B.B. Warfield

Is Calvinism a Heresy? (Bonus: Allie Beth Stuckey)

Published by Papa Giorgio

 

VIDEO VIA IDOL KILLER!

For the entire video by Idol Killer, see: “What is the Gospel? – Allie Beth Stuckey vs John Mark Comer“

For clarity and historical depth: The first four belonged to the Western Latin Church, the historical church that developed into the Roman Catholic Church. They were not Eastern Orthodox councils. The first four gatherings occurred before the Great Schism of 1054, the conventional date associated with the separation between Eastern Orthodox and Western Catholic Christianity.

They therefore belong to the history of the Western Church, although their geographical and political settings differed. Mainz and Quierzy, in particular, were Frankish synods rather than ecumenical councils of the entire Christian church.

Jerusalem in 1672 was different: it was an explicitly Eastern Orthodox synod responding to Protestant theology, including doctrines associated with Calvinism.

Council or synod Church tradition Historical setting
Arles (475–480 AD) Western Latin Church Late Roman Gaul, in what is now southern France
Orange (529 AD) Western Latin Church Southern Gaul, now France; associated with Caesarius of Arles
Mainz (848 AD) Western Latin Church The Carolingian Frankish Church, in what is now Germany
Quierzy (853 AD) Western Latin Church The Carolingian Frankish Church, in what is now northern France
Jerusalem (1672 AD) Eastern Orthodox Church Convened under Patriarch Dositheus II of Jerusalem

Council of Arles (475–480 AD)

Issue: Human freedom, predestination, and the extent of Christ’s atonement

Arles required the priest Lucidus to renounce propositions associated with an extreme form of predestinarian teaching. These included the denial of meaningful human freedom after the Fall, the claim that Christ did not die for the salvation of all, and the idea that some people were predestined to damnation.

Connection to the “later” TULIP (explained in APPENDIX):

  • Total Depravity: Challenges interpretations that eliminate any meaningful capacity to respond to God’s gracious initiative.
  • Limited Atonement: Challenges the claim that Christ’s death was not intended for the salvation of all.
  • Unconditional Election and Reprobation: Raises objections to certain formulations of predestination to damnation.

The central question is whether God’s sovereignty and humanity’s fallen condition require the conclusion that human responses are determined by God rather than genuinely resistible.

Second Council of Orange (529 AD)

Issue: The necessity of grace and predestination to evil

Orange affirmed that fallen humanity cannot turn to God or embrace saving faith apart from God’s prior grace. It rejected the idea that God predestines people to evil and emphasized the necessity of divine grace in salvation.

Connection to the “later” TULIP (explained in APPENDIX):

  • Total Depravity: Orange affirms humanity’s dependence on grace, but does not establish every later Calvinist claim about spiritual inability.
  • Unconditional Election: Its teachings raise questions about how election and condemnation should be understood, although Orange did not settle every later debate over election.
  • Determinism: Its rejection of predestination to evil challenges interpretations in which God’s decree is understood to determine sinful actions in a way that makes God the ultimate determiner of evil.

The important distinction is between God permitting and governing a world in which sin occurs and God determining that particular sinful choices must occur. The council’s rejection of predestination to evil is relevant to that distinction, though it does not by itself settle the modern debate over theological determinism.

Synod of Mainz (848 AD)

Issue: Gottschalk’s doctrine of double predestination

The Synod of Mainz condemned Gottschalk of Orbais, who taught a form of double predestination: God predestines some people to eternal life and others to eternal death. His position also included a restricted understanding of the beneficiaries of Christ’s death.

Connection to the “later” TULIP (explained in APPENDIX):

  • Unconditional Election: Related to the teaching that God elects individuals to salvation independently of their response.
  • Limited Atonement: Gottschalk held that Christ died for the elect rather than for all people.
  • Double Predestination: His formulation raises the question of whether God’s decree determines not only who will be saved but also who will be condemned.

This is particularly relevant to the historical debate over whether reprobation is simply God’s decision not to elect certain people or a positive predestination to damnation.

The distinction matters because later Calvinists have offered different explanations of reprobation and do not all formulate it identically.

Synod of Quierzy (853 AD)

Issue: Predestination to salvation versus predestination to sin and damnation

The proceedings against Gottschalk began earlier, but the doctrinal statement associated with Quierzy dates to 853. It affirmed predestination to salvation while distinguishing it from God’s foreknowledge of those who would be condemned. It also affirmed God’s desire to save all and the universal scope of Christ’s redemptive provision.

Connection to the “later” TULIP (explained in APPENDIX):

  • Unconditional Election: The synod’s account of election and condemnation differs from formulations of double predestination.
  • Limited Atonement: Its affirmation of universal redemption conflicts with strict formulations that limit Christ’s saving provision to the elect.
  • Determinism: Its distinction between predestination to salvation and foreknowledge of condemnation challenges the claim that both outcomes should be understood as equivalent acts of divine predetermination.

From a Provisionist perspective, this distinction is important: God’s sovereign provision of salvation does not necessarily entail that God determines which individuals will believe or refuse to believe.

Synod of Jerusalem (1672 AD)

Issue: Unconditional predestination and the Reformed understanding of salvation

The Synod of Jerusalem, associated with Patriarch Dositheus, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, responded to Protestant teachings it regarded as inconsistent with Eastern Orthodox doctrine. Its confession rejected unconditional predestination as it understood the Calvinist position and emphasized the relationship between divine grace and human response.

Connection to the “later” TULIP (explained in APPENDIX):

  • Unconditional Election: The synod rejected the Calvinist formulation of unconditional predestination that it addressed.
  • Irresistible Grace: Its understanding of grace and human response differs from the Calvinist claim that saving grace effectually brings the elect to faith.
  • Perseverance: Its broader understanding of salvation differs from the Reformed account of the perseverance of the saints.

Jerusalem is the most direct example in this list of an ecclesiastical body addressing doctrines identified with Calvinism after the Reformation.

One qualification: it was an Eastern Orthodox synod, so its decisions represent the doctrinal position of that church, rather than a universally binding judgment accepted by all Christian traditions.

Augustine, the Father of TULIP?
Examining the Historical Foundations of Augustinian-Calvinism

Introduction: Did Calvinism Begin with Augustine?

The five points of Calvinism, commonly summarized by the acronym TULIP, are among the most recognizable features of Reformed theology. They describe a system of salvation involving humanity’s inability to come to God apart from divine grace, God’s unconditional election of individuals, the particular intent of Christ’s atonement, the effectiveness of saving grace, and the perseverance of the saints.

But where did this theological framework originate?

Many Calvinists appeal to Augustine of Hippo (AD 354–430), one of the most influential theologians in Western Christianity. John Calvin himself acknowledged Augustine’s enormous influence on his theology. The question, therefore, is not whether Augustine influenced Calvinism. The more significant question is whether Augustine’s later teachings on determinism, election, grace, and perseverance supplied the historical foundation for the distinctive doctrines later associated with TULIP.

Kenneth M. Wilson directly addresses this question in two works:

  • The Foundation of Augustinian-Calvinism (2019), which develops his historical argument concerning Augustine’s theological development and the philosophical and religious influences he believes shaped it.
  • “Calvinism Is Augustinianism,” Chapter 6 of Calvinism: A Biblical and Theological Critique (2022), which presents a more concise version of his argument within a broader critique of Calvinism’s historical foundations.

Wilson makes a particularly strong claim: Augustine was the historical father of the theological framework underlying TULIP.

According to Wilson, Augustine’s later theology represented a significant departure from the earlier Christian emphasis on human freedom to respond to God’s gracious offer of salvation.

That conclusion is controversial. Nevertheless, Wilson’s historical argument raises an important question for anyone examining Calvinism:

Did Augustine recover the original Christian understanding of predestination, or did his later theology introduce a deterministic interpretation that substantially departed from earlier Christian thought?

