theology treated saving grace as an effective divine action that brings about the sinner’s saving response.

He connects this understanding with the philosophical and religious traditions he believes influenced Augustine, particularly their emphasis on divine intervention to restore an otherwise incapable will.

Wilson’s argument is that once total inability and unconditional election are accepted, irresistible grace follows naturally. If only those unconditionally elected receive the grace necessary to believe, and God’s decision to save them cannot fail, then saving grace must effectively secure their response.

In this framework, the person believes willingly, but the ultimate outcome is determined by God’s prior action.

The Provisionist objection:

Grace can be necessary, powerful, and entirely initiated by God without being irresistible. God calls, draws, convicts, reveals, and provides. A person does not overpower God by resisting His grace; rather, God has sovereignly permitted a genuine response to His gracious initiative.

Provisionism rejects the assumption that God’s saving purpose must be accomplished by determining every person’s response to the gospel.

P — Perseverance of the Saints

The question: Is perseverance guaranteed to every genuinely regenerated believer, or does final salvation depend on a special divine gift that determines who will persevere?

Wilson gives this point a distinctive historical treatment.

He argues that Augustine developed the doctrine of a special gift of perseverance to explain why some people who had received baptism and the Holy Spirit continued in faith while others subsequently fell away.

In Augustine’s developing framework, according to Wilson, the initial reception of grace did not necessarily guarantee final perseverance. God therefore had to grant an additional gift to those who would ultimately persevere.

Wilson sees this as a historical precursor to the perseverance doctrine later incorporated into TULIP.

However, this is also where an important distinction appears. Augustine’s account of perseverance does not map neatly onto the modern Calvinist assertion that everyone who is genuinely regenerated will certainly persevere to the end. Wilson argues that Augustine’s baptismal theology allowed for people who had received the Holy Spirit to fall away without receiving the additional gift of perseverance.

The historical point:

Wilson is not simply claiming that Augustine and modern Calvinists used different words for precisely the same doctrine. He is arguing that Augustine developed a theological solution to a problem that later became part of the Reformed understanding of perseverance, while the details of the two positions differ.

5. How the Five Points Fit Together

Wilson’s argument is not that Augustine independently developed five unrelated doctrines. He believes the doctrines emerged as interconnected consequences of a more fundamental change in Augustine’s understanding of the human will, divine sovereignty, and saving grace.

His proposed sequence can be summarized as follows:

  1. Total inability: Fallen humanity cannot make a saving response without prior divine intervention.
  2. Unconditional election: God determines which individuals receive the grace necessary for salvation.
  3. Effectual grace: God acts to ensure that those chosen respond to His saving call.
  4. Limited atonement: The intent and application of Christ’s saving work are restricted to those God has determined to save.
  5. Perseverance: God grants the additional grace necessary to ensure the final salvation of those who will persevere.

This is a summary of Wilson’s historical and theological reconstruction, not a claim that Augustine himself presented the doctrines in this exact order or in the modern terminology of TULIP.

Wilson’s argument is that the system developed from a foundational premise:

God’s unilateral determination of the individual’s eternal destiny, rather than a genuine human response to God’s universally offered grace.

Once that premise is accepted, Wilson contends, the remaining doctrines follow with considerable logical consistency.

The Provisionist challenge is directed at the foundational premise itself. If Scripture teaches that God graciously provides salvation to all, genuinely calls people to believe, and permits them to accept or resist His call, then the remaining points of TULIP cannot simply be assumed to follow from God’s sovereignty.

6. What About the Early Church Fathers?

One of Wilson’s strongest historical claims is that Augustine’s later determinism represented a significant departure from earlier Christian thought.

In both works, Wilson argues that the earlier Christian tradition generally defended human freedom to respond to God’s gracious provision while rejecting forms of unilateral determinism associated with Stoicism and Gnostic or Manichaean teachings.

He discusses figures such as Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, and Origen. Wilson interprets their writings as evidence that early Christian authors generally affirmed divine foreknowledge, grace, and predestination without concluding that God unilaterally determined each individual’s eternal destiny independently of that person’s response.

He also argues that Augustine’s earlier writings were more consistent with this understanding before his later theological shift.

If Wilson’s historical reconstruction is correct, this raises a significant question for appeals to church tradition:

should Augustine’s later theology be treated as the definitive interpretation of the early Christian consensus, or should it be examined against the writings of earlier Christian authors?

7. From Augustine to Luther and Calvin

Wilson traces the subsequent influence of Augustine through the Protestant Reformation.

Martin Luther, an Augustinian monk, drew heavily on Augustine in his understanding of grace and the bondage of the will. His 1525 work The Bondage of the Will became a major statement of his rejection of the idea that fallen humanity could independently choose salvation.

John Calvin likewise drew extensively on Augustine. Wilson argues that Calvin’s theological system adopted and further developed Augustine’s later understanding of predestination, human inability, and divine sovereignty.

This helps explain the term Augustinian-Calvinism. It describes the historical and theological relationship between Augustine’s later doctrines and the Reformed system associated with Calvin.

Nevertheless, Calvinism is not a single, unchanging body of thought in every historical detail. Later Reformed theologians developed, refined, and systematized their doctrines, and Calvinists disagree among themselves on a number of issues.

The five points of Calvinism were formally articulated in their familiar confessional setting at the Synod of Dort (1618–1619), long after Augustine and Calvin. Wilson’s argument is therefore best understood as a claim about the historical roots of the underlying theological ideas, not the literal existence of the TULIP acronym in Augustine’s writings.

8. Does This Mean Calvinism Is Gnosticism or Manichaeism?

No—not in the sense that the systems are identical. This distinction is essential to a responsible historical critique.

Wilson argues that certain deterministic concepts in Augustine’s later theology bear significant similarities to concepts found in Stoicism, Neoplatonism, Gnosticism, and Manichaeism. He believes Augustine incorporated elements of these earlier systems into his Christian interpretation of Scripture.

That is a claim about intellectual influence, historical development, and structural resemblance.

It does not mean that Calvinists accept every doctrine of these ancient philosophical or religious traditions. Historic Calvinism affirms the Christian doctrines of creation, the incarnation, the Trinity, the resurrection, and the goodness of God’s creation—positions that distinguish it sharply from important aspects of Gnostic and Manichaean systems.

The relevant question is narrower:

Did certain concepts concerning determinism, human inability, selective divine intervention, and saving grace enter Augustine’s later theology through philosophical and religious influences that differed from earlier Christian teaching?

Wilson answers yes.

His critics dispute aspects of his historical reconstruction and the degree to which the similarities demonstrate actual doctrinal dependence.

A fair assessment should examine the primary sources, the chronology of Augustine’s writings, and the specific doctrines being compared rather than treating a historical resemblance as proof of complete theological identity.

9. The Provisionist Alternative: Grace Without Theological Determinism

For those approaching the question from a Provisionist perspective, the historical discussion raises a deeper theological issue.

Does God’s sovereignty require Him to determine every human decision, including who will believe the gospel? Or can God sovereignly provide salvation, initiate the work of grace, and genuinely call people to repentance and faith without determining their response?

