Some “Tempering” of Michelle Malkin’s Book Defending Internment

Michelle Malkin’s book In Defense of Internment had quite a few narratives and stories I had never considered or heard. Some good WWII history. Of course there were detractors of it, so here are the main articles responding to the critiques. Here is a quick catch up to her not being on the political scene for years:

Michelle Malkin largely ended her three-decade career as a nationally syndicated political columnist in October 2022, publishing a farewell column titled “-30-: An Ending, but Not the End.” She cited changes in the media environment, corporate influence, censorship, and conflicts within both the political left and right as reasons for stepping away.

Rather than retiring completely, Malkin began a new chapter. She enrolled in paralegal studies at Pikes Peak State College in Colorado Springs and shifted her attention toward criminal justice advocacy, particularly cases she believes involve wrongful convictions.

One of her primary causes has been the case of former Oklahoma City police officer Daniel Holtzclaw, convicted in 2015 of multiple sexual offenses. Malkin has publicly challenged the conviction and investigated alleged problems with the evidence and prosecution.

By late 2025 and into 2026, she began reemerging through independent media, launching Corruptahoma: Unlock the Truth, a podcast and investigative project examining alleged misconduct, questionable forensic evidence, prosecutorial practices, and wrongful convictions in Oklahoma.

In essence: Malkin hasn’t abandoned investigative commentary; she has changed its focus. After stepping away from mainstream political punditry, she redirected her career toward criminal justice investigations and wrongful-conviction advocacy, building a new independent-media platform around that work.

As an aside, having followed Michelle’s ventures for years in the early conservative media world — founding one of my still favorite conservative news sites: HOT AIR — after her cousin [goddaughter] was “disappeared,” I think kidnapped into the sex slavery world never to be seen again, Michelle lost heart for it all. Moved to concentrate on a differing path for a career and spent more time with hubby and kids.

Here is here response as well as others, merely summarized and linked. There are quite a few reviews at AMAZON.

Michelle Malkin’s Defense of Internment:
Reexamining the Evidence and the Historical Debate

Michelle Malkin’s In Defense of Internment: The Case for Racial Profiling in World War II and the War on Terror (2004) challenged the prevailing historical narrative surrounding the wartime removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II. Her central argument was that the government’s actions should be examined within the context of the national security threats, intelligence assessments, and extraordinary circumstances facing the United States following the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Malkin’s argument rests partly on intelligence information that she believes has received insufficient attention in conventional accounts of the controversy, particularly the MAGIC intercepts. These intercepted Japanese diplomatic communications documented Japanese efforts to gather intelligence within the United States. Malkin argues that this material demonstrates that American security concerns were not entirely imaginary or fabricated after the fact, and that historical assessments should take seriously what government officials knew or reasonably believed during wartime.

She also challenges the tendency to evaluate wartime decisions exclusively through the benefit of hindsight. Following Pearl Harbor, the United States faced an actual military conflict with Japan, fears of sabotage, intelligence-gathering operations, and uncertainty about the extent of enemy activity on American soil. Malkin maintains that these circumstances deserve consideration when evaluating the decisions made by military and political authorities.

Her critics, particularly historians Greg Robinson and legal scholar Eric Muller, dispute whether the MAGIC intercepts substantiate the broader conclusions Malkin draws from them. They argue that evidence of Japanese intelligence operations does not establish widespread espionage among Japanese Americans, nor does it demonstrate that the intelligence directly motivated the mass removal program. They further contend that the government failed to establish individualized grounds for treating an entire population as a security threat.

Malkin has responded to these criticisms by defending her interpretation of the intelligence record and challenging the completeness of the historical examination undertaken by her opponents. She argues that important evidence and wartime considerations have been marginalized in discussions of Japanese American incarceration.

Importantly, the debate should distinguish between several separate questions:

  1. Did Imperial Japan conduct intelligence operations in the United States? Yes, historical records document Japanese intelligence-gathering efforts.
  2. Did American officials have legitimate national security concerns following Pearl Harbor? Clearly, the United States faced genuine wartime threats.
  3. Did the available intelligence establish that Japanese Americans collectively posed a security threat? That is a substantially different and contested question.
  4. Did the evidence justify the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans, including American citizens? This remains the central historical, constitutional, and moral controversy.

A useful contribution to this discussion is Charles Lofgren’s review, “Hardships of War,” published in the Claremont Review of Books. Lofgren recognizes aspects of Malkin’s historical argument while also examining weaknesses in her interpretation. His review illustrates why the discussion should not be reduced to simply accepting or dismissing Malkin’s book.