1. Augustine’s Importance to Calvinism

Augustine is a towering figure in the history of Western Christianity. His writings influenced medieval theology, the Protestant Reformation, and subsequent debates about sin, grace, election, and salvation.

Wilson emphasizes that Calvin’s dependence on Augustine was substantial. In Calvinism Is Augustinianism, he quotes Calvin acknowledging that he could express his theology through Augustine’s writings. Wilson also notes that Calvin cited Augustine hundreds of times in his Institutes of the Christian Religion.

Wilson cites other Reformed writers who acknowledge this relationship. The Reformed theologian Loraine Boettner famously characterized the Reformation as essentially a revival of Augustinianism.

Wilson also cites Matthew McMahon’s (a Calvinist arguing in favor of Augustine’s influence on TULIP) argument that Augustine, rather than Calvin, had already systematized much of what later became known as the five points of Calvinism. These admissions establish an important historical connection: Calvin did not develop his theology in isolation. He inherited and adapted an extensive theological tradition, and Augustine was a major source within that tradition.

One aspect of Augustine’s understanding of grace needs further comment. As human beings were incapable of saving themselves, and as God gave his gift of grace to some (but not all), it followed that God had “preselected” those who would be saved. Developing hints of this idea to be found in the New Testament, Augustine developed a doctrine of predestination. The term “predestination” refers to God’s original or eternal decision to save some, and not others. It was this aspect of Augustine’s thought which many of his contemporaries, not to mention his successors, found unacceptable. It need hardly be said that there is no direct equivalent in Pelagius’s thought.

Alister E. McGrath, Historical Theology: An Introduction to the History of Christian Thought (Malden, MA: Wiley & Sons LTD, 2013), 34.

However, influence does not establish that Augustine and Calvin taught identical doctrines in every respect. The issue is the relationship between Augustine’s later theological framework and the distinctive doctrines subsequently associated with Calvinism.

The filtered systematization of the five points of Calvinism which have been brought to the modern church as the doctrines of grace were originally systematized and widely written on, not by Calvin, but by Augustine. This is why one finds that every four pages written in the Institutes of the Christian Religion John Calvin quoted Augustine. Calvin, for this reason, would deem himself not a Calvinist, but an Augustinian. And both Augustine and Calvin would really deem themselves children at the feet of Jesus Christ and the teachings of the Bible, especially quoting their favorites passages from the Apostle Paul over and over again.

They are Pauline, and bibline, to the glory of Jesus Christ. To work backwards, then, one moves from the doctrines of grace today, to the Synod of Dordt, to the Institutes of the Christian Religion by Calvin, to the writings of Augustine, to the Bible. The biblical record is the foundation for all that came after concerning grace. It is no wonder why Augustine, even in his own day, was deemed the “Doctor of Grace.” Here we turn to him for this study.

This work is concerned with the writings of Augustine to determine Augustine’s views on the doctrines of grace (or what has become to be known as Calvinism or TULIP) and if his views are the same as John Calvin‘s, or for that matter the Synod of Dordt, the Westminster Confession and other reformed viewpoints on the Gospel that have been since penned. Knowing that the Bible does not change, and the matters of faith and practice in the Bible do not change, one should find Augustine’s words and thoughts about grace lying within the same veins as any reformer who believed the Gospel of grace, or any Puritan afterwards. It is easy to see where the Reformers or Puritans believed these doctrines. Again, those who believe these doctrines are referred to as “Calvinists.” But why are they not referred to as Augustinians? This is the scope of the study. Is it determinable that instead of calling one who believes the doctrines of grace a Christian Calvinist, should they be more likely deemed an Augustinian Calvinist? Are those terms interchangeable? Did Augustine believe these doctrines in the same way that Calvin, or the later Puritans did, or even Calvinists today?

C. Matthew McMahon, Augustine’s Calvinism: The Doctrines of Grace in Augustine’s Writings (Coconut Creek, FL: Puritan Publications, 2012), 7–9.

2. The Turning Point: Augustine’s Development Toward Determinism

One of Wilson’s most important arguments concerns the development of Augustine’s theology over time.

Wilson distinguishes Augustine’s earlier Christian writings from his later writings on predestination, grace, and the human will.

According to Wilson, Augustine initially defended a view of human freedom that allowed people to respond to God’s gracious offer of salvation. During this period, Augustine opposed Manichaean teachings that made human destiny dependent on a unilateral divine determination that left no genuine alternative response.

Wilson argues that this changed around AD 412, during Augustine’s controversy with Pelagius and Caelestius.

In Wilson’s reconstruction, Augustine increasingly adopted a theology in which God determined who would receive saving grace and who would not. Human beings remained responsible for their actions, but their ability to respond positively to God depended on God’s prior and decisive intervention.

Wilson calls this a form of “non-free free will”: people act voluntarily according to their desires, but their ultimate spiritual condition and saving response are determined by divine action rather than an independently exercisable ability to accept or reject God’s offer.

Why does Wilson identify AD 412 as significant?

Wilson argues that Augustine’s theological transition has often been dated too early, particularly to his work Ad Simplicianum, traditionally associated with approximately AD 396.

Wilson contends that Augustine continued defending positions compatible with human freedom for years after that work. He argues that the decisive shift becomes apparent around AD 412, when Augustine’s response to the Pelagian controversy led him to reconsider the implications of infant baptism, original sin, grace, and election.

Wilson believes this controversy was crucial because it forced Augustine to explain why some infants received baptism while others died without it, even though infants could not personally choose or reject baptism.

Wilson reconstructs Augustine’s reasoning as follows:

  1. Baptism was understood to convey forgiveness of sins and the reception of the Holy Spirit.
  2. Infants could not personally choose baptism or exercise faith in the same manner as adults.
  3. Some infants received baptism, while others died without it.
  4. If baptism was necessary for salvation, the difference between those outcomes could not be explained by the infants’ own choices.
  5. Augustine therefore concluded that God determined which infants would receive saving grace.

Wilson argues that this reasoning helped move Augustine toward unconditional election and a more comprehensive theology of divine determinism. The important point is that Wilson does not portray Augustine’s later theology as simply an unchanged continuation of his earlier writings. He argues that Augustine’s understanding of grace and predestination developed substantially in response to particular theological controversies.

3. The Philosophical and Religious Background: Stoicism, Neoplatonism, and Manichaeism

Wilson’s argument goes beyond Augustine’s response to Pelagius. He contends that Augustine’s earlier philosophical and religious experiences influenced his later theology. In The Foundation of Augustinian-Calvinism, Wilson examines four major intellectual traditions: Stoicism, Neoplatonism, Gnosticism, and Manichaeism.

His contention is that certain deterministic concepts found in these traditions reappeared in Augustine’s later Christian writings.

A. Stoicism: Meticulous providence and determinism

Stoicism taught a comprehensive understanding of providence in which events occurred within an ordered causal structure governed by fate.

Wilson argues that Augustine retained a strong conception of meticulous divine providence even after becoming a Christian. In this understanding, God’s providential ordering encompasses not merely broad historical purposes but the specific events and circumstances of human life.

Wilson sees a significant parallel between this conception and theological determinism: if every event is comprehensively determined by divine providence, then human decisions ultimately occur within an order from which they cannot finally depart.

This raises a question central to the debate between Calvinism and Provisionism:

Does God’s sovereignty require Him to determine every human choice, or can God sovereignly govern His creation while allowing people genuinely to respond to His gracious call?

Provisionists answer that God’s sovereignty does not require exhaustive divine determination of every human decision. God can accomplish His purposes while permitting meaningful human responses to His commands and offers.

Wilson argues that Augustine’s later understanding of providence moved away from the earlier Christian emphasis on divine foreknowledge and human freedom.

B. Neoplatonism: The corrupted will and the need for divine restoration

Wilson also examines the influence he attributes to Neoplatonic philosophy, particularly the writings of Plotinus and Porphyry. He argues that certain Neoplatonic concepts supplied a framework in which humanity’s fallen condition rendered the human will incapable of choosing the good without divine restoration.

