When Sovereignty Becomes the Explanation for Evil

What makes this sermon particularly troubling is not simply that the pastor believes in a strong doctrine of divine sovereignty. Christians should believe that God is sovereign. The problem is the definition of sovereignty being employed. The pastor tells his congregation that God is “in charge of everything” and “controlling the universe,” but then makes the crucial assertion that any evil—no matter how dark, horrifying, or deadly—is “not merely allowed, not merely permitted, but purposed and ordained by our God.”

That is a very different claim from saying that God permits evil, restrains evil, works through evil, or sovereignly brings good out of evil. He explicitly rejects those lesser formulations and insists upon divine purpose and ordination of evil itself.

That becomes especially disturbing because of how he has already described Herod. Herod’s rage “made this happen.” His tyranny “made this happen.” He was obsessed with power, murdered his family members, murdered his own wife and son, and was described as a psychopath. The pastor wants us to see Herod’s actions as genuinely wicked and genuinely attributable to Herod.

But if the murders of Bethlehem were themselves eternally and infallibly purposed and ordained by God, then the sermon owes us an explanation of what God’s sovereignty means in relation to Herod’s wickedness. Herod certainly intended evil—but under exhaustive divine determinism, God had already determined that Herod would have that intention, would make those decisions, would perform those murders, and that those particular children would die. The creature is then condemned for carrying out what the decree made certain would occur.

This is precisely why the distinction between permission and ordination matters so much. If God permits Herod to murder, God has not thereby become the moral author of Herod’s murderous decision. God can judge Herod for an act that God permitted while simultaneously overruling that act for His own purposes. But if God specifically ordained the murderous act itself—if the event could not possibly have occurred otherwise because God eternally decreed that it occur—then the theological problem becomes considerably more serious. The question is no longer merely, “Can God use evil for good?” Of course He can. The question becomes, “Why must the evil itself be included within God’s determining decree in order for God to be sovereign?”

And the answer cannot simply be, “Because otherwise God would not be sovereign.” That assumes the very definition that needs to be demonstrated. A God who must causally determine every human decision in order to remain sovereign is not necessarily a God with a larger view of sovereignty. One could argue that it is actually a smaller view of God:

• a God who must determine every movement in order to guarantee His purposes.

A greater sovereignty is possible—the God who can permit genuine rebellion, allow creatures to act contrary to His moral desires, and still guarantee that no rebellion can ultimately frustrate His purposes. In that framework, God does not lose control when Herod sins. Herod is genuinely responsible for Herod’s evil, while God remains fully capable of accomplishing His purposes through and despite it.

This is especially important in light of the theological material being promoted within the church. You mentioned that the church sold books by John Piper that present an extremely strong view of God’s relationship to evil, and that this pastor had the men studying A. W. Pink’s The Sovereignty of God. That matters because Pink does not merely teach a generic doctrine that God is sovereign.

He explicitly argues that God decreed the Fall and that God “foreordained all its fruits and activities.” He describes God as having “foreordained all the activities of evil” and says that wicked creatures can do nothing except what God’s eternal counsel has determined. Pink even argues that saying God merely permits evil is insufficient to account for the biblical facts; he insists that God’s hand and counsel determined what wicked people would do.

So the pastor’s language in this sermon should not be treated as an isolated slip of the tongue. When someone steeped in that theological tradition tells his congregation that evil is not merely permitted but “purposed and ordained” by God, there is a very specific theological meaning available to that statement. It is the same theological trajectory in which God’s exhaustive decree encompasses not merely the existence of evil but the particular acts through which evil occurs.

That is why the statement deserves to be challenged rather than softened into the harmless proposition that “God can bring good out of bad circumstances.”

And this is where the sermon begins to undermine its own moral force. The pastor spends considerable time asking the congregation to recoil from Herod. He wants us to feel the horror of mothers having their children ripped away and executed. He wants us to recognize Herod’s rage and tyranny as the cause of the tragedy. He wants us to understand that Herod was a wicked man who killed people because he wanted power. All of that makes perfect moral sense. But then he tells us that every evil is ultimately purposed and ordained by God. If that statement is meant in the exhaustive Calvinistic sense, then Herod’s evil was not merely something God knew would happen and permitted. It was something God had eternally incorporated into His decree.

