See my:

• “Dead Men Don’t Grab” | The Irresistible and Effectual Call 
• Why Both Atheists and Christians Need to Believe in Free Will
• Calvinism: God Meticulously Controls Everything | even this post
• Logical Ends of TULIP (No Rebellious Creatures)

The problem begins with the salvation appeal itself. The Calvinist tells the unbeliever, “You must believe and repent,” but then explains that the unbeliever cannot believe, cannot repent, and cannot come to Christ unless God first regenerates him. The person is therefore commanded to do what, by the system’s own definition, he is incapable of doing unless God first performs a work in him. The command remains, but the ability to fulfill the command does not.

This creates a serious tension concerning responsibility. The sinner is held responsible for his unbelief, yet he is told that he cannot overcome that unbelief unless God first gives him the ability to believe. In the exchange above, Derek Murrell from Irresistible Truth initially resists the conclusion that the unbeliever’s condemnation has anything to do with what God did or did not do. Yet when pressed, he acknowledges that the person cannot repent without God, cannot believe without God’s work, and finally agrees with fundementalist Christian turned atheist, Douglas Letkeman’s conclusion:

• “every single person in hell today is in hell today… because of what God didn’t do.” His answer? “Correct.”

This is where John Hendryx’s admission becomes particularly important.

Hendryx explains that theologians use “compatibilism” to reconcile God’s sovereignty with human responsibility, but he explicitly acknowledges that “compatibilism is a form of determinism” and is “no less deterministic than hard determinism.” The Calvinist answer, therefore, is not to deny that God determines human choices, but to argue that a person can still be morally responsible for a choice that God has determined him to make. In other words, compatibilism doesn’t solve the determinism problem by denying that human choices are determined; it attempts to reconcile determinism with human responsibility by insisting that a determined choice can still be considered the person’s responsible choice.

And that is precisely where the problem arises. If God determines that one person will believe and another will remain in unbelief—and the latter cannot believe unless God first regenerates him—then what does “responsibility” actually mean? The Calvinist can say the unbeliever willingly rejects Christ, but the deeper question remains: could he have done otherwise without God first giving him the ability to do otherwise? If the answer is no, then simply calling him “responsible” does not explain how responsibility works; it merely asserts it.

John MacArthur, however, shows why that distinction raises a profound problem. He argues that if God is the primary cause and humans are merely secondary causes moved by that primary cause, then the determinism ultimately extends to the secondary cause as well. God is the one who ultimately “decided,” “compelled,” and “coerced” the action. In other words, the human being remains the immediate or secondary cause of the action, but that secondary cause itself is also determined by the primary cause. God remains the ultimate determining cause behind both the action and the secondary cause through which that action occurs.

Put these pieces together, and the tension becomes difficult to escape.

Hendryx acknowledges that compatibilism is determinism.

MacArthur highlights the problem that arises when the primary cause determines the secondary cause.

And the salvation conversation puts that problem into practical terms. The sinner is commanded to believe and repent, yet is told that he cannot believe or repent unless God first regenerates him. If God must provide that ability before the sinner can respond, and God chooses to provide it to some while passing over others, then the one who is passed over remains unable to produce the very response God requires of him.

The issue, then, is not whether Calvinism uses the word “responsibility.” It clearly does. The real question is whether calling a person responsible resolves the problem of his inability. If the sinner cannot believe, cannot repent, and cannot come to Christ unless God first acts upon him, then the decisive difference between the one who believes and the one who remains in unbelief is ultimately the prior work—or lack of work—of God. The sinner may willingly reject Christ, but according to this system, he cannot will himself out of that condition unless God first gives him the ability to do so.

And that brings us back to the most striking moment in the conversation. The conclusion is essentially this:

• if God has to do something in me in order for me not to go to hell, and He chooses not to do it, what could I possibly do about it?

When that implication is put directly to Derek Murrell, his answer is simply: “Correct.” At that point, the question is no longer whether man is called responsible. The question is whether the decisive difference between salvation and condemnation ultimately rests in the sinner’s response—or in God’s sovereign determination to give or withhold the ability to respond.