Within Wilson’s comparison, this resembles the later Calvinist doctrine of total inability: the sinner cannot produce the saving response God requires unless God first acts to overcome that inability.

Wilson further argues that Neoplatonic thought offered a way to reconcile the absence of genuine alternatives with personal responsibility. A person could act voluntarily according to an existing disposition even if that disposition and the resulting action were ultimately determined. For Wilson, this resembles the compatibilist understanding of freedom found in some forms of Calvinism.

The comparison is important, but it requires precision. Neoplatonism was a diverse philosophical tradition, and its concepts should not automatically be equated with the full Reformed doctrine of total depravity. Wilson is arguing for a historical and conceptual relationship, not demonstrating that every Neoplatonic teaching is identical to Calvinist theology.

C. Gnosticism: A divinely differentiated humanity

Wilson also discusses Gnostic teachings in which humanity was divided into different spiritual categories. In some Gnostic systems, only a predetermined group possessed the capacity to receive saving knowledge, while others lacked the ability to attain salvation.

Wilson sees a structural resemblance between this idea and unconditional election understood as God’s unilateral determination of who receives the ability to believe. His comparison concerns the unequal distribution of saving ability: salvation may be proclaimed broadly, but only those specially enabled by divine action can ultimately respond.

This comparison should not be mistaken for a claim that Calvinists accept Gnostic cosmology or the Gnostic distinction between a good spiritual realm and an evil material realm. They do not need to hold those beliefs for Wilson’s narrower comparison to be relevant.

Calvinists desire to stand out among complacent Christians who might not be as educated in biblical studies as they are. At face value, being intellectual about the Bible is not an error in itself. That is, until intellectualism takes over. Dr. Ron Comfort, president and founder of Ambassador Baptist College in Lattimore, North Carolina, has noticed this. He observes the similarities between the ancient heresy of Gnosticism and present day Calvinism. He notes what the International Standard Bible Encyclopedia writes about Gnosticism:

Gnosticism is Christianity perverted by a learning and speculation. The intellectual pride of the Gnostics refined away the gospel into a philosophy making salvation exclusive and not universal. They lived under the conviction that they possessed a mysterious knowledge that could only be understood by them.

Comfort concludes with the question, “Now, I wonder, does that sound like something that is prevalent in our land today?” The parallels between Calvinism and Gnosticism are stunning. By speculative and intellectual assumptions, both Gnosticism and Calvinism deviate from orthodox Christianity in concluding that salvation is exclusive.

Micah Coate, A Cultish Side of Calvinism (2011), chap. 3, “The Marks of a Cult within Calvinism,” 66–67.

  • Gnosticism, as presented in the quotation: Salvation is associated with special knowledge unavailable to everyone.
  • Calvinism, as Coate characterizes it: Saving grace is given effectively to the elect, while others are not given the ability to respond savingly.

The question is whether a theological system that restricts the effective ability to respond to a predetermined group shares a significant structural feature with earlier systems that similarly differentiated the saved from the unsaved.

D. Manichaeism: Inability and unilateral divine intervention

Manichaeism is particularly important in Wilson’s argument because Augustine spent approximately nine years as a Manichaean hearer before becoming a Christian.

THE CORE CONNECTIONS & ACCUSATIONS

  • Augustine’s Background: Critics point to Augustine of Hippo’s approximately nine years of involvement with Manichaeism, a religious movement with dualistic teachings, before his conversion to Christianity. Because Augustine’s writings significantly influenced John Calvin and later Reformed theology, critics question whether aspects of his earlier worldview influenced his understanding of sin and human nature. [1, 2]
  • Total Inability / Total Depravity: Manichaeism presented a deeply dualistic understanding of good and evil and the human condition. Critics argue that Calvinism’s doctrine of total inability—the “T” in TULIP, which teaches that fallen humanity cannot come to faith apart from God’s enabling grace—resembles this pessimistic view of human nature. [1, 2, 3, 4]
  • The Material World and the Flesh: Gnostic movements often viewed the material world as inferior, corrupt, or even evil, although Gnostic beliefs varied. Critics argue that Augustine’s teachings concerning original sin, its transmission through human generation, and the effects of sexual desire reflect a similar pessimism about embodied human existence. They further contend that aspects of this outlook carried into later Reformed theology. [1, 2]

Wilson contends that Augustine later returned to certain deterministic interpretations associated with his former religious environment, particularly when addressing the relationship between inherited sin, the human will, and saving grace.

In Wilson’s reconstruction, the human will cannot independently escape its corrupted condition. A decisive divine intervention must restore the capacity to respond, and this intervention is not equally effective for everyone.

Wilson argues that this pattern resembles the later Calvinist understanding of regeneration and effectual calling: saving grace does not merely offer assistance to a person who may respond; it effectively brings about the saving response in those whom God has chosen.

The important qualification is that resemblance does not establish identity. Manichaeism’s cosmology, its account of matter and evil, and its understanding of salvation differ fundamentally from historic Christian theology. Wilson’s argument concerns specific parallels in determinism, inability, and divine selection—not an assertion that Calvinism is simply Manichaeism under another name.

4. Augustine and the Five Points of TULIP

Wilson brings these historical arguments together in his discussion of the five points of Calvinism. He argues that Augustine’s later theology supplied the essential framework from which these doctrines developed.

It is important to remember that TULIP is a later summary of Reformed theology. Augustine did not write a work organized under that acronym, and the five points were not formally formulated in their familiar arrangement during his lifetime.

Wilson nevertheless argues that the underlying theological ideas can be traced to Augustine’s later writings.

T — Total Depravity or Total Inability

The question: Can fallen human beings respond to God’s gracious offer of salvation, or must God first regenerate them so that they can believe?

Wilson argues that Augustine’s later theology developed a particularly strong understanding of humanity’s inability.

According to Wilson, Augustine moved beyond the idea that humanity is sinful, morally weakened, and dependent on grace. He increasingly taught that fallen humanity lacked the ability to make a saving response to God unless God first intervened.

Wilson connects this development with Augustine’s changing understanding of original sin. He argues that Augustine’s later doctrine involved inherited guilt and condemnation, rather than merely the mortality, moral weakness, and propensity to sin associated with his earlier writings.

Wilson also examines Augustine’s interpretation of passages such as Romans 5:12 and Psalm 51:5, arguing that Augustine’s later conclusions differed from his earlier understanding.

For Wilson, this change was foundational because the remaining doctrines of TULIP followed logically once humanity was understood to be totally unable to respond to God.

The Provisionist objection:

Humanity’s universal sinfulness does not necessarily establish that people have no ability to respond to God’s gracious call. Provisionism maintains that fallen people cannot save themselves, earn salvation, or come to Christ independently of divine grace. Nevertheless, God graciously provides what is necessary for people to respond to the gospel.

The disagreement is not whether grace is necessary. It is whether grace must first regenerate a person in order to make faith possible.

U — Unconditional Election

The question: Does God choose individuals for salvation without reference to their response to His gracious offer, or is election conditional upon faith that God foreknows?

Wilson argues that Augustine’s later doctrine of election developed from his understanding of humanity’s inability and the necessity of divine intervention.

His discussion of infant baptism is central. Because infants could not personally exercise faith or choose baptism, Wilson argues that Augustine concluded their salvation depended on God’s unilateral decision to provide the means of salvation.

Wilson contends that Augustine then extended this logic to humanity more generally. God determines who receives the saving grace necessary for faith, while others do not receive that grace.

Wilson uses the term “Divine Unilateral Predetermination of Individuals’ Eternal Destinies” (DUPIED) to distinguish this form of determinism from election understood in relation to God’s foreknowledge of human responses.

In Wilson’s interpretation, Augustine’s later understanding of election resembles the unconditional election taught in Calvinism.