Provisionism maintains that salvation is entirely dependent on God’s gracious provision in Jesus Christ. Fallen humanity cannot earn salvation or save itself. God initiates the work, Christ provides the atonement, and the gospel calls people to believe.

But the fact that salvation is entirely of grace does not necessarily mean that God must unilaterally determine which individuals will believe.

The five traditional Provisionist affirmations can be summarized this way:

  • Human sinfulness: All people are sinful and need God’s grace, but sinfulness does not automatically establish total inability to respond to God’s gracious call.
  • Conditional election: God determines the condition of faith for receiving salvation; believers do not earn their election or salvation.
  • Universal atonement: Christ’s atoning work is provided for all humanity, although not everyone receives its saving benefits.
  • Resistible grace: God graciously calls and enables people to respond, but His gracious invitation can be resisted.
  • Faith and perseverance: Faith is not a meritorious work, and genuine Christian faith is to be lived out in continuing trust and obedience to Christ.

These affirmations do not deny God’s sovereignty or the necessity of grace. They reject the conclusion that grace must operate through the unilateral determination of every individual’s saving response.

From this perspective, Wilson’s historical argument is relevant because it challenges the assumption that theological determinism is the only possible way to understand divine sovereignty, election, and grace.

Conclusion: Examining the Foundation Rather Than Merely the System

Kenneth Wilson’s The Foundation of Augustinian-Calvinism and his chapter “Calvinism Is Augustinianism” offer a sustained historical challenge to the idea that the distinctive doctrines of Calvinism simply represent the uncontested teaching of the earliest Christian tradition.

Wilson argues that Augustine’s later theology departed from his own earlier emphasis on human freedom and developed a deterministic framework influenced, in Wilson’s interpretation, by Stoicism, Neoplatonism, and Manichaeism. He further argues that this framework became a major historical foundation for the theology later associated with Calvin and the five points of TULIP.

His most important contention is that total inability and unconditional election were foundational changes from which the other doctrines followed. He sees irresistible grace, limited atonement, and perseverance as interconnected consequences of Augustine’s later understanding of divine providence and saving grace.

These are substantial claims, and they should not be treated as established merely because Wilson presents them forcefully. His historical reconstruction is contested, and Calvinist theologians offer alternative readings of Augustine and the early church fathers.

Nevertheless, the questions he raises deserve serious consideration:

  • Did Augustine’s theology of predestination develop significantly during his controversy with Pelagius?
  • How did Augustine’s earlier philosophical and religious experiences affect his later understanding of divine providence?
  • To what extent did Calvin inherit Augustine’s later theology, and where did later Reformed theology develop it further?
  • Does the early Christian evidence support the claim that theological determinism was the original Christian understanding of salvation?
  • Does God’s sovereignty require the unilateral determination of every individual’s eternal destiny, or can God sovereignly provide salvation while allowing a genuine response to His grace?

For Provisionists, the central concern is not simply whether Augustine influenced Calvin. That influence is well established. The deeper concern is whether the deterministic features of Augustine’s later theology faithfully represent the biblical teaching on God’s character, universal saving provision, divine grace, and human responsibility.

The historical question and the biblical question must ultimately be considered together. A doctrine’s antiquity does not prove its truth, and a doctrine’s later development does not automatically disprove it. Each must be tested against Scripture and examined in its historical context.

The issue, then, is not whether Augustine was an important Christian theologian. It is whether the particular theological framework that developed in his later writings—and that Wilson identifies as the foundation of Augustinian-Calvinism—provides the most faithful account of God’s sovereignty and His gracious offer of salvation to humanity.


BONUS:

Allie Beth Stuckey gets early church history wrong:

How R.C. Sproul Got Pelagius and Pelagianism Wrong (Part 1)

I want to first head into Sproul’s position on Pelagius. The opening sources for this are

1. Sproul’s basic historical story

In The Pelagian Captivity of the Church, Sproul presents the historical sequence roughly like this:

Pelagius

  • denies original sin / human corruption
  • says grace isn’t necessary for obedience
  • Augustine responds with total dependence on grace
  • a “middle ground” develops

Semi-Pelagianism

  • Semi-Pelagianism says grace is necessary but human beings retain the ability to accept or reject it
  • the Roman Catholic Church later embraces this position
  • Arminianism represents essentially the same theological error today.

That’s very explicit in the article. Sproul says Semi-Pelagianism is the “middle ground” between Augustine and Pelagius and describes its “island of righteousness” from which fallen humans can choose to cooperate with grace.

And he repeats essentially the same framework in Willing to Believe. His chapter describes the issue as whether regeneration is monergistic or synergistic and says:

“All forms of semi-Pelagianism” involve synergism in regeneration.

Sproul’s historical framework is quite explicit:


“The classic issue between Augustinian theology and all forms of semi-Pelagianism” is whether regeneration precedes faith or whether a person first believes and is then regenerated. He says, “All forms of semi-Pelagianism assert some sort of synergism in the work of regeneration,” with God’s grace dependent upon human cooperation.

He then says that, according to Semi-Pelagianism, “regeneration is wrought by God, but only in those who have first responded in faith to him.”

[…]

And Sproul ultimately connects this directly to Arminianism, saying that those who believe salvation “ultimately depends on something that we do for ourselves” thereby affirm “a form of semi-Pelagianism.” So this wasn’t an incidental comment in one magazine article. It was part of Sproul’s larger theological framework.


R.C. SPROUL’S HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK:

Pelagianism Semi-Pelagianism Arminianism

R.C. Sproul’s treatment of Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism is important because he does not merely use “Semi-Pelagian” as a passing theological label. In Willing to Believe, he presents a historical and theological framework in which Augustinianism stands opposed to Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism, with Arminian theology later falling into essentially the same category.

Sproul’s framework is explicit:

“The classic issue between Augustinian theology and all forms of semi-Pelagianism focuses on one aspect of the order of salvation (ordo salutis): What is the relationship between regeneration and faith? Is regeneration a monergistic or synergistic work? Must a person first exercise faith in order to be born again? Or must rebirth occur before a person is able to exercise faith?”¹

Sproul then defines the distinction between monergism and synergism:

“Monergistic regeneration means that regeneration is accomplished by a single actor, God. It means literally a ‘one-working.’ Synergism, on the other hand, refers to a work that involves the action of two or more parties. It is a co-working.”

He immediately makes this a historical claim about Semi-Pelagianism:

“All forms of semi-Pelagianism assert some sort of synergism in the work of regeneration. Usually God’s assisting grace is seen as a necessary ingredient, but it is dependent on human cooperation for its efficacy.”

And he goes further:

“According to semi-Pelagianism regeneration is wrought by God, but only in those who have first responded in faith to him. Faith is seen not as the fruit of regeneration, but as an act of the will cooperating with God’s offer of grace.”²

Thus, Sproul establishes a very definite sequence:

God provides grace man cooperates by believing  God regenerates.

His Augustinian/Reformed alternative reverses the order:

God regenerates  regeneration produces faith.