The broader significance of Malkin’s work is its challenge to readers to examine primary historical evidence, intelligence records, government decisions, and the competing interpretations of historians. Whether one ultimately accepts her conclusions or not, the underlying questions about wartime security, government authority, individual liberty, and constitutional protections deserve careful examination.

The issue is not whether America faced a genuine threat in 1941. It did. The historical question is how that threat was assessed, what the government actually knew, and whether the resulting policies were justified by the evidence available at the time.

Hardships of War:
A Critical Examination of Michelle Malkin’s
Defense of Japanese American Internment

Author: Charles A. Lofgren
Publication: Claremont Review of Books
Subject: A historical examination of Michelle Malkin’s In Defense of Internment: The Case for Racial Profiling in World War II and the War on Terror (2004).

Introduction

In his review, “Hardships of War,” historian Charles A. Lofgren examines Michelle Malkin’s controversial defense of the government’s World War II removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans. Malkin’s book challenges the prevailing historical interpretation that the policy was primarily the product of racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and political opportunism.

Lofgren approaches Malkin’s argument with a degree of nuance. Rather than dismissing her work outright, he acknowledges that she raises legitimate historical questions concerning Japanese intelligence operations, American military concerns, and the intelligence information available during the war. However, he also identifies weaknesses in her interpretation of the evidence and questions whether the intelligence material establishes the necessity of mass removal.

His review is particularly valuable because it engages the historical evidence rather than treating the controversy as a simple choice between national security and civil liberties.

1. Japanese Espionage and American Security Concerns

One important component of Malkin’s argument is her use of the MAGIC intercepts: decoded Japanese diplomatic communications that documented Japanese intelligence-gathering efforts within the United States.

These communications reveal that Japanese officials were attempting to obtain information about American military installations, shipping, industrial production, and other strategic matters.

Lofgren does not dismiss the existence of Japanese espionage. He acknowledges that intelligence-gathering operations were real and that American officials had legitimate reasons to be concerned following the attack on Pearl Harbor.

There were also documented Japanese military operations along the American coastline, including submarine attacks and shelling incidents. These circumstances provide important context for understanding the atmosphere of uncertainty and fear confronting American military authorities in 1941 and 1942.

However, the existence of Japanese espionage does not automatically establish that Japanese Americans collectively represented a security threat. That distinction becomes central to Lofgren’s criticism.

2. The MAGIC Intercepts: What Did the Intelligence Actually Establish?

The MAGIC intercepts are among the most important pieces of evidence in Malkin’s defense.

They document Japanese efforts to develop intelligence sources and obtain sensitive information within the United States. Malkin argues that this material has been insufficiently considered in conventional accounts of the internment controversy.

Lofgren acknowledges the significance of the intercepts but questions whether Malkin draws conclusions from them that extend beyond what the documents actually demonstrate.

In particular, evidence that Japanese intelligence personnel were seeking information does not necessarily establish widespread espionage among Japanese Americans or prove that the Japanese American population as a whole was involved in such activities.

The distinction is important: documenting an intelligence threat is not the same as demonstrating that an entire ancestry group posed that threat.

3. The Timing of Military Decisions

Lofgren also examines the chronology of events surrounding the government’s decision to remove Japanese Americans from the West Coast.

Some of the incidents Malkin discusses occurred after the critical decisions concerning mass removal had already been made.

For example, the Japanese submarine shelling near Santa Barbara occurred on February 23, 1942, after President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942.

Lofgren argues that subsequent events cannot automatically be used to justify decisions that preceded them.

This raises an important historical question: What information was actually available to military and political decision-makers when they formulated and implemented the removal policy?

A proper assessment must distinguish between intelligence available at the time and evidence that emerged afterward.

4. The Role of Military and Political Leadership

Lofgren further examines the changing positions of military and civilian officials, including General John L. DeWitt, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy.

He considers the influence of military assessments, political pressure, and demands from West Coast representatives who advocated removing people of Japanese ancestry from strategically sensitive areas.

Lofgren questions whether Malkin adequately examines the extent to which political considerations influenced the government’s decision.

This is particularly relevant because the historical debate concerns not simply whether security concerns existed, but how those concerns were translated into government policy.

Were the decisions based primarily on demonstrated military necessity, intelligence assessments, political pressure, or a combination of these factors?