The Provisionist objection:

Conditional election does not mean that people earn their salvation. God determines the gracious provision and the condition under which its benefits are received. Faith is not payment for salvation; it is the means by which a person receives what God has provided in Christ.

Provisionists therefore distinguish God’s sovereign decision to save believers from the claim that God unconditionally determines which individuals will believe and which will remain unable to believe.

L — Limited Atonement

The question: Did Christ die with the intention of saving only the elect, or did He provide atonement for all humanity, with its saving benefits received by those who believe?

Wilson argues that limited atonement follows logically from Augustine’s later understanding of election and providence.

His reasoning is that if God unilaterally determines who will be saved, and God’s providential purposes cannot ultimately fail, then Christ’s atoning work must be understood in relation to the people God has determined to save.

Wilson believes Augustine’s later theology increasingly restricted the saving intent of Christ’s death to the elect. He examines Augustine’s attempts to interpret 1 Timothy 2:4, which says that God desires all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.

Wilson argues that Augustine struggled to reconcile the universal language of this passage with his increasingly deterministic understanding of divine sovereignty.

An important qualification is necessary here: Wilson acknowledges that Augustine did not always state the later doctrine of limited atonement in the explicit form familiar from Reformed confessions. Wilson’s claim is that Augustine’s later premises implied a restriction of Christ’s saving work to the elect.

The Provisionist objection:

Universal atonement does not require universal salvation. Christ’s death can be sufficient and intended for all without every person receiving its saving benefits. The atonement is God’s provision; faith is the means of receiving its benefits.

The central question is whether Christ’s death was provided for all people or exclusively for those whom God unconditionally determined to save.

I — Irresistible Grace

The question: Can a person resist God’s gracious call to salvation, or does God’s saving grace unfailingly produce the response He intends?

Wilson argues that Augustine’s later theology treated saving grace as an effective divine action that brings about the sinner’s saving response.

He connects this understanding with the philosophical and religious traditions he believes influenced Augustine, particularly their emphasis on divine intervention to restore an otherwise incapable will.

Wilson’s argument is that once total inability and unconditional election are accepted, irresistible grace follows naturally. If only those unconditionally elected receive the grace necessary to believe, and God’s decision to save them cannot fail, then saving grace must effectively secure their response.

In this framework, the person believes willingly, but the ultimate outcome is determined by God’s prior action.

The Provisionist objection:

Grace can be necessary, powerful, and entirely initiated by God without being irresistible. God calls, draws, convicts, reveals, and provides. A person does not overpower God by resisting His grace; rather, God has sovereignly permitted a genuine response to His gracious initiative.

Provisionism rejects the assumption that God’s saving purpose must be accomplished by determining every person’s response to the gospel.

P — Perseverance of the Saints

The question: Is perseverance guaranteed to every genuinely regenerated believer, or does final salvation depend on a special divine gift that determines who will persevere?

Wilson gives this point a distinctive historical treatment.

He argues that Augustine developed the doctrine of a special gift of perseverance to explain why some people who had received baptism and the Holy Spirit continued in faith while others subsequently fell away.

In Augustine’s developing framework, according to Wilson, the initial reception of grace did not necessarily guarantee final perseverance. God therefore had to grant an additional gift to those who would ultimately persevere.

Wilson sees this as a historical precursor to the perseverance doctrine later incorporated into TULIP.

However, this is also where an important distinction appears. Augustine’s account of perseverance does not map neatly onto the modern Calvinist assertion that everyone who is genuinely regenerated will certainly persevere to the end. Wilson argues that Augustine’s baptismal theology allowed for people who had received the Holy Spirit to fall away without receiving the additional gift of perseverance.

The historical point:

Wilson is not simply claiming that Augustine and modern Calvinists used different words for precisely the same doctrine. He is arguing that Augustine developed a theological solution to a problem that later became part of the Reformed understanding of perseverance, while the details of the two positions differ.

5. How the Five Points Fit Together

Wilson’s argument is not that Augustine independently developed five unrelated doctrines. He believes the doctrines emerged as interconnected consequences of a more fundamental change in Augustine’s understanding of the human will, divine sovereignty, and saving grace.

His proposed sequence can be summarized as follows:

  1. Total inability: Fallen humanity cannot make a saving response without prior divine intervention.
  2. Unconditional election: God determines which individuals receive the grace necessary for salvation.
  3. Effectual grace: God acts to ensure that those chosen respond to His saving call.
  4. Limited atonement: The intent and application of Christ’s saving work are restricted to those God has determined to save.
  5. Perseverance: God grants the additional grace necessary to ensure the final salvation of those who will persevere.

This is a summary of Wilson’s historical and theological reconstruction, not a claim that Augustine himself presented the doctrines in this exact order or in the modern terminology of TULIP.

Wilson’s argument is that the system developed from a foundational premise:

God’s unilateral determination of the individual’s eternal destiny, rather than a genuine human response to God’s universally offered grace.

Once that premise is accepted, Wilson contends, the remaining doctrines follow with considerable logical consistency.

The Provisionist challenge is directed at the foundational premise itself. If Scripture teaches that God graciously provides salvation to all, genuinely calls people to believe, and permits them to accept or resist His call, then the remaining points of TULIP cannot simply be assumed to follow from God’s sovereignty.

6. What About the Early Church Fathers?

One of Wilson’s strongest historical claims is that Augustine’s later determinism represented a significant departure from earlier Christian thought.

In both works, Wilson argues that the earlier Christian tradition generally defended human freedom to respond to God’s gracious provision while rejecting forms of unilateral determinism associated with Stoicism and Gnostic or Manichaean teachings.

He discusses figures such as Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, and Origen. Wilson interprets their writings as evidence that early Christian authors generally affirmed divine foreknowledge, grace, and predestination without concluding that God unilaterally determined each individual’s eternal destiny independently of that person’s response.

He also argues that Augustine’s earlier writings were more consistent with this understanding before his later theological shift.

If Wilson’s historical reconstruction is correct, this raises a significant question for appeals to church tradition:

should Augustine’s later theology be treated as the definitive interpretation of the early Christian consensus, or should it be examined against the writings of earlier Christian authors?

7. From Augustine to Luther and Calvin

Wilson traces the subsequent influence of Augustine through the Protestant Reformation.

Martin Luther, an Augustinian monk, drew heavily on Augustine in his understanding of grace and the bondage of the will. His 1525 work The Bondage of the Will became a major statement of his rejection of the idea that fallen humanity could independently choose salvation.

John Calvin likewise drew extensively on Augustine. Wilson argues that Calvin’s theological system adopted and further developed Augustine’s later understanding of predestination, human inability, and divine sovereignty.

This helps explain the term Augustinian-Calvinism. It describes the historical and theological relationship between Augustine’s later doctrines and the Reformed system associated with Calvin.

Nevertheless, Calvinism is not a single, unchanging body of thought in every historical detail. Later Reformed theologians developed, refined, and systematized their doctrines, and Calvinists disagree among themselves on a number of issues.

The five points of Calvinism were formally articulated in their familiar confessional setting at the Synod of Dort (1618–1619), long after Augustine and Calvin. Wilson’s argument is therefore best understood as a claim about the historical roots of the underlying theological ideas, not the literal existence of the TULIP acronym in Augustine’s writings.

8. Does This Mean Calvinism Is Gnosticism or Manichaeism?

No—not in the sense that the systems are identical. This distinction is essential to a responsible historical critique.

Wilson argues that certain deterministic concepts in Augustine’s later theology bear significant similarities to concepts found in Stoicism, Neoplatonism, Gnosticism, and Manichaeism. He believes Augustine incorporated elements of these earlier systems into his Christian interpretation of Scripture.

That is a claim about intellectual influence, historical development, and structural resemblance.