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GOSPEL COALITION article summary

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One-Paragraph Summary

SUMMARY OF THE GOSPEL COALITION ARTICLE: “THE DOCTRINE OF REPROBATION”

The article is a defense of the Augustinian/Reformed doctrine of reprobation, which teaches that God’s eternal decree concerns not only those whom He chooses to save, but also those whom He does not choose to save. In the author’s formulation, reprobation involves God eternally withholding saving grace from certain individuals and determining to judge them according to divine justice. The author therefore understands reprobation as more than God’s foreknowledge that certain people will reject Him; their exclusion from saving grace and ultimate condemnation fall within God’s sovereign eternal decree.

The article develops this position in three primary ways.

Scripture Teaches Reprobation

The author argues that Scripture directly supports reprobation, with Pharaoh and Romans 9 serving as the principal examples. In the Exodus account, the author rejects the interpretation that God hardened Pharaoh merely as a response to Pharaoh’s prior self-hardening. Instead, the article argues that God announced beforehand that He would harden Pharaoh and raised him up for the purpose of displaying His power and glory.

Romans 9 is presented as the clearest New Testament explanation of this principle. The author interprets Paul’s discussion of the “vessels of mercy” and “vessels of wrath” as teaching that God sovereignly distinguishes between individuals, preparing some for mercy and enduring others who are prepared for destruction. The purpose is ultimately God’s glory: His mercy and grace are displayed toward the elect while His wrath and power are displayed toward those destined for destruction.

Reprobation Logically Follows From Unconditional Election

This is one of the article’s most important arguments.

If salvation depends upon God’s unconditional choice of particular individuals, and God does not choose everyone, then there must necessarily be individuals whom God does not choose for salvation.

The author therefore argues that unconditional election necessarily entails reprobation. Simply calling the position “single predestination”—God predestines some to salvation but does not predestine anyone to condemnation—does not resolve the problem. According to the article, such a view leaves the destiny of the non-elect outside God’s purposeful decree, which the author considers inconsistent with God’s comprehensive sovereignty.

The argument is therefore:

Unconditional election → some are chosen → others are not chosen →
their exclusion from saving grace falls within God’s sovereign decree.

God’s sovereignty extends over salvation and human choices

The article’s argument does not stop with election. It presents God’s sovereignty as extending over everything that comes to pass, including human choices. Consequently, the distinction between those who believe and those who reject Christ ultimately falls under God’s sovereign will.

The doctrine is also presented as spiritually beneficial because it humbles humanity. Rather than viewing humanity as the ultimate reference point, believers are reminded that human beings exist for God’s glory and that God’s purposes, rather than human preferences, determine reality.

The Two Aspects of Reprobation

The article makes an important distinction between two aspects of reprobation:

Preterition — the negative aspect:
God eternally chooses not to extend saving grace to particular individuals. The article says this decision is not based on foreseen works, merit, or sin, but on God’s sovereign will.

Predamnation — the positive aspect:
God eternally determines to deal with those individuals according to divine justice. Reformed theologians disagree over whether this decree itself is conditioned upon foreseen or actual sin, but the article maintains that the ultimate condemnation of these individuals is included within God’s sovereign purpose.

The article goes further and states that the Augustinian/Reformed tradition agrees that God predestines certain individuals to be justly punished, and that at least some aspect of this reprobation is not based on foreseen sin but on God’s good pleasure, with the purpose of magnifying His justice and grace.

Is This Double Predestination?

In substance, yes. The article is defending a form of double predestination, although it insists that election and reprobation are not perfectly symmetrical. The distinction can be summarized this way:

The author specifically identifies the “asymmetry between election and reprobation” as an important qualification within Reformed theology. Thus, the article is not merely saying that God permits some people to reject Him. Its position is substantially stronger:

• God’s eternal decree establishes both who will receive saving grace and who will be passed over, with the non-elect ultimately being condemned according to divine justice.

And the author’s fundamental argument is that this conclusion follows from the combination of unconditional election, God’s exhaustive sovereignty, and the author’s interpretation of passages such as Pharaoh and Romans 9.