That question deserves careful examination.

5. The Distinction Between Internment and Mass Removal

Another important historical distinction concerns the terminology used to describe the government’s wartime policies.

Technically, internment generally referred to the detention of enemy aliens under wartime authority. The broader West Coast removal program, however, involved the forced relocation and incarceration of Japanese Americans, including American citizens who had not been individually charged with espionage or sabotage.

The two policies should not be confused.

Malkin challenges some of the comparisons made between the American relocation centers and other forms of wartime imprisonment. Lofgren recognizes the importance of distinguishing the American facilities from Nazi extermination camps, while also questioning aspects of Malkin’s treatment of the Supreme Court’s decision in Korematsu v. United States.

The fact that the relocation centers were not extermination camps does not, by itself, resolve the constitutional or moral questions surrounding the government’s actions.

6. Lofgren’s Overall Assessment

Lofgren’s assessment is neither an unqualified endorsement nor a wholesale rejection of Malkin’s book.

He recognizes that Malkin brings attention to intelligence evidence and wartime circumstances that deserve consideration. He acknowledges the existence of Japanese espionage and the genuine security concerns confronting American officials.

Nevertheless, he believes Malkin does not sufficiently establish the connection between the intelligence evidence and the government’s decision to undertake indiscriminate mass removal.

His principal objections concern the interpretation of the MAGIC intercepts, the chronology of events, the influence of political considerations, and the extent to which the available evidence justified the policy adopted.

Lofgren’s review therefore provides a useful independent examination of Malkin’s historical argument, while identifying questions that her defenders must address.

Conclusion: The Historical Questions Remain Important

The debate surrounding Michelle Malkin’s In Defense of Internment raises questions that extend beyond the events of World War II.

The United States faced a genuine military threat following Pearl Harbor. Japanese intelligence operations existed, and American officials had legitimate responsibilities to protect military installations, shipping, and the civilian population.

However, recognizing those realities does not automatically establish that the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans was justified.

The central historical questions remain:

  • What did American intelligence actually know about Japanese espionage operations?
  • Which officials received and relied upon the MAGIC intercepts?
  • Did the available intelligence establish a threat among Japanese Americans collectively?
  • How much did military assessments, political pressure, and racial prejudice contribute to the removal decision?
  • Could individualized investigations and security measures have addressed the actual threats without imposing collective restrictions?

Lofgren’s review is valuable because it acknowledges the evidence that makes Malkin’s argument worthy of examination while identifying the weaknesses that prevent her conclusions from being accepted without further scrutiny.

Historical analysis should neither dismiss inconvenient evidence nor stretch that evidence beyond what it establishes. The existence of a national security threat and the justification for a particular government response are two separate questions. Both deserve examination.

 

Japanese Internment ~ Regrettable But Complex

This post shed light on an all too simplistic tactic of left-leaning thinking and the internment of many innocent Japanese. Remember, this is NOT a post defending this historical failure of the U.S., but it merely sheds some light on the type of manure created today that causes misplaced activism in our youth.

Part of the problem with the left is that they try to equate our current problem with a low-number of 100-million people in the world that would like to kill and support those that kill Westerners for being nothing more than Kaffir with internment of an innocent population of people in the U.S. — the Japanese American. That being said, another thing I cannot stand about the left is that they do not understand the complexities of decisions in hard times.

They look back and simply say,

  • “I wouldn’t have made that choice.”

They have no idea the choice they would make given the intel of the day in question. Thomas Sowell likens this thinking to Stage One Thinking. So, even though every leading Democrat believed Saddam Hussein had WMDs, and every intelligence agency worth their weight in gold said he had them… Bush still lied, knowingly, in order to steal oil that we never ended up getting.

It’s childish thinking at best, at worst it is destructive to the fabric of our complicated Union. Like the complete-and-total-myth that the Iraq war was over oil. This type thinking and simplifying of complex decisions is dangerouse to the fabric of our nation and since the Iraq war we have gotten extremists movements like Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter, and others.

(Many actions taken during this time are regrettable)

Here is the excerpt from Michelle Malkin’s book, In Defense of Internment: The Case for Racial Profiling in World War II and the War on Terror:

…The Japanese quickly staved off the formation. During the air battle, Nishikaichi shot down one enemy plane, but his aircraft took several hits. One punctured the Zero’s gas tank. Nishikaichi steered the crippled plane toward the westernmost Hawaiian island: Niihau. The 19-mile-long tract was privately owned by the Robinsons, a Scottish ranching family. Fewer than two hundred residents, mostly native Hawaiians plus three laborers of Japanese descent and their families, called Niihau home. Nishikaichi’s superiors had mistakenly informed him that the land was uninhabited. In case of emergency, the Japanese planned to use the island as a submarine pickup point for stranded pilots.