It does not mean that Calvinists accept every doctrine of these ancient philosophical or religious traditions. Historic Calvinism affirms the Christian doctrines of creation, the incarnation, the Trinity, the resurrection, and the goodness of God’s creation—positions that distinguish it sharply from important aspects of Gnostic and Manichaean systems.

The relevant question is narrower:

Did certain concepts concerning determinism, human inability, selective divine intervention, and saving grace enter Augustine’s later theology through philosophical and religious influences that differed from earlier Christian teaching?

Wilson answers yes.

His critics dispute aspects of his historical reconstruction and the degree to which the similarities demonstrate actual doctrinal dependence.

A fair assessment should examine the primary sources, the chronology of Augustine’s writings, and the specific doctrines being compared rather than treating a historical resemblance as proof of complete theological identity.

9. The Provisionist Alternative: Grace Without Theological Determinism

For those approaching the question from a Provisionist perspective, the historical discussion raises a deeper theological issue.

Does God’s sovereignty require Him to determine every human decision, including who will believe the gospel? Or can God sovereignly provide salvation, initiate the work of grace, and genuinely call people to repentance and faith without determining their response?

Provisionism maintains that salvation is entirely dependent on God’s gracious provision in Jesus Christ. Fallen humanity cannot earn salvation or save itself. God initiates the work, Christ provides the atonement, and the gospel calls people to believe.

But the fact that salvation is entirely of grace does not necessarily mean that God must unilaterally determine which individuals will believe.

The five traditional Provisionist affirmations can be summarized this way:

  • Human sinfulness: All people are sinful and need God’s grace, but sinfulness does not automatically establish total inability to respond to God’s gracious call.
  • Conditional election: God determines the condition of faith for receiving salvation; believers do not earn their election or salvation.
  • Universal atonement: Christ’s atoning work is provided for all humanity, although not everyone receives its saving benefits.
  • Resistible grace: God graciously calls and enables people to respond, but His gracious invitation can be resisted.
  • Faith and perseverance: Faith is not a meritorious work, and genuine Christian faith is to be lived out in continuing trust and obedience to Christ.

These affirmations do not deny God’s sovereignty or the necessity of grace. They reject the conclusion that grace must operate through the unilateral determination of every individual’s saving response.

From this perspective, Wilson’s historical argument is relevant because it challenges the assumption that theological determinism is the only possible way to understand divine sovereignty, election, and grace.

Conclusion: Examining the Foundation Rather Than Merely the System

Kenneth Wilson’s The Foundation of Augustinian-Calvinism and his chapter “Calvinism Is Augustinianism” offer a sustained historical challenge to the idea that the distinctive doctrines of Calvinism simply represent the uncontested teaching of the earliest Christian tradition.

Wilson argues that Augustine’s later theology departed from his own earlier emphasis on human freedom and developed a deterministic framework influenced, in Wilson’s interpretation, by Stoicism, Neoplatonism, and Manichaeism. He further argues that this framework became a major historical foundation for the theology later associated with Calvin and the five points of TULIP.

His most important contention is that total inability and unconditional election were foundational changes from which the other doctrines followed. He sees irresistible grace, limited atonement, and perseverance as interconnected consequences of Augustine’s later understanding of divine providence and saving grace.

These are substantial claims, and they should not be treated as established merely because Wilson presents them forcefully. His historical reconstruction is contested, and Calvinist theologians offer alternative readings of Augustine and the early church fathers.

Nevertheless, the questions he raises deserve serious consideration:

  • Did Augustine’s theology of predestination develop significantly during his controversy with Pelagius?
  • How did Augustine’s earlier philosophical and religious experiences affect his later understanding of divine providence?
  • To what extent did Calvin inherit Augustine’s later theology, and where did later Reformed theology develop it further?
  • Does the early Christian evidence support the claim that theological determinism was the original Christian understanding of salvation?
  • Does God’s sovereignty require the unilateral determination of every individual’s eternal destiny, or can God sovereignly provide salvation while allowing a genuine response to His grace?

For Provisionists, the central concern is not simply whether Augustine influenced Calvin. That influence is well established. The deeper concern is whether the deterministic features of Augustine’s later theology faithfully represent the biblical teaching on God’s character, universal saving provision, divine grace, and human responsibility.

The historical question and the biblical question must ultimately be considered together. A doctrine’s antiquity does not prove its truth, and a doctrine’s later development does not automatically disprove it. Each must be tested against Scripture and examined in its historical context.

The issue, then, is not whether Augustine was an important Christian theologian. It is whether the particular theological framework that developed in his later writings—and that Wilson identifies as the foundation of Augustinian-Calvinism—provides the most faithful account of God’s sovereignty and His gracious offer of salvation to humanity.

BONUS:

Allie Beth Stuckey gets early church history wrong:

Thinking Through Revelation

Published by Papa Giorgio

We are getting our waders on at church to get knee deep in chapter two of John’s Revelation. However, this opening portion of this new series was excerpted here with my addition of graphics, a small audio addition by J. Vernon McGee. Our pastors first sermon (week 1) was a great intro that smooths out the creases in “where the chips fall” regarding varying views on this “omega” book of the Bible.

Here are some related J-Vern sermons/commentary I went through as well

A few books I recommend on the subject that were listed in the video near the end:

I use a quote from Walter Elwell in the video that says the Millennial time-period is only mentioned in Revelation 20. But here, Dr. Michael J. Vlach, shows us that allll the waay back in Genesis, this time-period is referenced:

Genesis 1:26, 28 and Millennial Views

A comparison of how the millennial views of Premillennialism, Postmillennialism, and Amillennialism relate to Genesis 1:26, 28 and the kingdom mandate for man to rule from and over the earth

Concepts: Life and Death Matters (Misdefining God’s Attributes)

Published by Papa Giorgio

Firstly, as I am want to point out, John Van Huizum often gets ideas, precepts, and others understanding of a subject woefully wrong. Take for instance this small portion of a recent article by him entitled “A Question of Life and Death” (click to enlarge).

“These words” in John’s limited understanding ~ wrongly attributing to God ~ that no “clergy” themselves attribute to God are the crux of the issue. And I do not post the many excerpts to follow to prove John wrong. I post them in the hopes that John reads what most clergy themselves study. Enjoy this seminary level reaction to attributing to God one’s own ignorance of a topic:

God’s Love and Justice—A Point of Tension?

We have looked at many characteristics of God, without exhausting them by any means. But what of the interrelationships among them? Presumably, God is a unified, integrated being whose personality is a harmonious whole. There should be, then, no tension among any of these attributes. But is this really so?

The one point of potential tension usually singled out is the relation­ship between God’s love and his justice. On one hand, God’s justice seems so severe, requiring the death of those who sin. This is a fierce, harsh God. On the other hand, God is merciful, gracious, forgiving, long-suffering. Are not these two sets of traits in conflict with one an­other? Is there, then, internal tension in God’s nature?[10]

If we begin with the assumptions that God is an integrated being and the divine attributes are harmonious, we will define the attributes in the light of one another. Thus, justice is loving justice and love is just love. The idea that they conflict may have resulted from defining these at­tributes in isolation from one another. While the conception of love apart from justice, for example, may be derived from outside sources, it is not a biblical teaching.

What we are saying is that love is not fully understood unless seen as including justice. If love does not include justice, it is mere senti­mentality. The approach that would define love as merely granting what someone else desires is not biblical. It runs into two difficulties: (1) Giving someone what would make him or her comfortable for the moment may be nothing more than indulging that person’s whim—such action may not necessarily be right. (2) This is usually an emo­tional reaction to an individual or situation that is immediately at hand. But love is much wider in scope—it necessarily entails justice, a sense of right and wrong, and all humankind. As Joseph Fletcher has correctly shown, justice is simply love distributed.[11] It is love to all one’s neighbors, those immediately at hand and those removed in space and time. Justice means that love must always be shown, whether or not a situation of immediate need presents itself in pressing and vivid fashion. Love in the biblical sense, then, is not merely to in­dulge someone near at hand. Rather, it inherently involves justice as well. This means there will be a concern for the ultimate welfare of all humanity, a passion to do what is right, and enforcement of appropri­ate consequences for wrong action.

