The below was inspired via MemEvangelist’s posting of a graphic.

John Piper is—according to Charles Ryrie, Chuck Smith, and J. Vernon McGee—teaching what these critics regard as heresy, much as they have argued regarding John MacArthur’s teaching on Lordship Salvation. But even within the Reformed camp, Piper’s teaching on “final salvation through works” raises important questions about the relationship between faith, works, and salvation.

Like Dorothy following the yellow brick road to the Emerald City, the Calvinist is told to look for evidence that he is truly one of the elect. But the road seems to lead to a growing list of unconditions—signs of genuine faith, surrender, behavioral transformation, and lifelong perseverance. If salvation is a free gift received through faith alone, when does the evidence of salvation become a condition for obtaining or retaining it? And if final salvation requires not merely faith but a life of persevering obedience, has the yellow brick road quietly changed its destination from faith alone to faith plus works?

The question is not whether good works matter, but whether they remain the fruit of salvation or become part of the conditions for finally reaching the Emerald City.

Bad Theology Leads To Bad Faith.

But if faith is irresistibly produced by God through Unconditional Election and Irresistible Grace, can the Reformed tradition adequately account for unhealthy faith, distorted theology, and false assurance? Is the very premise of faith plus works an unhealthy one, or does the deeper problem concern how faith and works function within the doctrine of salvation?

Even Piper’s—and, as a fellow Reformed theologian, R. Scott Clark’s—starting premise deserves scrutiny. The question is not merely whether good works are necessary evidence of genuine faith. The more difficult question is whether works become instrumental in final salvation, creating a two-stage model in which a person is initially justified by grace alone through faith alone, but finally saved through works.

Is the premise of faith + works unhealthy?

Even Piper’s [and as Reformed, Mr. Clarks] starting premise is not without problems.

Is faith a genuine human response to God’s gracious provision and the gospel—or is it the inevitable result of God unilaterally determining and producing a person’s response through the irresistible regeneration of the elect?

Does Regeneration Precede Faith?

Over at ANSWERING CALVINISM we read this:

Scripture repeatedly connects believing with receiving life and salvation. John 1:12–13 speaks of receiving Christ and becoming children of God; Ephesians 2:8 describes salvation through faith; and Acts 16:31 commands the hearers to believe in the Lord Jesus. The debate is not whether salvation depends on grace, but whether grace must first regenerate particular individuals irresistibly before they can believe.

This leads to another question. If regeneration places a person in Christ, and Romans 8:1 declares that there is no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus, what is the person’s spiritual status before exercising faith? Has the person already received the saving benefits associated with union with Christ, or does faith mark the point at which those benefits are received? Regeneration, union with Christ, justification, and forgiveness are related doctrines, but they are not automatically interchangeable. The claim that regeneration logically precedes faith does not, by itself, prove that justification and forgiveness are complete before faith.

If the person is already in Christ, why is faith still necessary for salvation?

Another issue with the Reformed Determinist position is that “unhealthy faith” is impossible in this view.

Does Exhaustive Divine Determinism Allow for Unhealthy Faith?

The problem extends beyond the order of salvation to the relationship between divine sovereignty and human responsibility.

If God unconditionally decrees and ordains all things—including every thought, desire, belief, and decision—then what about unhealthy faith? If someone embraces a distorted understanding of God, the gospel, or salvation, does that belief also fall within the divine decree? And if God irresistibly determines the faith of the elect, why should saving faith be treated as the inevitable product of divine determination while theological error and false assurance are attributed merely to human failure?

The question is unavoidable:

If God ordains the outcome, in what meaningful sense could a person’s unhealthy faith have turned out differently?

If God ordains both the belief and its consequences, how does this framework distinguish between a belief God sovereignly determines and a belief for which the individual is held responsible?

Calvinists may respond that God ordains events through secondary causes, that people act willingly according to their own desires, and that divine sovereignty does not make God the author of sin. But this response raises a further question:

if God determines the desires and choices through which people act, in what sense are they the ultimate source of those choices?

And if God determines the choices through which evil occurs, how can the problem of ultimate responsibility be dismissed simply by labeling human beings “secondary causes”? As Piper attests to:

The Problem of “Maximal Aversion”

One member of the Society of Evangelical Arminians describes what he sees as a recurring problem in Calvinist reasoning:

“Calvinism is a system built on what I call ‘maximal aversion.’ Basically, Calvinists define their theological acuity by what they are not: non-Pelagians, non-16th century Catholics, and non-Arminians.”

The writer argues that Calvinists can become so determined to exclude any possibility of human contribution to salvation that they struggle to account for the biblical connection between receiving God’s grace and responding through faith and repentance. In his view, regeneration is sometimes placed before faith to preserve a system in which no human response can be understood as a genuine condition for receiving salvation. He summarizes his criticism this way:

“Any exegetical or theological inconsistency can be justified as long as it serves the greater good of the maximal aversion to human-initiated contingencies.”

That is the critic’s assessment, not a description that every Calvinist would accept. Reformed theologians generally argue that faith is not a meritorious work and that a person’s willing response is itself the result of divine grace. Nevertheless, the criticism raises a question worth examining:

• does the desire to exclude works-based salvation sometimes predetermine how passages about faith, repentance, regeneration, and human responsibility are interpreted?

For further discussion, see Examining Calvinism: Born Again and Examining Calvinism: Charge of Paradox.

The Central Question

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The issue is not whether salvation depends on God’s grace. The issue is whether that grace must irresistibly regenerate the elect before they can believe—and whether this account adequately explains the biblical commands to repent and believe, the relationship between faith and new birth, and human responsibility for belief and unbelief.

If faith is possible only after God has irresistibly regenerated the elect, what role does the gospel invitation play in the individual’s response? If God determines the desires and choices through which a person believes, how is that response genuinely human? And if every belief falls within God’s sovereign decree, how should we understand unhealthy faith, false assurance, and theological error?

Is faith a genuine human response to God’s gracious provision and the gospel—or is it the inevitable result of God unilaterally determining and producing a person’s response through the irresistible regeneration of the elect?