Nishikaichi crash-landed the plane in a field near one of the ranch homes. The first to reach him was Hawila “Howard” Kaleohano, a burly native Hawaiian employed by the Robinson family. The island had no telephones. On that tranquil, late Sunday morning, with church services just letting out, none of the inhabitants was yet aware of the death and destruction that had just rained down on Pearl Harbor.

Nonetheless, Kaleohano wisely confiscated the dazed Nishikaichi’s gun and papers. Kaleohano, perhaps the most educated native Hawaiian on Niihau, had been keeping tabs on world affairs through newspapers supplied by ranch owner Aylmer Robinson (who paid weekly visits to the island and lived twenty miles away on Kauai). Wary but warm, Kaleohano brought the enemy pilot to his home. Along the way, Nishikaichi asked Kaleohano if he was “a Japanese.” The answer was an emphatic, “No.”

“The question was a gambit in what was to become a search for a confederate,” wrote Allan Beekman, a Hawaii-based historian who published the definitive account of the Niihau incident. Nishikaichi would find a yes-man soon enough.

After sharing a meal and cigarettes, Nishikaichi demanded that Kaleohano return his papers, which included maps, radio codes, and Pearl Harbor attack plans. Kaleohano refused. To make their communication easier, Kaleohano asked his neighbors to summon one of the island’s three residents of Japanese descent to translate for Nishikaichi. They first brought a Japanese-born resident and laborer, Ishimatsu Shintani, to the house. He reluctantly exchanged a few words with the pilot in Japanese, but the spooked Shintani left in a hurry—apparently sensing trouble and wanting nothing to do with his compatriot in name only.

The islanders then turned to Yoshio Harada and his wife Irene, both U.S. citizens, born in Hawaii to Japanese immigrants. Harada had moved from Kauai to California as a young man and lived there for seven years before relocating to Niihau with his wife in 1939. The hardworking and unassuming parents of three ran the Robinson ranch’s company store. Nishikaichi was cheered by the Haradas’ presence. “Oh, you’re a Japanese!” the enemy fighter pilot exclaimed when Yoshio Harada addressed him in their native tongue. Instantly at ease with the Nisei couple, Nishikaichi dropped the bombshell news about the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Haradas did not inform their neighbors.

That night, the hospitable Niihau residents—still in the dark about the atrocity at Oahu—treated Nishikaichi to a festive luau. They roasted a pig and swapped songs. Silently, Nishikaichi despaired. He had lost hope that he would be rescued.

Later that night, the islanders apparently learned about the Pearl Harbor attack on the radio. They decided to confine the pilot in the Haradas’ home until help arrived.

Exploiting their common ethnic ties and urging loyalty to the emperor, Nishikaichi won over the Haradas. They enlisted the other resident of Japanese descent—the skittish Shintani—in a conspiracy to retrieve Nishikaichi’s papers from Kaleohano. On the afternoon of December 12, a reluctant Shintani visited Kaleohano and asked for the enemy pilot’s papers. He offered his neighbor a wad of cash. Kaleohano refused. Shintani desperately told him to burn the papers. It was a matter of life and death, Shintani pleaded with Kaleohano. Japan made him do this, Shintani insisted. Kaleohano again refused.

An hour later, Nishikaichi and the Haradas launched a campaign of terror against the islanders. They overtook the guard on duty and locked him in a warehouse. Mrs. Harada cranked up a phonograph to drown out the commotion. Yoshio Harada and Nishikaichi retrieved a shotgun from the warehouse and headed to Kaleohano’s home. Kaleohano, who was in the outhouse, saw them coming and hid while Nishikaichi and his collaborators unsuccessfully searched for the pilot’s papers. They recovered Nishikaichi’s pistol and headed toward his grounded plane. Harada watched as the enemy pilot tried in vain to call for help on his radio.