Sproul states the latter position just as explicitly:

“The Reformers taught not only that regeneration does precede faith but also that it must precede faith. Because of the moral bondage of the unregenerate sinner, he cannot have faith until he is changed internally by the operative, monergistic work of the Holy Spirit. Faith is regeneration’s fruit, not its cause.”³

From Semi-Pelagianism To Arminianism

Sproul does not leave this framework in the fifth century. He applies it directly to later Arminian theology. Discussing the question of whether salvation ultimately depends upon something human beings do for themselves, Sproul writes that those who answer yes:

“thereby deny man’s utter helplessness in sin, and affirm that a form of semi-Pelagianism is true after all.”⁴

He then describes the Reformed assessment of Arminianism as a return to Rome and a betrayal of the Reformation.⁵ The progression is therefore fairly clear:⁶

This is important because it shows that Sproul is doing more than arguing that Calvinism and Arminianism have different ordo salutis. He is placing the later dispute within a historical narrative that runs from Pelagianism through Semi-Pelagianism to Arminianism, with Augustinianism and the Reformation on the opposing side.

Where the Historical Question Begins

The problem is not that Sproul distinguishes monergism from synergism. That is a legitimate theological distinction, and his argument that Reformed theology understands regeneration as a monergistic work can be evaluated on biblical and systematic-theological grounds.

The historical question is different:

Did the fifth-century Christians later labeled “Semi-Pelagians” actually constitute a coherent theological movement holding the precise position Sproul attributes to them?

And even more fundamentally: Is “Semi-Pelagianism” an appropriate fifth-century historical designation in the first place?

This is where modern historical scholarship complicates Sproul’s presentation.

John Cassian is a particularly useful example. Cassian has traditionally been placed under the Semi-Pelagian label, yet Lauren Pristas’s research argues that Cassian understood salvation as being, from beginning to end, the effect of God’s grace while simultaneously insisting that salvation involves genuine human consent. Pristas therefore concludes that Cassian’s theology “is not Semi-Pelagian.”⁷

That creates an important complication for Sproul’s definition.

If Semi-Pelagianism simply means that human beings cooperate with divine grace, then Cassian may appear to fit the category. But if Cassian can affirm that salvation is entirely the effect of divine grace while also affirming genuine human consent, then the label “Semi-Pelagian” may obscure important distinctions within the actual fifth-century debate.

There is another problem: the terminology itself is much later than the controversy it is commonly used to describe.

The term “Semi-Pelagianism” was not the self-designation of a fifth-century movement. Historical research by Irena Backus and Aza Goudriaan traces the term to the sixteenth century, with its first known use by Theodore Beza around 1556. Initially, Beza used it polemically to describe contemporary Roman Catholic teaching concerning grace and human will; only later was the term applied retrospectively to the fifth-century Massilian controversy.⁸

That does not mean the fifth-century controversy was imaginary. There were genuine disagreements among Augustine, Prosper, Cassian, Faustus of Riez, the monks of Hadrumetum, and others concerning grace, free will, predestination, and the beginning of faith.

The issue is whether we should take the later category “Semi-Pelagianism” and treat it as though it were the name of a clearly defined fifth-century movement whose members all shared Sproul’s theological definition.

That is considerably harder to establish.

The Important Distinction

We therefore need to separate two questions.

I am not arguing that Sproul was wrong to distinguish monergism from synergism. Nor am I arguing that he was wrong that Arminian theology differs from Reformed theology concerning the relationship between regeneration and faith.

Those are theological propositions that can be debated on biblical and systematic-theological grounds. The historical issue is narrower:

Sproul takes a later theological category—“Semi-Pelagianism”—and presents it as though it straightforwardly describes the historical opponents of Augustine, then uses that category as a bridge to characterize Arminianism.

That is a substantially different claim. Sproul’s theological taxonomy may be internally coherent. That does not automatically make his historical taxonomy accurate. And this distinction becomes even more important when we return to Pelagius himself.

Modern examination of Pelagius’s surviving writings has complicated the traditional portrait of him as someone who simply believed human beings could achieve righteousness without divine grace. Pelagius repeatedly spoke of God’s grace and assistance, Christ’s work, the help of the Holy Spirit, baptism, and God’s continuing help. Ali Bonner’s examination of the surviving Pelagian corpus emphasizes precisely these features.⁹

That does not make Pelagius Augustinian. It certainly does not make him Calvinistic.

But it does raise a significant historical question:

If Pelagius himself does not fit the caricature later associated with “Pelagianism,” and if the Christians later labeled “Semi-Pelagians” did not necessarily share a single coherent theological system, how reliable is the traditional historical chain from Pelagius Semi-Pelagianism Arminianism?

That is the question worth investigating.

And this is why Sproul’s Willing to Believe is so useful. He puts his historical framework on the table in unusually clear language. We do not have to infer what he means. He explicitly defines Semi-Pelagianism as synergism in regeneration, contrasts it with Augustinian monergism, and then applies the category to those who believe that human faith precedes regeneration—including Arminians.¹⁰

The question, then, is not simply whether Sproul’s theology is Reformed.

It obviously is.

The more interesting question is whether his history accurately represents the people and controversies to which he applies those categories.


Notes

  1. R. C. Sproul, Willing to Believe: The Controversy over Free Will (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1997), 3.
  2. Sproul, Willing to Believe, 3.
  3. Ibid., 3.
  4. Ibid., 4.
  5. Ibid., 4.
  6. Ibid., 5.
  7. Lauren Pristas, The Theological Anthropology of John Cassian (PhD diss., Boston College, 1993), cited in God’s Provision for All: A Defense of God’s Goodness.
  8. Irena Backus and Aza Goudriaan, “‘Semipelagianism’: The Origins of the Term and Its Passage into the History of Heresy,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 65, no. 1 (2014): 25–46.
  9. Ali Bonner, The Myth of Pelagianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), especially her discussion of Pelagius’s surviving writings and his treatment of grace and divine assistance.
  10. Sproul, Willing to Believe, 3–5.

…more below

The TRUTH About Semi-Pelagianism | Leighton Flowers | Calvinism

Many people love to throw around the terms “Pelagianism” and “Semi-Pelagianism”, but many folks have no idea what those terms entail. More often than not, they are effectively a boogeyman and/or straw man to avoid actual, productive discourse. Leighton Flowers explains what the terms mean and why Provisionism does not fit into either category.

To read Dr. Adam Harwood’s article on the topic please go here; To read Dr. David Allen’s article on the topic please go here.

2. The First Problem:
Sproul’s Portrait of Pelagius—and the History Behind It

The first major problem with Sproul’s historical framework is his portrayal of Pelagius himself.

In his Chosen by God teaching, reproduced in the Renewing Your Mind broadcast “Everyone Believes This Doctrine,” Sproul explicitly lays out the threefold historical framework he accepts:

He says:

“I didn’t invent this designation, but I agree with it. These are the three major generic types of theology that have influenced church history.”¹

That is important because Sproul is not merely using these terms casually. He is consciously adopting this threefold historical taxonomy.¹

He then describes the fundamental disagreement between Augustine and Pelagius as the question of how necessary God’s grace is for salvation. And his description of Pelagius is exceptionally strong:

“Pelagius was of the opinion that the grace of God assists human beings to be saved, but is in no way necessary.”²

Sproul immediately explains:

“His fundamental assumption was that man in his natural state has within himself the capacity to keep the commandments of God to such a degree as to be redeemed without any help from divine grace.”²

Sproul therefore presents Pelagianism as essentially human ability without a necessary dependence upon divine grace. That is a very significant historical claim.