Actually, love and justice have worked together in God’s dealing with the human race. God’s justice requires that there be payment of the penalty for sin. God’s love, however, desires humans to be restored to fellowship with him. The offer of Jesus Christ as the atonement for sin means that both the justice and the love of God have been maintained.

And there really is no tension between the two. There is tension only if one’s view of love requires that God forgive sin without any payment being made. But that is to think of God as different from what he really is. Moreover, the offer of Christ as atonement shows a greater love on God’s part than would simply indulgently releasing people from the consequences of sin. To fulfill his just administration of the law, God’s love was so great that he gave his Son for us. Love and justice are not two separate attributes competing with one another. God is both righ­teous and loving, and has himself given what he demands.[12]

[10] Nels Ferre, The Christian Understanding of God (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), pp. 227-28.

[11] Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966), pp. 86-102.

[12] William G. T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1971 re­print), vol. 1, pp. 377-78.

Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books/Academic, 1998), 323-325.

II. GOD THE REDEEMER OF SINNERS

While reiterating the teaching of nature as to the existence and character of the personal Creator and Lord of all, the Scriptures lay their stress upon the grace or the undeserved love of God, as exhibited in his dealings with his sinful and wrath-deserving creatures. So little, however, is the consummate divine attribute of love advanced, in the scriptural revelation, at the expense of the other moral attributes of God, that it is thrown into prominence only upon a background of the strongest assertion and fullest manifestation of its companion attributes, especially of the divine righteousness and holiness, and is exhibited as acting only along with and in entire harmony with them. God is not represented in the Scriptures as forgiving sin because he really cares very little about sin; nor yet because he is so exclusively or predominatingly the God of love, that all other attributes shrink into desuetude in the presence of his illimitable benevolence. He is rather represented as moved to deliver sinful man from his guilt and pollution because he pities the creatures of his hand, immeshed in sin, with an intensity which is born of the vehemence of his holy abhorrence of sin and his righteous determination to visit it with intolerable retribution; and by a mode which brings as complete satisfaction to his infinite justice and holiness as to his unbounded love itself. The biblical presentation of the God of grace includes thus the richest development of all his moral attributes, and the God of the Bible is consequently set forth, in the completeness of that idea, as above everything else the ethical God. And that is as much as to say that there is ascribed to him a moral sense so sensitive and true that it estimates with unfailing accuracy the exact moral character of every person or deed presented for its contemplation, and responds to it with the precisely appropriate degree of satisfaction or reprobation. The infinitude of his love is exhibited to us precisely in that while we were yet sinners he loved us, though with all the force of his infinite nature he reacted against our sin with illimitable abhorrence and indignation. The mystery of grace resides just in the impulse of a sin-hating God to show mercy to such guilty wretches; and the supreme revelation of God as the God of holy love is made in the disclosure of the mode of his procedure in redemption, by which alone he might remain just while justifying the ungodly. For in this procedure there was involved the mighty paradox of the infinitely just Judge himself becoming the sinner’s substitute before his own law and the infinitely blessed God receiving in his own person the penalty of sin.

B.B. Warfield, Selected Short Writings of Benjamin B. Warfield (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1970), 71-72.

(5) The ‘water and the blood’ of Christ, who thereby Himself overcame the world, is our power of victory (1 John 5 :4-6) . This depends on a right doctrine of the cross. Christianity in integrity means the orthodox Christology of Nicea and Chalcedon and the vicarious satisfaction of divine justice at Calvary, i.e. propitiation of the divine wrath as well as expiation of the evil of sin. Nothing can set the conscience free from the accusation of conscience and consequent weakness at the emotional and ethical center unless the sinner, having been made aware of the debt of sin he owes to God, is also made aware the debt has been paid in full by the vicarious sacrifice of the God-man at Calvary. There is no Christian moral victory without conviction that ‘Jesus paid it all.’ (See previous comments on revelation at Calvary and discussion of reconciliation and propitiation.) Francis Pieper commenting on ‘Christianity as the Absolute Religion’ says, `[T]he Christian religion is absolutely perfect because it is not a moral code instructing men how to earn the forgiveness of sin themselves, but rather it is faith in that forgiveness which was gained through Christ’s vicarious fulfillment of the Law and his substitutionary suffering of our punishment.’[10] Luther spoke often of this. As Calvin also remarked, our assurance that ‘God remains kindly disposed and favorable to our works is not grounded in some nebulous belief in the loving character of God, but specifically the love of God manifested at Calvary.’

`God’s unconditional love’ may be an unfortunate expression. I think it is. Calvary proves God’s love is great, but not unconditional at all. ‘[Y]ou hate all evildoers’ (Ps. 5:5); ‘The LORD is in his holy temple… his soul hates the wicked and the one who loves violence’ (Ps. 11:4, 5). ‘There are six things that the LORD hates…’ (Prov. 6:16-19— including a false witness and ‘one who sows discord among brothers’). God does not love the reprobate, as such, at all and He loves no one unconditionally. Even the elect He loves conditional upon His grace, which for reasons known only to H Him has not been equally extended to everyone on earth, granted the gospel is addressed to all without distinction. Let the unconvinced read the passages in Scripture about the eternal state of the lost and God’s jealous anger over unrestrained and unpunished murderers, idolaters, fornicators, etc. See notes herein on ‘sin to high heaven’ in hamartiology.

10. Francis Pieper, Christian Dogmatics i (St Louis: Concordia Publ., 1950s), pp. 33-40.

Robert Duncan Culver, Systematic Theology: Biblical and Historical (Ross-shire, Scotland: Christian Focus Publications, 2005), 590-591. I highly suggest the section on “Universalism” on pp. 1088-1091.

GOD’S JEALOUSY AND PERFECTION

Two more of God’s moral attributes are jealousy and perfection. Admittedly, jealousy is a surprising attribute, yet it is one of only a few that the Bible declares is God’s “name,” a distinctive title of one of God’s essential characteristics. In fact, this raises the unique problem (discussed below) as to why what is a sin for creatures is a moral attribute of God.

THE DEFINITION OF GOD’S JEALOUSY

The root meanings of the basic Old Testament word for “jealous” (kan-naw) are “to be desirous of,” “to be zealous about,” “to be excited to anger over,” and “to execute judgment because of.”

The Bible speaks of man’s jealousy (“zealous envy,” “angry fury”) in many places. It talks of being jealous of one’s brother (Gen. 37:11); of having jealousy over a wife (Num. 5:14); of jealousy leading to rage (Prov. 6:34); of jealousy being as cruel as death (Song 8:6 Nagy); of jealousy and selfish ambition ( James 3:16); and of Paul’s jealous zeal for the church (2 Cor. 11:2—see below, under “An Objection to God’s Jealousy”).

As will be shown (in the texts cited below), jealousy is used of God in terms of His holy zeal and His angry wrath. God has holy zeal to protect His supremacy, and God has angry wrath on idolatry and other sins.

THE BIBLICAL BASIS FOR GOD’S JEALOUSY

God’s jealousy can be understood by looking at its nature, its subject, and its object.

The Nature of God’s Jealousy

God’s jealousy carries the connotation of anger, fury, and wrath. Anger (Deut. 29:20): “The LORD will never be willing to forgive him; his wrath and zeal will burn against that man. All the curses written in this book will fall upon him, and the LORD will blot out his name from under heaven.” Fury (Zech. 8:2): “This is what the LORD Almighty says: ‘I am very jealous for Zion; I am burning with jealousy for her.’ ” Wrath (Isa. 42:13): “The LORD will march out like a mighty man, like a warrior he will stir up his zeal; with a shout he will raise the battle cry and will triumph over his ene­mies.”