That produces an uncomfortable asymmetry. Herod cannot escape responsibility because he acted according to his own wicked desires. But God, according to the same system, determined that Herod would possess those wicked desires, determined that he would exercise them, determined the particular murders that would result, and determined that those particular children would die. The standard Calvinist answer is that God and Herod had different intentions:

• Herod intended evil, while God intended a righteous purpose.

But that distinction does not answer the deeper question. It explains why Herod’s motive was evil, but it does not explain why God had to eternally determine that the evil action occur at all.

This is where the doctrine begins to put pressure on God’s holiness. The biblical God does not need to be the determiner of sin in order to remain sovereign over sinners. James does not tell us merely that God does not personally commit sin. He gives us a categorical statement about God’s relationship to evil:

• “God cannot be tempted by evil, nor does He Himself tempt anyone.”

The concern is God’s character. God is holy. Evil is contrary to His nature. Sin is something God judges, hates, and ultimately destroys. We therefore ought to be very cautious about constructing a doctrine of sovereignty that requires us to say that every sinful action was eternally and infallibly determined by God.

There is an important distinction between saying

• “God ordained that Christ would redeem the world through the evil actions of wicked men”

and saying

• “God ordained every evil action because every evil action was part of His exhaustive decree.”

The first can be seen clearly in the biblical story of the Crucifixion: wicked men genuinely intended evil, while God brought about redemption through what they did. But once the principle is universalized to every evil act, the moral problem becomes much larger. Why stop at the Crucifixion? If every evil is equally “purposed and ordained,” then Herod’s murders, genocide, rape, torture, betrayal, child abuse, and every other horror become part of the same exhaustive decree.

And this is where some formulations of high Calvinism become particularly difficult to defend morally. Pink himself argues that God’s decree extends to “all the activities of evil.” He argues that even the evil actions of Judas and the crucifiers were decreed by God, while simultaneously maintaining that their evil intentions made them guilty. That distinction may preserve a formal doctrine of creaturely culpability, but it does not remove the question of why a holy God had to determine the evil act itself.

The other sermon you provided actually offers a better way to frame God’s greatness. It argues that Scripture presents a world filled with human actions that are “totally antithetical to the desires of a thrice holy God” while God nevertheless remains sovereign.

The point is profound:

• God’s sovereignty is not measured by how much evil He determines, but by how completely He can accomplish His purposes without having to become the determiner of evil.

The same sermon argues that God can allow billions of human volitions to occur while still bringing all things together for good and holding people responsible for the choices they make.

That presents a much more compelling picture of divine power. God does not need to micromanage every human decision to remain God. He does not need to decree Herod’s murderous rage in order to guarantee the safety of Christ. He does not need to cause every evil in order to redeem some evil. He can permit rebellion without being threatened by rebellion. He can allow creatures to genuinely resist His moral will without surrendering His ultimate purpose. He can take what Joseph’s brothers meant for evil and turn it toward good without making God the author of their hatred. He can take the greatest act of human wickedness—the murder of His Son—and turn it into the greatest act of redemption in history.

That is not a smaller sovereignty. It is arguably a far greater one.

And this is ultimately why I think your “beeps” in the sermon are important. You were not merely interrupting him to disagree with Calvinism. You were forcing the listener to remember his own words.

1. First he tells us that Herod’s rage made this happen. Herod’s tyranny made this happen.
2. Then he tells us that every evil is not merely permitted but purposed and ordained by God.

The listener needs to hold those statements together and ask whether they actually fit.

If the pastor means that God sovereignly permitted Herod’s evil, restrained its extent, and used it to accomplish His redemptive purposes, then there is no fundamental problem. But if he means what the high-Calvinist tradition he was teaching means—that God eternally and infallibly determined that Herod would perform those murders—then the sermon has a serious theological problem. It is asking the congregation to condemn as evil something that, according to its own doctrine, God first determined would necessarily occur.

And that is precisely where I would sharpen the criticism:

• the issue is not whether God is sovereign enough to overcome evil. The issue is whether we must redefine God’s sovereignty so that He becomes the determiner of every evil we subsequently condemn.

If that is what sovereignty means, then the doctrine has not magnified God’s holiness and power. It has made God’s relationship to evil unnecessarily—and dangerously—close.