The problem with that characterization

The question is not whether Pelagius agreed with Augustine.

HE DIDN’T.

Nor is the question whether Pelagius had a different understanding of grace, human ability, original sin, and salvation.

HE CLEARLY DID.

The more precise question is whether Pelagius actually taught what Sproul says he taught: that divine grace was “in no way necessary” and that human beings could be redeemed “without any help from divine grace.” That is where the surviving writings of Pelagius become important.

Ali Bonner’s examination of those writings finds repeated references to God’s grace, God’s help, the Holy Spirit, Christ’s work, baptism, and divine assistance. Her discussion of Pelagius’s On Free Will, for example, points to his acknowledgment of God’s continuing and daily help. That does not make Pelagius Augustinian. But it creates an important distinction:

Pelagius rejected Augustine’s understanding of grace

is one claim.

Pelagius believed God’s grace was unnecessary for salvation

is another.

The second claim requires considerably more scrutiny.

The chronology of Augustine’s own theology also complicates the story

There is another reason the traditional narrative deserves closer examination: the chronology of Augustine’s theology itself.

Ken Wilson, in The Foundation of Augustinian-Calvinism, argues that Augustine’s later deterministic theology did not emerge in its mature form in the 396–397 period, as is commonly associated with Ad Simplicianum. Wilson argues instead that a major theological transition occurred around 412, during Augustine’s developing conflict with the Pelagians. According to Wilson, Augustine’s theology prior to 412 continued to affirm human free choice and election according to God’s foreknowledge, while his later writings increasingly introduced the concepts that would become central to Augustinian predestination and inability.³

Wilson specifically argues that Augustine’s theological shift began during the controversy with Pelagius and included the loss of human free will, inherited damnable guilt, unilateral divine gift of faith, and selective perseverance.³

This is important because it changes the way the historical story can be framed. Instead of simply assuming:

Pelagius challenged Augustine’s already fully developed Augustinian theology

we have to at least consider the possibility that

the Pelagian controversy itself was one of the major catalysts in the development and radicalization of Augustine’s later anthropology.

Wilson goes even further. He argues that Augustine had maintained what Wilson calls the traditional Christian understanding of free choice for roughly twenty-five years before 412, and that Augustine’s later deterministic theology represented a significant departure from his earlier position.⁴

That is Wilson’s thesis, which is important because it demonstrates that the historical development of Augustine’s theology is itself a subject of scholarly dispute.

And that matters because the question before us is not merely:

“Was Augustine right?”

It is also:

“How did Augustine’s understanding of human nature and grace become the dominant Western position?”

Those are two different historical questions.

And the church’s response was not as simple as the traditional narrative suggests

Once we examine the fifth-century controversy itself, the simple story begins to break down. The traditional presentation can sound like this:

But the historical process was considerably more complicated.

Pelagius was vindicated at Diospolis in 415. African bishops continued to oppose Pelagius and Caelestius, and African councils condemned teachings associated with them. Pope Zosimus subsequently reopened the case and initially treated Caelestius’s position favorably. The controversy then escalated until Emperor Honorius intervened in 418.

On April 30, 418, Honorius issued an imperial decree against Pelagius and Caelestius. The Council of Carthage followed with condemnation on May 1, and Pope Zosimus subsequently endorsed the African position through his Epistola tractoria. So the historical progression was not simply: Augustine convinces the church Pelagius loses.

It was:

That does not mean that Augustine simply bypassed the church and imposed his theology by the “Roman sword.” There were genuine councils, bishops, theological arguments, and papal involvement.

But neither should the history be reduced to an uncontested theological consensus.

Imperial authority became an important part of the final settlement.

And Wilson adds another interesting historical observation. He argues that the earliest reactions to what became known as the Pelagian controversy occurred principally in the East and that Eastern bishops—not Augustine—initiated the initial opposition to Pelagianism. He also notes that Eastern theology concerning nature, grace, original sin, and the necessity of grace could agree with Augustine on important points without embracing his later deterministic anthropology.⁵

Again, Wilson’s larger conclusions are his interpretation of the evidence, not something that should simply be treated as settled fact. But the historical point is important:

“Augustine versus Pelagius” does not adequately describe the entire controversy.

There were multiple figures, multiple theological questions, different regional responses, councils, papal decisions, and eventually imperial intervention.

This is where Sproul’s framework needs qualification

Sproul’s theological argument can be evaluated on its own terms:

  • What is the condition of fallen humanity?
  • What does grace accomplish?
  • Can the human will respond to grace?
  • Does regeneration precede faith?

Those are legitimate theological questions.

But Sproul’s historical taxonomy is another matter.

He presents:

as essentially successive expressions of the same basic theological problem, standing against the Augustinian understanding of grace. Indeed, he explicitly connects the later Remonstrants, Calvinists, and Methodists to this same underlying dispute.⁶ That is precisely where modern historical scholarship raises questions.

The people later classified as “Semi-Pelagians” did not necessarily constitute one unified movement, and the term itself was coined centuries after the fifth-century controversy. Likewise, the surviving writings of Pelagius make it increasingly difficult to sustain the simplest version of the traditional caricature.

And the chronology of Augustine’s own theological development is disputed as well. Wilson argues for a significant transition around 412, while other scholars place Augustine’s decisive shift earlier or interpret the development as more gradual. The important point for our purposes is not that Wilson has settled the question, but that the historical development of Augustinian anthropology is itself contested. Granted, “Sproul didn’t understand Pelagius” is too basic. Rather:

Sproul’s historical account is heavily shaped by the Augustinian/Reformed interpretation of the Pelagian controversy. His theological taxonomy is clear and internally coherent, but modern examination of Pelagius’s surviving writings, the complicated history of the fifth-century controversy, and competing reconstructions of Augustine’s own theological development make his historical construction considerably more difficult to maintain in its traditional form.

And that is really the larger point. Sproul’s theological argument may stand or fall on Scripture and theology. But his historical genealogy should not simply be assumed. It has to be demonstrated.


Notes

  1. R. C. Sproul, “Everyone Believes This Doctrine,” Renewing Your Mind, transcript, p. 2.
  2. Ibid., p. 3.
  3. Ken Wilson, The Foundation of Augustinian-Calvinism (Regula Fidei Press, 2019), pp. 40–42. Wilson argues that Augustine’s major transition toward his later deterministic theology occurred around 412 during his conflict with the Pelagians.
  4. Wilson, The Foundation of Augustinian-Calvinism, pp. 25, 36, 40. Wilson argues that Augustine maintained traditional Christian free-choice theology prior to 412 and that the later transition occurred during the Pelagian controversy.
  5. Wilson, The Foundation of Augustinian-Calvinism, pp. 71–72. Wilson argues that pre-Augustinian Christian authors generally defended free choice against unilateral determinism and that the initial reactions to Pelagianism occurred principally in the East.
  6. R. C. Sproul, “Everyone Believes This Doctrine,” Renewing Your Mind, transcript, p. 4.