The Subject of God’s Jealousy

God’s jealousy is vented on images, idols, other gods, and other sins. Images (Ps. 78:58): “They angered him with their high places; they aroused his jealousy with their idols.” Idols (1 Cor. 10:19-22): “Do I mean then that a sacrifice offered to an idol is anything, or that an idol is anything? No, but the sacrifices of pagans are offered to demons, not to God. . . . Are we trying to arouse the Lord’s jealousy?” Other gods (Deut. 32:16): “They made him jealous with their foreign gods and angered him with their detestable idols.” Other sins (1 Kings 14:22): “Judah did evil in the eyes of the LORD. By the sins they committed they stirred up his jealous anger more than their fathers had done.”

The Object of God’s Jealousy

The object of God’s jealousy is first and foremost His own nature, then His name, His people (Israel), His land (the Holy Land), and His city ( Jerusalem). His own nature (Ex. 34:14): “Do not worship any other god, for the LORD, whose name is Jealous, is a jealous God.” His name (Ezek. 39:25): “Therefore this is what the Sovereign LORD says: I will now bring Jacob back from captivity and will have compassion on all the people of Israel, and I will be zealous for my holy name.” His people (Zech. 8:2): “This is what the LORD Almighty says: ‘I am very jealous for Zion; I am burning with jealousy for her.’ ” His land ( Joel 2:18): “Then the LORD will be jeal­ous for his land and take pity on his people.” His city (Zech. 1:14): “Pro­claim this word: This is what the LORD Almighty says: ‘I am very jealous for Jerusalem and Zion.’ “

THE THEOLOGICAL BASIS FOR GOD’S JEALOUSY

A combination of other attributes forms the basis for God’s jealousy. Foremost among these is God’s holiness; God is particularly jealous about preserving His own uniqueness. Of course, all of God’s attributes are unique and comprise the one infinite, absolutely perfect, and supreme God. The theological argument for God’s jealousy can be formulated as follows:

(1)     God is unique and supreme (see His metaphysical attributes—chap-ters 2-12).

(2)     God is holy, loving, and morally perfect (see His moral attributes—chapters 13-17).

(3)     Hence, God is uniquely and supremely holy, loving, and morally perfect.

(4)     Whatever is supremely holy, loving, and perfect is to be preserved with the utmost zeal.

(5)     God’s jealousy is His zeal to preserve His own holy supremacy.

(6)     Therefore, He is eminently justified in His jealousy. Indeed, it is essential to His very nature: His name is Jealous (Ex. 34:14).

THE HISTORICAL BASIS FOR GOD’S JEALOUSY

The Early Church Fathers on God’s Jealousy

Although not one of the more noted attributes of God, His jealousy did not go unnoticed by the early church Fathers. There are considerable ref­erences to God’s jealousy.

Justin Martyr

They sacrificed to demons whom they knew not; new gods that came newly up, whom their fathers knew not. Thou hast forsaken God that begat thee, and forgotten God that brought thee up. And the Lord saw, and was jealous, and was provoked to anger by reason of the rage of His sons and daughters. . . . They have moved Me to jealousy with that which is not God, they have provoked Me to anger with their idols; and I will move them to jealousy with that which is not a nation, I will provoke them to anger with a foolish people. For a fire is kindled from Mine anger, and it shall burn to Hades. (DJ, 119 in Roberts and Donaldson, ANF, I)

Irenaeus

It is therefore one and the same God the Father who has prepared good things with Himself for those who desire His fellowship, and who remain in subjection to Him; and who has the eternal fire for the ring­leader of the apostasy, the devil, and those who revolted with him, into which [fire] the Lord has declared those men shall be sent who have been set apart by themselves on His left hand. And this is what has been spoken by the prophet, “I am a jealous God, making peace, and creating evil things”; thus making peace and friendship with those who repent and turn to Him, and bringing [them to] unity, but preparing for the impenitent, those who shun the light, eternal fire and outer darkness, which are evils indeed to those persons who fall into them. (AH, 4.40.1 in ibid., I)

Tertullian

Even His severity then is good, because [it is] just: when the judge is good, that is just. Other qualities likewise are good, by means of which the good work of a good severity runs out its course, whether wrath, or jealousy, or sternness. For all these are as indispensable to severity as severity is to justice. The shamelessness of an age, which ought to have been reverent, had to be avenged. Accordingly, qualities which pertain to the judge, when they are actually free from blame, as the judge him­self is, will never be able to be charged upon him as a fault. (FBAM, 2.216 in ibid., III)

Cyprian

There is no ground, therefore, dearest brother, for thinking that we should give way to heretics so far as to contemplate the betrayal to them of that baptism, which is only granted to the one and only Church. It is a good soldier’s duty to defend the camp of his general against rebels and enemies. It is the duty of an illustrious leader to keep the standards entrusted to him. It is written, “The Lord thy God is a jealous God” (EC, 72.10 in ibid., 5.787, V).

The Medieval Fathers on God’s Jealousy

Augustine

For Him doth “the friend of the bridegroom” sigh, having now the first-fruits of the Spirit laid up with Him, yet still groaning within him­self, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of his body; to Him he sighs, for he is a member of the Bride; for Him is he jealous, for he is the friend of the Bridegroom; for Him is he jealous, not for himself; because in the voice of Thy “waterspouts,” not in his own voice, doth he call on that other deep, for whom being jealous he feareth, lest that, as the serpent beguiled Eve through his subtlety, so their minds should be corrupted from the simplicity that is in our Bridegroom, Thine only Son. (C, 13.13 in Schaff, NPAT, 1.1)

Ineffable is therefore that patience, as is His jealousy, as His wrath, and whatever there is like to these. For if we conceive of these as they be in us, in Him are there none. We, namely, cancel none of these without been set apart by themselves on His left hand. And this is what has been spoken by the prophet, “I am a jealous God, making peace, and creating evil things”; thus making peace and friendship with those who repent and turn to Him, and bringing [them to] unity, but preparing for the impenitent, those who shun the light, eternal fire and outer darkness, which are evils indeed to those persons who fall into them. (AH, 4.40.1 in ibid., I)

Tertullian

Even His severity then is good, because [it is] just: when the judge is good, that is just. Other qualities likewise are good, by means of which the good work of a good severity runs out its course, whether wrath, or jealousy, or sternness. For all these are as indispensable to severity as severity is to justice. The shamelessness of an age, which ought to have been reverent, had to be avenged. Accordingly, qualities which pertain to the judge, when they are actually free from blame, as the judge him­self is, will never be able to be charged upon him as a fault. (FBAM, 2.216 in ibid., III)

Cyprian

There is no ground, therefore, dearest brother, for thinking that we should give way to heretics so far as to contemplate the betrayal to them of that baptism, which is only granted to the one and only Church. It is a good soldier’s duty to defend the camp of his general against rebels and enemies. It is the duty of an illustrious leader to keep the standards entrusted to him. It is written, “The Lord thy God is a jealous God” (EC, 72.10 in ibid., 5.787, V).