Meanwhile, Kaleohano fled from the outhouse and ran to the main village to warn his neighbors of Nishikaichi’s escape. He returned to his house to retrieve the papers, hid them in a relative’s home, and set out with a strong team of islanders in a lifeboat toward Kauai to get help. They rowed for fourteen hours before reaching shore, where they informed their boss, Aylmer Robinson, and military officials of the intruder Nishikaichi and the treachery of the Haradas. That night, Harada and Nishikaichi set both the plane and Kaleohano’s home on fire. They fired off their guns in a lunatic rage and threatened to kill every man, woman, and child in the village. After gathering for a prayer meeting, many residents escaped to a mountaintop with kerosene lamps and reflectors in an attempt to signal Kauai. Others weren’t so fortunate.

On the morning of December 13, Harada and Nishikaichi captured islander Ben Kanahele and his wife. It was a fateful choice that Harada and Nishikaichi would live to regret. Kanahele was ordered to find Kaleohano. In their own “Let’s Roll” moment of heroism, the gutsy Kanaheles refused to cooperate. When Nishikaichi threatened to shoot Kanahele’s wife, fifty-one-year-old Ben lunged for the enemy’s shotgun. The young Japanese fighter pilot pulled his pistol from his boot and shot Kanahele three times in the chest, hip, and groin. Mrs. Kanahele pounced at Nishikaichi; her once-peaceful neighbor Harada tore her away.

Angered, the wounded Kanahele summoned the strength to pick up Nishikaichi and hurl him against a stone wall, knocking him unconscious. Quick-thinking Mrs. Kanahele grabbed a rock and pummeled the pilot’s head. For good measure, Ben Kanahele took out a hunting knife and slit Nishikaichi’s throat, ensuring his death. A desperate Harada turned the shotgun on himself and committed suicide.

The Kanaheles’ harrowing battle against a Japanese invader and his surprising collaborator was over.

On Sunday afternoon, an army expedition party arrived with Kaleohano at the village and took Shintani and Mrs. Harada into custody. The next evening, the rest of Hawaii finally got wind of the nightmare on Niihau. Radio station KTOH in Kauai broadcast a news bulletin on the ordeal. The Honolulu Star Bulletin published a follow-up account the next day. Shintani was sent to an internment camp and later returned to Niihau; he became a U.S.

citizen in 1960. Irene Harada was imprisoned for nearly three years in Honouliuli. In 1945, after she was released, she asked for permission to bring the bodies of both Harada and Nishikaichi to Kauai for a funeral. Mrs. Harada was never charged with treason or any other crime.

Forgotten in today’s history books, the bravery of Howard Kaleohano and Ben Kanahele was justly rewarded at the time. Kanahele received the Purple Heart and Medal of Merit; Kaleohano received the Medal of Freedom and an $800 award from the army to pay for belongings that had been damaged or destroyed in the fire set to his home by Nishikaichi and Harada.

The significance of the Haradas’ stunning act of disloyalty and Shintani’s meek complicity in collaboration with Nishikaichi was not lost on the Roosevelt administration. “The fact that the two [sic] Niihau [ethnic] Japanese who had previously shown no anti-American tendencies went to the aid of the pilot when Japan domination of the island seemed possible, indicates likelihood that Japanese residents previously believed loyal to the United States may aid Japan if further Japanese attacks appear successful,” noted Captain Irving Mayfield, then district intelligence officer for the Fourteenth Naval District, after a naval intelligence investigation on the Niihau takeover in January 1942. Lieutenant C. B. Baldwin was more emphatic. The facts of the case “indicate a strong possibility that other Japanese residents of the Territory of Hawaii, and Americans of Japanese descent . . . may give valuable aid to Japanese invaders in cases where the tide of battle is in favor of Japan and where it appears to residents that control of the district may shift from the United States to Japan,” he said.

Unbeknownst to Mayfield and Baldwin, at least one high-ranking Japanese naval intelligence officer apparently concurred. In November 1941, less than one month before the Pearl Harbor attack, Lieutenant Commander Suguru Suzuki met with Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s chief of staff, Matome Ugaki, to discuss conditions in Hawaii. If Japan were to invade Hawaii, Suzuki informed Ugaki, local ethnic Japanese probably would cooperate with the occupying forces.

The Haradas were neither radical nationalists nor professional spies. They were ordinary Japanese Americans who betrayed America by putting their ethnic roots first. How many other ethnic Japanese—especially on the vulnerable West Coast—might be swayed by enemy appeals such as Nishikaichi’s? How many more might be torn between allegiance for their country of birth and kinship with Imperial invaders? These were the daunting questions that faced the nation’s top military and political leaders as enemy forces loomed on our shores.