3. The Second Problem:
Sproul Turns a Theological Distinction
into a Historical Taxonomy

This is where the issue becomes more complicated. R.C. Sproul’s distinction between monergism and synergism is clear. More importantly, Sproul himself is very clear about what he believes separates the Reformed position from what he calls Semi-Pelagianism.

In Willing to Believe, Sproul frames the issue around the relationship between regeneration and faith:

“The classic issue between Augustinian theology and all forms of semi-Pelagianism focuses on one aspect of the order of salvation (ordo salutis): What is the relationship between regeneration and faith?”¹

He then defines the two alternatives:

“Monergistic regeneration means that regeneration is accomplished by a single actor, God.”¹

By contrast, synergism involves “the action of two or more parties”—a “co-working.”¹ Sproul then makes his historical-theological classification explicit:

“All forms of semi-Pelagianism assert some sort of synergism in the work of regeneration.”¹

For Sproul, the decisive question is therefore not simply whether human beings possess a will, or whether they make genuine choices. The question is whether an unregenerate person can respond to God’s grace in faith before regeneration occurs. Sproul’s answer is no. He says:

“The Reformers taught not only that regeneration does precede faith but also that it must precede faith.”¹

And he explains why:

“Because of the moral bondage of the unregenerate sinner, he cannot have faith until he is changed internally by the operative, monergistic work of the Holy Spirit. Faith is regeneration’s fruit, not its cause.”¹

That gives us a very clear picture of Sproul’s theological system:

Sproul Then Extends This Category to Arminianism

This is particularly important because Sproul does not leave Semi-Pelagianism as a description of an isolated fifth-century controversy.

In the same discussion, Sproul quotes J. I. Packer and O. R. Johnston asking whether salvation is “wholly of God” or whether it “ultimately depend[s] on something that we do for ourselves.” Their conclusion is that those who take the latter position “affirm that a form of semi-Pelagianism is true after all.”¹

Sproul accepts this assessment and connects it directly to Arminian theology. He describes later Reformed opposition to Arminianism as a rejection of the Reformation’s doctrine of sola gratia, even describing Arminianism as, in principle, a “return to Rome” and a “betrayal of the Reformation.”¹

This is not merely a criticism of a contemporary theological alternative. Sproul is presenting a historical continuity:

Sproul summarizes the larger conflict by saying:

“The age-old debate between Pelagianism and Augustinianism is played out in the arena of these issues.”¹

That sentence is important. Sproul is not simply saying, “I disagree with Arminianism.” He is placing the Arminian controversy within what he considers an age-old Pelagian-versus-Augustinian conflict.

Sproul’s Chosen by God Reinforces the Same Framework

This was not an argument Sproul made only in Willing to Believe.

In Chosen by God, he makes essentially the same distinction when discussing the Reformed understanding of predestination. Sproul says that, in the Reformed view, God’s choice precedes man’s choice. God intervenes to bring the elect to saving faith, and the ultimate destiny of the individual is therefore determined by God rather than resting ultimately upon human choice.²

He contrasts this with what he calls the “foreknowledge view”, arguing that if God’s inward call merely accompanies people whom God already knows will respond, then the decisive difference still lies in the human response.²

Likewise, when discussing regeneration and faith, Sproul argues that God’s grace can be resisted in a general sense, but God’s regenerating grace cannot fail to accomplish its purpose. Once God creates spiritual life and gives the person a desire for Christ, the person will choose Christ.³

This is why Sproul prefers the term “effectual grace” to “irresistible grace.”³ His reasoning is internally consistent: If regeneration actually occurs, faith necessarily follows.

Therefore, if faith must occur before regeneration, then faith cannot be the fruit of regeneration. It must instead be the human response that precedes it. For Sproul, that is the fundamental theological error.

Truths We Confess Makes the Same Point

Sproul’s Truths We Confess: A Layman’s Guide to the Westminster Confession of Faith provides another particularly useful example.

There he describes what he calls the “semi-Pelagian position” as the belief that God gives saving or “prevenient” grace to everybody, but that after God has done His part, “the final decision depends on what each individual does with that grace.”⁴

Sproul then asks why one person cooperates with grace while another rejects it. His answer is that, if both received the same grace, the person who responded correctly has ultimately done something the other person did not do.⁴ He therefore argues that the Reformed position gives God the decisive role in salvation, whereas the alternative ultimately leaves the final distinction between the saved and the lost in the human response.⁴

Again, the theological structure is unmistakable:

But Here We Need to Separate Two Different Questions

And this is the point where I think we need to be especially careful.

Sproul’s theological distinction is one question.

Is regeneration monergistic or synergistic? Does regeneration precede faith? Can an unregenerate person respond positively to God’s grace? Does saving faith originate entirely in God’s action, or does the human response constitute a genuine condition that God has chosen to honor?

Those are legitimate theological questions, and Sproul presents a coherent Reformed answer to them.

But Sproul’s historical taxonomy is a different question.

Did the fifth-century Christians later called “Semi-Pelagians” actually constitute a unified movement that held the precise theological position Sproul attributes to them? And even more fundamentally: Is “Semi-Pelagianism” an appropriate name for a fifth-century movement at all?

That is where the historical evidence becomes considerably less tidy.

The problem is not that there were no fifth-century disagreements about grace and free will. There certainly were. The problem is that later historians and theologians grouped a variety of people, texts, and controversies under a single category and then treated that category as though it described a clearly identifiable historical movement.

John Cassian is a particularly useful example. The traditional designation of Cassian as “Semi-Pelagian” has itself been disputed. One study cited in our research describes Cassian’s position as teaching that salvation is, from beginning to end, the effect of God’s grace while simultaneously involving genuine human consent and the rehabilitation of human freedom. The author explicitly concludes that Cassian’s thought is NOT SEMI-PELAGIAN.⁵

That should make us pause.

If “Semi-Pelagianism” simply means human cooperation with divine grace, Cassian appears to fit the category.

But if a Christian can affirm that salvation is entirely dependent upon God’s grace while also affirming genuine human consent, then cooperation by itself cannot establish that someone was historically “Semi-Pelagian.”

RPT BREAK:

This distinction is important because it is easy to confuse human response with human contribution. As discussed in Calvinism’s Conflation | Flowers and Tozer, the non-Calvinist position can affirm that salvation is entirely dependent upon God’s gracious provision while still maintaining that the sinner must personally respond in repentance and faith. In that framework, God provides the atonement, the gospel, the gracious invitation, and the means of salvation; the person’s response does not add merit to Christ’s work or make salvation partly man’s accomplishment.

That is precisely why the mere presence of human cooperation cannot, by itself, establish the historical label “Semi-Pelagian.” The real historical question is what kind of cooperation was being affirmed, and how was that cooperation understood in relation to God’s grace?

The Name Itself Creates Another Historical Problem

The term “Semi-Pelagianism” was not the self-designation of a fifth-century theological movement. It is a later label applied retrospectively to a collection of fifth-and-sixth-century debates. This does not mean that the controversies were invented. It means we have to distinguish between:

  1. the actual fifth-century debates over grace, free will, predestination, and perseverance;
  2. the particular individuals and positions involved in those debates;
  3. the later category called “Semi-Pelagianism”; and
  4. the modern theological system to which that label is sometimes applied.

Those are not necessarily the same thing.