The Medieval Fathers on God’s Jealousy

Augustine

For Him doth “the friend of the bridegroom” sigh, having now the first-fruits of the Spirit laid up with Him, yet still groaning within him­self, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of his body; to Him he sighs, for he is a member of the Bride; for Him is he jealous, for he is the friend of the Bridegroom; for Him is he jealous, not for himself; because in the voice of Thy “waterspouts,” not in his own voice, doth he call on that other deep, for whom being jealous he feareth, lest that, as the serpent beguiled Eve through his subtlety, so their minds should be corrupted from the simplicity that is in our Bridegroom, Thine only Son. (C, 13.13 in Schaff, NPNF, 1.1)

Ineffable is therefore that patience, as is His jealousy, as His wrath, and whatever there is like to these. For if we conceive of these as they be in us, in Him are there none. We, namely, cancel none of these without molestation: but be it far from us to surmise that the impassible nature of God is liable to any molestation. But like as He is jealous without any dark­ening of spirit, wroth without any perturbation, pitiful without any pain, repenteth Him without any wrongness in Him to be set right; so is He patient without aught of passion. (OP, 1 in ibid., 1.III)

Because “the Lord our God is a jealous God,” let us refuse, whenever we see anything of His with an alien, to allow him to consider it his own. For of a truth the jealous God Himself rebukes the woman who commits fornication against Him, as the type of an erring people, and says that she gave to her lovers what belonged to Him, and again received from them what was not theirs but His. In the hands of the adulterous woman and the adulterous lovers, God in His wrath, as a jealous God, recognizes His gifts; and do we say that baptism, consecrated in the words of the gospel, belongs to heretics? (BAD, 3.19.25 in ibid., 1.IV)

The Reformation Leaders on God’s Jealousy

Martin Luther

“For Him Who once drowned the whole world in the Flood and sank Sodom with fire, it is a simple thing to slay or to defeat so many thousands of peasants. He is an almighty and terrible God” (WL, 4.226).

God says: “I the Lord thy God am a jealous God.” Now, God is jeal­ous in two manners of ways; first, God is angry as one that is jealous of them that fall from him, and become false and treacherous, that prefer the creature before the Creator; that build upon the favors of the great; that depend upon their friends, upon their own power—riches, art, wis­dom, etc.; that forsake the righteousness of faith, and contemn it, and will be justified and saved by and through their own good works. God is also vehemently angry with those that boast and brag of their power and strength; as we see in Sennacherib, king of Assyria, who boasted of his great power, and thought utterly to destroy Jerusalem. . . .

Secondly, God is jealous for them that love him and highly esteem his word; such God loves again, defends and keeps as the apple of his eve, and resists their adversaries, beating them back that they are not able to perform what they intended. Therefore, this word jealous com­prehends both hatred and love, revenge and protection; for which cause it requires both fear and faith; fear, that we provoke not God to anger, or work his displeasure; faith, that in trouble we believe he will help, nourish, and defend us in this life, and will pardon and forgive us our sins, and for Christ’s sake preserve us to life everlasting. (TT, 135-36)

John Calvin

But though in every passage where the favour or anger of God is mentioned, the former comprehends eternity of life and the latter eternal destruction, the Law, at the same time, enumerates a long cata­logue of present blessings and curses (Lev. xxvi. 4; Deut. xxviii. 1). The threatenings attest the spotless purity of God, which cannot bear iniq­uity, while the promises attest at once his infinite love of righteousness (which he cannot leave unrewarded), and his wondrous kindness. Being bound to do him homage with all that we have, he is perfectly entitled to demand everything which he requires of us as a debt; and as a debt, the payment is unworthy of reward. He therefore foregoes his right, when he holds forth reward for services which are not offered sponta­neously, as if they were not due. (ICR, 1.8.4)

Jacob Arminius

Hatred is an affection of separation in God; whose primary object is injustice or unrighteousness; and the secondary, the misery of the crea­ture: The former is from “the love of complacency”; the latter, from “the love of friendship.” But since God properly loves himself and the good of justice, and by the same impulse holds iniquity in detestation; and since he secondarily loves the creature and his blessedness, and in that impulse hates the misery of the creature, that is, He wills it to be taken away from the creature; hence it comes to pass, that He hates the creature who perseveres in unrighteousness, and He loves his misery. (WJA, II.44)

The Post-Reformation Theologians on God’s Jealousy

Jonathan Edwards

Those who come to Christ need not be afraid of God’s wrath for their sins; for God’s honor will not suffer by their escaping punishment and being made happy. The wounded soul is sensible that he has affronted the majesty of God, and looks upon God as a vindicator of his honor; as a jealous God that will not be mocked, an infinitely great God that will not bear to be affronted, that will not suffer his authority and majesty to be trampled on, that will not bear that his kindness should be abused. (WJE, 376)

For we see that when men come to be under convictions, and to be made sensible that God is not as they have heretofore imagined, but that he is such a jealous, sin-hating God, and whose wrath against sin is so dreadful, they are much more apt to have sensible exercises of enmity against him than before. (ibid., 1021)

William G. T Shedd

There is a kind of wrath in the human soul that resembles the wrath of God, and constitutes its true analogue. It is the wrath of the human conscience, which is wholly different from that of the human heart. That kind of anger is commanded in the injunction “Be ye angry and sin not” (Eph. 4:26). Were this species of moral displacency more often considered, and the Divine anger illustrated by it, there would be less of the common and unthinking opposition to the doctrine of the Divine wrath. (DT, 176)

Stephen Charnock

God is a jealous God, very sensible of any disgrace, and will be as much incensed against an inward idolatry as an outward: that command which forbade corporeal images, would not indulge carnal imagina­tions; since the nature of God is as much wronged by unworthy images, erected in the fancy, as by statues carved out of stone or metals. (EAG, 1.198)

J. I. Packer

God’s jealousy is not a compound of frustration, envy and spite, as human jealousy so often is, but appears instead as a [literally] praisewor­thy zeal to preserve something supremely precious.

Zeal to protect a love relationship or to avenge it when broken [is a good sort of jealousy]. This jealousy also operates in the sphere of sex; there, however, it appears not as the blind reaction of wounded pride but as the fruit of marital affection. As Professor Taylor has written, mar­ried persons “who felt no jealousy at the intrusion of a lover or an adul­terer into their home would surely be lacking in moral perception; for the exclusiveness of marriage is the essence of marriage” [The Epistle of James, 106]. This sort of jealousy is a positive virtue, for it shows a grasp of the true meaning of the husband-wife relationship, together with a proper zeal to keep it intact. . . . God’s jealousy is of this kind; that is, as an aspect of his covenant love for his people. The Old Testament regards God’s covenant as his marriage with Israel, carrying with it a demand for unqualified love and loyalty.

From these passages we see plainly what God meant by telling Moses that his name was “Jealous.” He meant that he demands from those whom he has loved and redeemed utter and absolute loyalty, and he will vindicate his claim by stern action against them if they betray his love by unfaithfulness. (KG, 170-71)

AN OBJECTION TO GOD’S JEALOUSY

Objection One—Based on an Alleged Inconsistency

This objection points to an apparent inconsistency: Why is jealousy right for God but wrong for us? All other moral attributes of God we are asked to emulate: God is love, and we should be loving (1 John 4:19); God is holy, and we should be holy (Lev. 11:45). Why, then, if God is jealous, should we not also be jealous?

Response to Objection One

The answer to this objection is simple: There is no inconsistency; jeal­ousy can be right sometimes and wrong at other times. Wrong jealousy for us is about being jealous for what does not belong to us. God cannot ever be jealous of what does not belong to Him, since He owns everything. Psalm 24:1 declares: “The earth is the LORD’S, and everything in it, the world, and all who live in it.” Deuteronomy 32:21 adds, “They made me jealous by what is no god and angered me with their worthless idols. I will make them envious by those who are not a people; I will make them angry by a nation that has no understanding.”

Everything belongs to God, even the things He has entrusted to the care of others; hence, it is not right for us to be jealous about what is not ours. Jealousy, as such, is not evil; what is evil is being jealous about what is not ours. Therefore, there is no inconsistency in it being right for God to be jealous for our affection (which belongs to Him) and it being wrong for us.

Note, however, that not all jealousy is wrong for human beings—godly jealousy is right. For example, Paul’s jealousy for the church was commend­able. He wrote, “I am jealous for you with a godly jealousy. I promised you to one husband, to Christ, so that I might present you as a pure virgin to him” (2 Cor. 11:2). Likewise, there is nothing wrong with a husband having appropriate jealousy over his wife (or vice versa), since she belongs to him (cf. Num. 5:14) and he to her.

Norman Geisler, Systematic Theology: Introduction: Bible, vol. I (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House Publishers, 2002), 338-345.