Ali Bonner’s examination of Pelagius’s surviving writings makes the problem even sharper. She argues that there is a “profound disjunction” between the Pelagianism described by Pelagius’s opponents and what can actually be found in Pelagius’s surviving writings.⁶ She argues that many of the propositions later associated with “Pelagianism” cannot be demonstrated from Pelagius’s own surviving texts.⁶

Bonner also argues that ideas associated with Pelagius—particularly human freedom and the goodness of human nature—were already widespread in earlier ascetic Christian literature.⁷

Whether one accepts Bonner’s much stronger thesis that “Pelagianism” itself was a historical fiction is another question. Her work is revisionist and has generated substantial scholarly discussion, with some scholars accepting important parts of her critique while questioning aspects of her reconstruction and methodology. But the primary-source evidence is sufficient to establish a more modest point:

So What Exactly Is the Problem With Sproul?

It isn’t that R.C. Sproul didn’t understand Pelagius, it is rather that Sproul was working within a longstanding Augustinian and Reformed interpretation, and his theological argument is quite clear. A more historically defensible criticism is this:

Sproul’s theological distinction between monergism and synergism is clear and internally coherent, but his historical taxonomy treats “Pelagianism” and “Semi-Pelagianism” as though they were straightforward descriptions of identifiable historical movements. Modern examination of the surviving sources makes that historical construction considerably more complicated.

And that distinction matters.

That historical connection has to be demonstrated from the historical evidence.

And that is precisely where the traditional narrative begins to come apart.


Notes

  1. R. C. Sproul, Willing to Believe: The Controversy over Free Will (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1997), 35–37.
  2. R. C. Sproul, Chosen by God (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House, 1986), 136–37.
  3. Sproul, Chosen by God, 120–21.
  4. R. C. Sproul, Truths We Confess: A Layman’s Guide to the Westminster Confession of Faith, discussion of Westminster Confession 3.1–4. ;
  5. Lauren Pristas, discussion of John Cassian, cited in God’s Provision for All: A Defense of God’s Goodness. The source summarizes Pristas as arguing that for Cassian salvation is “from beginning to end” the effect of God’s grace while also involving genuine human consent.
  6. Ali Bonner, The Myth of Pelagianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), discussion of Pelagius’s surviving writings and Augustine’s fourteen attributed tenets.
  7. Bonner, The Myth of Pelagianism, discussion of pre-Pelagian ascetic literature and the continuity of its teaching on human nature, free will, and grace.

4. The Third Problem:
Human Cooperation with Grace Is
Not the Same as Semi-Pelagianism

This is where the distinction becomes especially important.

R.C. Sproul’s definition of Semi-Pelagianism centers on human cooperation in salvation. In Willing to Believe, he describes the classic disagreement between Augustinian theology and what he calls Semi-Pelagianism as a question of whether regeneration precedes or follows faith. For Sproul, the Reformed position is monergistic: God alone acts in regeneration, and regeneration produces faith. Semi-Pelagianism, by contrast, is synergistic: God provides grace, but the human response is involved in bringing about regeneration.¹

That theological distinction is clear enough. The problem comes when synergism itself becomes virtually synonymous with Semi-Pelagianism.

Roger Olson points out that the terms monergism and synergism are broader theological categories. Synergism simply refers to some form of free human participation in salvation; it does not automatically mean Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism. Olson explicitly distinguishes heretical synergism from what he calls evangelical synergism. Classical Arminianism, he argues, is synergistic, but it is not Pelagian or Semi-Pelagian because it teaches that God’s prevenient grace precedes every human response toward God.²

That distinction matters.

If Semi-Pelagianism means that fallen human beings can initiate salvation out of their own natural ability, then classical Arminianism does not fit that definition. Olson describes classical Arminianism as affirming that fallen humanity is spiritually helpless and that supernatural grace is necessary even for the first movement of the will toward God. He summarizes the Arminian position this way: God initiates the relationship and enables the person to respond freely; no one can repent, believe, or be saved without the Holy Spirit’s supernatural work.³

In other words, the question cannot simply be:

Does the human being respond?

The more important question is:

Where does the ability to respond come from?

That is a very different question.

Grace Does Not Have to Eliminate Human Response

Jerry Walls makes essentially this distinction in Does God Love Everyone? His model gives God the decisive role in salvation while still treating human faith and cooperation as genuinely significant. He describes God’s actions as the dominant ones: God initiates, regenerates, sanctifies, glorifies, and ultimately secures salvation. At the same time, human free response is a necessary condition for salvation. Walls therefore does not see human response as competing with God’s grace. Rather, God’s gracious initiative makes the human response possible without making that response meaningless.⁴ This is important because it exposes a weakness in a common Reformed argument:

If salvation involves human cooperation, then salvation is no longer entirely of grace.

That conclusion does not necessarily follow. A person can receive something entirely by grace and still be required to respond to it. The response does not thereby become the meritorious cause of the gift.

Chuck Smith’s Calvinism, Arminianism & the Word of God provides a useful evangelical illustration of this distinction. Smith affirms that humanity is fallen, that no one can earn or deserve salvation, and that salvation depends upon God’s grace and the work of the Holy Spirit. Yet he also says that God offers salvation to all and that human beings must accept God’s invitation.

Smith’s position is therefore neither:

“Man saves himself.”

nor:

“Man contributes nothing whatsoever to the response of faith.”

Instead, it is essentially:

God provides the gracious provision; the human being must respond to it.

Whether that theological model is ultimately biblical is a separate question. But it demonstrates why “human cooperation” by itself is insufficient to establish Semi-Pelagianism.

Even Arminian Sources Distinguish the Two

Olson is particularly valuable here because he does not merely defend Arminianism against Calvinist criticism. He traces the distinction historically within the Arminian tradition itself.

He points to theologians such as Richard Watson, William Burton Pope, Thomas Summers, and John Wesley, who strongly affirmed original sin and the necessity of supernatural grace while rejecting Semi-Pelagianism. William Burton Pope, for example, insisted that humanity has no ability to return to God apart from grace and that even cooperation with grace is itself the result of grace.

Olson likewise distinguishes the classical Arminian tradition from later figures whom he considers more properly Semi-Pelagian. He argues that Philip Limborch moved in a Semi-Pelagian direction because his conception of prevenient grace merely assisted remaining human capabilities, whereas Arminius and Wesley understood prevenient grace as a supernatural work of God that enables the fallen person to respond.

That is a significant historical distinction. It means that even within the Arminian tradition, the important question was not simply whether humans cooperate with grace. The question was what grace does to the fallen human will before that cooperation occurs.

This Also Complicates Sproul’s Identification of Arminianism with Semi-Pelagianism

This is where Sproul’s taxonomy becomes especially difficult.

Sproul does not merely use Semi-Pelagianism to describe a fifth-century controversy. He also applies the category to later theological systems. In Willing to Believe, he accepts the argument that if salvation ultimately depends upon something human beings do for themselves, then a form of Semi-Pelagianism has effectively been embraced. He therefore places Arminianism on the synergistic side of the same basic divide.⁵

But Olson specifically challenges this identification.

He notes that Arminianism has repeatedly been equated with Semi-Pelagianism in Reformed literature while ignoring the Arminian doctrine of prevenient grace. He even documents cases in which Calvinist writers treated Arminianism as Semi-Pelagian while failing to engage its explicit teaching that grace precedes and enables the human response.

Olson’s point deserves consideration even if one ultimately rejects his Arminian theology:

  • If an opponent’s actual doctrine includes supernatural grace preceding and enabling the human response, then calling that doctrine Semi-Pelagian requires more argument than simply pointing to the existence of human response.

And that brings us back to the historical question.

The Category Needs to Be Used Carefully

There is a legitimate theological disagreement between Calvinism and Arminianism concerning the relationship between grace, regeneration, faith, and human freedom. Sproul is perfectly within his rights to argue that his monergistic understanding is the biblical one.

But that theological argument should not be confused with the historical claim that every theology involving human cooperation with grace belongs to the historical category of “Semi-Pelagianism.”

Those are two different propositions.

The first asks:

What does Scripture teach about God’s grace, regeneration, faith, and the human will?

The second asks:

Who in church history actually taught what we now call Semi-Pelagianism, and does that category accurately describe them?

The first is a theological question. The second is a historical question.

And once those questions are separated, Sproul’s argument becomes much more complicated. His monergism-versus-synergism framework is clear and internally coherent, but it does not automatically establish his historical taxonomy.

Human cooperation does not prove Pelagianism.

Human cooperation does not even prove Semi-Pelagianism.

The decisive historical question is what kind of cooperation is being described, and whether that cooperation originates in unaided human ability or in God’s prior grace.

That distinction is crucial—not only for evaluating Arminianism, but also for determining whether the fifth-century Christians later labeled “Semi-Pelagians” actually belonged under that label in the first place.

Notes

  1. R. C. Sproul, Willing to Believe: The Controversy over Free Will (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1997), 35–37. Sproul defines the classic issue as the relationship between regeneration and faith and distinguishes monergism from synergism.
  2. Roger E. Olson, Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2006). Olson distinguishes heretical Pelagian/Semi-Pelagian synergism from what he calls evangelical synergism.
  3. Olson, Arminian Theology, discussion of prevenient grace. Olson states that God initiates the relationship and enables the person to respond freely and that no person can repent, believe, or be saved without the Spirit’s supernatural support.
  4. Jerry L. Walls, Does God Love Everyone? The Heart of What’s Wrong with Calvinism (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2016). Walls distinguishes God’s decisive role in salvation from the necessity of human free response.
  5. Sproul, Willing to Believe, 36–37.
  6. Roger E. Olson, Arminian Theology, discussion of the historical identification of Arminianism with Semi-Pelagianism and the distinction between classical Arminianism and later developments.

5. There’s an Even Bigger Irony

Sproul makes another statement that deserves closer examination:

“Historically semi-Pelagianism is not called semi-Augustinianism, but semi-Pelagianism.”¹

At first glance, this sounds like a straightforward historical observation. But there is an irony here:

the historical label Sproul is using to explain the movement was not actually a fifth-century label.

The people later classified as “Semi-Pelagians” did not identify themselves by that name. More importantly, the term Semi-Pelagianism did not arise during the fifth-century controversies over Augustine, Pelagius, and the Gallic monks. The terminology arose much later. Irena Backus and Aza Goudriaan trace the origin of the term to sixteenth-century Protestant polemics, identifying Theodore Beza as the first person known to have used the term, around 1556.²

The existence of a later label does not, by itself, demonstrate the existence of the historical system that the label eventually came to describe. Otherwise, we risk reasoning backward:

But that is precisely the historical question that needs to be demonstrated.

The proper question is not simply

what later theologians called these people.

The question is

what the fifth-century theologians actually believed about sin, grace, human freedom, faith, and the beginning of salvation.

This does NOT mean that there was no fifth-century controversy over grace and human freedom. There clearly was. Nor does the later origin of the term prove that the people eventually labeled “Semi-Pelagians” agreed with one another on every point. It means that we need to distinguish the historical people and their writings from the later theological category imposed upon them.

And this is where Sproul’s statement becomes particularly interesting. His argument is that Semi-Pelagianism represents a compromise with Augustinianism because it retains an “island of righteousness” within fallen humanity—a capacity by which the person can “turn,” “change,” “incline,” or “dispose” himself toward grace.¹

But notice what has happened.

📢 The theological definition is being used to justify the historical label, while the historical label is then used to reinforce the theological definition.

That creates a potential circularity. The historical question cannot simply be:

“Why did later theologians call them Semi-Pelagians rather than Semi-Augustinians?”

The more important questions are:

  • What did the fifth-century theologians actually teach?
  • Did they believe that fallen humanity could initiate the movement toward God apart from preceding grace?
  • What did they believe about original sin, prevenient grace, free will, faith, and the beginning of salvation?
  • And to what extent did these theologians actually constitute a single theological movement?

Those questions have to be answered from the fifth-century sources themselves—not simply from the terminology later applied to them.

The history of the term makes this even more important. Backus and Goudriaan show that the meaning of Semi-Pelagianism itself CHANGED OVER TIME. Beza initially used the term for contemporary opponents. The Formula of Concord used it in 1577 for Lutheran synergists. Then, beginning with the Roman Catholic polemicist Nicholas Sanders in 1571, the term increasingly became associated with the fifth-century Massilian monks. Thus, the familiar historical meaning of Semi-Pelagianism was itself the product of a developing post-Reformation classification.²

That is a significant qualification to the traditional historical storyline. It means we should be careful with a neat progression such as:

because those labels do not necessarily represent three neatly connected historical stages in which one self-conscious movement simply developed into the next.

The terminology came later. The categories were refined later. And the application of those categories to fifth-century figures was itself part of a later theological and historical debate.² This does not settle the theological question in favor of Arminianism, Provisionism, or any other position. Nor does it prove that the fifth-century critics of Augustine were simply “Semi-Augustinians” in every meaningful sense. Those are separate questions.

What it does establish is something much more modest—and much more important for our purposes:

We cannot use the later name “Semi-Pelagianism” as though the name itself proves the existence, unity, or theological content of the historical movement to which it was eventually applied.

Sproul is therefore making two different arguments that need to be separated.

  1. The first can be debated from Scripture and theology.
  2. The second has to be established from history, texts, terminology, and context.

And once we make that distinction, the historical picture becomes considerably more complicated than Sproul’s theological taxonomy suggests.

The irony, then, is not that the fifth-century controversy was imaginary. It is that the very name being used to organize the history is itself a later construction.

And that brings us to the next question:

But Were the So-Called “Semi-Pelagians” Actually Semi-Pelagian?


Footnotes

  1. R. C. Sproul, “The Pelagian Captivity of the Church,” Modern Reformation 10, no. 3 (May/June 2001): 22–29.
  2. Irena Backus and Aza Goudriaan, “‘Semipelagianism’: The Origins of the Term and Its Passage into the History of Heresy,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 65, no. 1 (2014): 25–46.

6. But Were the So-Called “Semi-Pelagians”
Actually Semi-Pelagian?

Once we recognize that the term Semi-Pelagianism was applied retrospectively, another question becomes unavoidable:

Did the fifth-century theologians later given that label actually hold the theological position that the label came to represent?

The answer is not nearly as simple as the traditional storyline suggests.

There certainly were real fifth-century disagreements over grace, free will, predestination, and the beginning of faith. Augustine’s theology of grace provoked concerns among some Christians in southern Gaul, and figures such as John Cassian, Prosper of Aquitaine, Vincent of Lérins, Faustus of Riez, and the monks associated with Hadrumetum became involved in different ways. The issue, therefore, is not whether there was a controversy.

There was.

The issue is whether these diverse people should be grouped together under a single theological system called Semi-Pelagianism.¹ John Cassian is probably the most important test case.

Cassian has traditionally been presented as the leading representative of the so-called Semi-Pelagians. In the traditional account, he represented a middle position between Pelagius and Augustine: he affirmed the necessity of grace but maintained that the human will must cooperate with that grace. His Conferences, particularly Conference XIII, have therefore frequently been cited as evidence of Semi-Pelagian theology.²

But there is a significant problem with simply equating human cooperation with Semi-Pelagianism.

Lauren Pristas’s study of Cassian reaches a very different conclusion. She argues that, for Cassian, salvation is “from beginning to end, the effect of God’s grace” and that it is therefore fully divine. At the same time, because salvation is the salvation of a rational creature who has sinned through free choice, Cassian maintains that salvation necessarily includes genuine human consent and the restoration of the faculty of free choice.

Pristas’s conclusion is explicit: Cassian’s theology is not Semi-Pelagian.

That distinction is extremely important for our discussion.

Cassian can affirm human cooperation with grace without affirming that human beings independently initiate salvation. Those are not necessarily the same thing.

And that brings us back to the central problem with Sproul’s classification. If Semi-Pelagianism is defined broadly enough to mean any theological system in which human beings cooperate with God’s grace, then Cassian can readily be placed inside the category. But if the defining issue is whether fallen humanity can make the first movement toward God apart from preceding divine grace, then the question becomes much more complicated.

In other words: Human cooperation with grace does not necessarily equal human initiative apart from grace.

That distinction cannot simply be dismissed as a minor technicality. It is precisely the distinction that separates classical Arminian theology from Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism as those terms are ordinarily understood by their defenders.

The historical evidence also complicates the idea that the fifth-century “Semi-Pelagians” formed one unified movement. Backus and Goudriaan note that the traditional use of the term can misleadingly suggest that the fifth-century figures formed a coherent movement that consciously identified its teaching with Pelagius. They point out that neither Augustine nor the Capitula of the Council of Orange called such a movement “Semi-Pelagian,” and they highlight scholarship questioning whether there was actually a sustained, unified controversy in fifth-century Gaul corresponding neatly to the later category.³

This is why the word “so-called” is useful here. It does not mean that the people in question held no distinctive views. It means that we should distinguish the historical people from the later classification applied to them.

The problem becomes even clearer when we consider that some of these figures agreed with Augustine on far more than the traditional “middle position” description suggests. The Massilian opponents of Augustine were not simply defenders of Pelagius. They accepted the reality of the Fall and the necessity of divine grace. Their disagreements centered on questions such as the operation of grace, human freedom, predestination, and the beginning of faith.³

This makes the familiar three-step genealogy increasingly difficult to sustain:

The diagram looks neat.

The history is not.

Indeed, Ali Bonner goes considerably further than this. Bonner argues that the very category of “Pelagianism” itself breaks down under close examination and that the later classification of various fifth-century texts and authors creates distinctions that were not necessarily present in the original historical setting. Her thesis is controversial and should not simply be treated as settled scholarship, but it illustrates how seriously some modern historians question the traditional categories themselves.⁴

We therefore need to resist two opposite mistakes. The first mistake would be to say:

“The term was coined later, therefore Semi-Pelagianism never existed.”

That conclusion does not follow. A later label can describe an earlier theological position.

The second mistake is the opposite:

“Later theologians called them Semi-Pelagians, therefore they must have held the later definition of Semi-Pelagianism.”

That conclusion does not follow either. The proper historical method lies between those extremes.

We have to examine the actual writings, arguments, historical circumstances, and relationships among the fifth-century figures and then ask whether the later category accurately describes them.

And this brings us back to the theological distinction established earlier in this article.

Those questions overlap, but they are not identical.

And that is precisely why the charge “Semi-Pelagian” cannot simply be established by pointing to the existence of human cooperation. We have to determine what kind of cooperation was being taught, where the ability to cooperate came from, and whether grace preceded and enabled that response.

That is especially important when evaluating later Arminian theology. Classical Arminian writers such as Arminius and Wesley did not appeal to some surviving “island of righteousness” within fallen humanity as the source of saving faith. They explicitly grounded the sinner’s ability to respond in divine grace. Arminius, for example, described the fallen will as powerless toward spiritual good except as it is “excited by Divine grace.” Wesley likewise emphasized the supernatural and enabling character of prevenient grace.

So we are now in a position to make an important distinction:

Whether one ultimately agrees with that Arminian theology is another matter. But historically and theologically, it cannot simply be dismissed as “Semi-Pelagian” merely because it rejects Reformed monergism.

That is the point at which Sproul’s taxonomy becomes less convincing as a historical genealogy. His monergism-versus-synergism distinction may be a legitimate theological framework for evaluating different doctrines of salvation. But it does not automatically establish that everyone who falls on the synergistic side belongs to the historical category Semi-Pelagianism.

The fifth-century evidence has to be allowed to speak for itself.And when it does, the picture is considerably more complicated than:


Footnotes

  1. Irena Backus and Aza Goudriaan, “‘Semipelagianism’: The Origins of the Term and Its Passage into the History of Heresy,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 65, no. 1 (2014): 25–46. Backus and Goudriaan note that the traditional designation can suggest a coherent fifth-century movement that consciously identified itself with Pelagius, while also discussing scholarship that questions whether there was a sustained controversy in fifth-century Gaul corresponding neatly to the later category. (Cambridge University Press)
  2. See John Cassian, Conferences, especially Conference XIII, traditionally regarded as important evidence for the position later called Semi-Pelagianism. The traditional identification of Cassian with Semi-Pelagianism, however, has been disputed by modern scholarship.
  3. Backus and Goudriaan, “‘Semipelagianism,’” 25–46. They note that neither Augustine nor the Capitula of the Council of Orange refers to a movement as “Semi-Pelagian,” and they discuss the problems involved in treating the fifth-century Massilians as a single, coherent movement. (Cambridge University Press)
  4. Ali Bonner, The Myth of Pelagianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). Bonner argues that the traditional category of Pelagianism itself is historically problematic and that later classifications have sometimes imposed artificial divisions upon what was a broader ascetic movement. Her reconstruction is revisionist and contested, so it should be treated as an argument within the scholarly discussion rather than as settled consensus.
  5. Roger E. Olson, Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2006), discussion of Arminius, original sin, prevenient grace, and the distinction between classical Arminianism and Semi-Pelagianism. Arminius’s statement that the fallen will has no spiritual power except those “excited by Divine grace” is reproduced in Olson’s discussion.
  6. Olson, Arminian Theology, discussion of John Wesley’s doctrine of prevenient grace.